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 3 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Introduction of the Topic. 
When we arrived at Makumira Theological College outside Arusha on our black and red 
motorbikes, wearing leather jackets, leather boots, helmets and sunglasses, we drove around the 
campus area in search for our contact person. We stopped, but no one was in sight. Suddenly a 
student came running out of one of the buildings towards us and asked with a voice as serious 
and hostile as if we had interrupted a funeral: “Who are you, and what are you doing here?” 
Surprised, but in a humble voice I explained who we were and the purpose of our visit. At once 
the student’s face melted into a grin and he started excusing himself: “I am very sorry that I was 
so rude to you, I hope you will forgive me, but we are afraid of Muslims who are trying to 
undermine our college.” 
 
As the above referred story indicates, the relationship between Christians and Muslims on the 
coast of East Africa is somewhat tense. Tanzania which previously was known for being the 
“successful” African experiment, with its unity both religiously and politically, is facing harder 
times. The unity which the country achieved was through the creation of an “African socialism,” 
the so-called ujamaa philosophy, created to a large extent by the now legendary African 
President Julius K. Nyerere. His aim was to melt African tradition and Western socialism 
together and show that the principles of the old African traditions, the tribes taking care of one 
another, was the same as the basic thoughts of Western socialism. The ujamaa politics was 
officially left by the government in 1983, and Nyerere retired from presidency in 1985. An era in 
African politics was over, and commentators all over the world wondered what would now 
happen to Tanzania.  
 The religious conflicts in the country started to become visible around this time. Tension 
was experienced in the streets of Dar es Salaam where religious debates with an increasing 
temperature emerged. The following decade turned out to be one of increased hostility between 
the two religious groups, with several actions carried out by religious extremists that caused 
concern all over the country. The question that commentators who have followed the situation 
ask is this: what caused the changes in the Christian-Muslim relationship in Tanzania?  
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Personal Interest 
Anyone who has visited Africa and has experienced the vitality of the African way of life knows 
how hard it is to leave the continent. Some of us also experience the longing to go back as a 
driving force always searching for possibilities to return to this fascinating continent. This world 
of smells and tastes, colourful apparition and hospitable inhabitants. Africa, with its deserts, 
savannas, wildlife and rainforests has created dreams and illusions among many Westerners like 
myself and has fooled us into a lasting relationship to what we thought was a part of paradise. 
 Anyone who has studied history and the topic of Western colonialism, has felt the need to 
shed a tear and ask for redemption when the destiny of Africa has been described. The way we 
have made the continent the playground of our dreams and the garbage can of our conflicts of 
interest is sad reading. 
 Anyone with interest in religious matters, and anyone pre-occupied with the thought of 
theology as a universal matter has had to re-evaluate his thoughts after experiencing the 
influence of religion in Africa. Especially Westerners who face the problems of secularism and 
the ignorance of transcendent matters  every day, suffers a small shock when arriving in Africa. 
There, on the other side of the world, people do not laugh at you because you believe in a god 
which you can not see, on the contrary, they laugh at you if you do not believe in a spiritual 
reality. 
 
A mixture of these feelings has been a part of me during my time as a student and has also 
resulted in three visits to different parts of Africa. The writing of this thesis gave me the 
opportunity to combine my interests, and to focus on the history and the religion of one particular 
area of Africa. The choice to focus on Islam and Christianity was partly a result of my interest in 
Western mission in Africa, for which Islam has turned out to be the major challenge. The 
worldwide Islamic resurgence, with all the prejudices and misinformation that are spread through 
the mass-media, also made me circle around such a problem. But most of all my interest for 
Islam was created through my work as a teacher at Hersleb School in Oslo where I was 
responsible for a class of only Muslim pupils. The conflicts that arise when two different 
religions meet and have to live togeteher, is a situation that I experienced on one level during my 
work at the school, and on another level during my field studies in Kenya and Tanzania in the 
fall of 1994. 
 What is interesting about Tanzania is first of all that it is a country where Islam and 
Christianity are represented with almost an equal number of followers. It is also a country which 
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is known to have had a very peaceful inter-religious climate. The religious conflict is quite new 
in time, and has so far not been as violent as the conflicts in Sudan and Nigeria. The fact that the 
religious antagonism is at an early stage makes it easier to trace the reasons behind the emerging 
clash of interests. It also gives the hope that a more serious conflict can be avoided. Furthermore, 
the East African coast has a very interesting geographical location, sharing the Indian Ocean with 
the Middle East and the Indian continent. This makes the area a melting pot of traditions from 
both the African, the Arab and the Indian world. 
 
Object and Scope 
In order to reach a deeper understanding of the religious relationship in Tanzania, several 
questions have to be answered.When I realized that the problems emerging were of a serious 
character and that the religious communities were facing changes, a strong longing for 
understanding struck me. The questions that I sought to answer were as follows:  
  
 - Which incidents have disturbed the religious relations the last decade? 
 - What has happened within the Muslim and Christian communities that 
     has led to the change? 
 - Which domestic political changes have led to the change? 
 - What influence from other countries has led to the change?  
 
My first task will be to give a presentation of the incidents that have taken place the last decade. 
The second question aims at showing the changes that have occured both within the Christian 
and the Muslim communities. The impression that I got early in my work was that the biggest 
change of attitude had appeared within the Muslim community. The presentation of the Muslims 
is aimed at understanding why a change has appeared among them by looking at their history 
and the new elements that have influenced the religious society. The new radical elements will 
dominate my presentation even if it has been crucial to me to show that the Muslim community 
contains a wide spectrum of directions. I have also tried to find common thoughts that have 
affected both the moderate and the radical groups, hence are the joint concern of the whole 
Muslim community. 
  The presentation of the Christian community is limited to deal with the new tendencies in 
the churches. The traditional views of the Catholic, the Lutheran and the Anglican churches will 
not be commented upon unless they have affected the relationship to the Muslims. I, however, 
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found the growth of the Pentecostal churches, with their influence on both the established 
churches and on the Christian-Muslim relationship, very interesting, and have tried to give it a 
deeper examination. 
 The third question focuses on the changing political landscape in Tanzania as a reason 
behind the religious conflict. Several scholars have emphasized the importance of the domestic 
political changes, and a presentation of three scholars holding this view, though with different 
perspectives, will be given. The fourth question deals with the Islamic worldwide revival and the 
influence of the leading Muslim countries on the situation in Tanzania.  
 
The aim of my research developed from what I found missing in the literature I read - a deeper 
search for the reasons behind the change in the relationship between the two religious groups. 
My intention has been to write a thesis that can help us understand the Christian-Muslim 
relationship in Africa better. I also intended to write a thesis that could help Christians in 
Tanzania understand their Muslim counterpart better, since knowledge about Islam is important 
to avoid conflicts. This is one of the reasons why my work in certain parts is very detailed. If my 
work should be of any help to people in the area working with these questions, I found it 
necessary to give a thorough presentation of both the Muslim community and of different 
scholars’ theories.  
 
After my field studies in Tanzania and Kenya in the fall of 1994 certain distinctions were made. 
Tanzania was made the nucleus of my research because of the previous good religious 
relationship, the recent conflict,  the special political situation and the lack of recent research 
from the area. But the history of the coast of Tanzania is also the history of the coast of present 
day Kenya, and the two countries are often referred to as “the coast of East Africa” in scholarly 
works. The choice to also comment upon parallells in the Christian-Muslim relationship in 
Kenya was made because it could help me find out whether the conflict in Tanzania was a 
conflict in this country alone. If Kenya, with a different political situation and with different 
political leaders experienced the same tendencies as Tanzania, an explanation focusing only on 
domestic political changes in Tanzania would be unsatisfactory. It would on the contrary indicate 
that what Tanzania experiences is a trend that influences a much larger area. 
 To concentrate my work on the last decade was a natural choice. The early 80s contained 
certain important incidents. The ujamaa philosophy was officially left by the government in 
1983, Julius Nyerere withdrew from presidency in 1985 and Professor C.K. Omari wrote his first 
major report about the Christian-Muslim relationship in 1984. By then the relationship between 
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the two religious groups was still one of peace, but the political changes in Tanzania and an 
increased focus on pure Islamic ideas in certain parts of the Muslim community were starting to 
play their part. Another reason for choosing the last decade as the main period of research was 
that no larger written work is describing the changes that have occured lately.   
 
This thesis will deal with a tendency in the religious landscape, denoting people as either 
Christians or Muslims from a classical understanding of the two religions. The fact that the 
religions in Tanzania, even to a lesser extent than most other African countries, contains secterial 
variations with considerable influence from traditional religions is clear to me. But I will relate 
my descriptions to the established religious communities which are situated in the most 
populated areas, and my opinion is that these communities give a fairly representative picture of 
the religious geography of Tanzania. 
 
Approach and Sources 
The work with my thesis at the Norwegian Lutheran School of Theology has been in the 
department of Missiology, Dr. Tormod Engelsviken being my tutor. This is due to my work with 
Christians facing the challenge of another religion in an African context. My thesis does, 
however, more specificly belong to the discipline of History of Missions, describing the recent 
history of Tanzania. The thesis also touches other disciplines like History of Religions, and can 
thus be reckoned as a cross-disciplinary study. 
 I have chosen to start by giving a brief introduction of the historical development in the 
area from the time of Islam’s arrival to the East African coast. The method used in the first 
chapter is an historical approach. The classical history work of Trimingham, “Islam in East 
Africa” has been my major source. His presentation has been supplemented and criticized by the 
use of August Nimtz’s “Islam and Politics in East Africa” and more recent historical works. 
David Westerlund’s “Ujamaa na dini” is giving a very good introduction to the situation that the 
religious communities faced under the ujamaa politics. 
 In the two major parts of my thesis, first the presentation of the changes and secondly the 
attempt to explain the changes, I have had to expand my use of methods. In the study of recent 
history, Knut Kjeldstadli claims that sociologists, social anthropologists, journalists and 
historians must work together to achieve a picture of the situation as nuanced as possible 
(Kjeldstadli 1992:97). I have followed his advice and tried to combine the different subjects. The 
religious development in Tanzania has so far mainly been commented upon in religious journals, 
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periodicals and newspapers. No major scholarly work has yet described the present trends. In my 
presentation I have used all the articles I could get hold of in order to get an as wide impression 
as possible of the events. Some of these articles are worth a closer presentation. The sociologist 
Dr. C.K. Omari from the University of Dar es Salaam is reckoned as the most prominent local 
commentator on the religious development. His informative articles from 1984/1987/1994 have 
been a natural frame in the description of the development the last decade. Another valuable 
article has been Dr. Frieder Ludwig’s “After ujamaa - Is Religious Revivalism a Threat to 
Tanzania’s stability?”, which contains valuable information about the changes taken place within 
the churches. Also Sigvard von Sicard’s article “Islam in Tanzania” is very interesting reading 
with its focus on the foreign Muslim influence in Tanzania. My presentation of the Muslim 
community is largely based upon articles found in Muslim periodicals and newspapers. In 
addition I have received some unpublished Muslim articles from Westerlund and Ludwig which 
were translated from Swahili.  
  The articles that I have found, describing the recent development, have to a small degree 
contained diverging views. This is due to that very little written material about the situation 
exists, and that the scholars often have used the same sources. In order to expand this picture I 
have used material from local newspapers as a supplement in describing the events taking place. 
Commenting upon this I am the first to state that newspapers alone can never be reliable sources 
in serious research. My use of newspaper material is first of all that of referring events that have 
taken place, as a source of information. Secondly the newspapers present a local view on the 
conflict, and the newspapers are often the spokesmen of certain groups of people. When a 
Christian newspaper claims that 500 Muslims have joined military training for a religious war, it 
is not only a question whether this is a fact or not, but it means that many Christians believe that 
500 Muslims have joined the training. It is not always the question whether fear is adequate or 
not. If one group fears another group it makes them react in a certain way unless someone can 
explain that their fear is without reason. 
 Interviews have been used in order to get information from a somewhat different  angle. 
The interviews referred to in this thesis were first of all used to confirm the written information I 
already had. Talking to people who have experienced the conflict also helped me catch some of 
the atmosphere present, and it also got me closer to the situation than any written work could 
ever have managed (see Kjeldstadli 1992: 185-189). 
  
In my attempt to give an explanation of the changes in the religious situation, I have presented 
the theories of the sociologist C. K. Omari and the social anthropologist Kjersti Larsen. This has 
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been done in order to supplement the views of the theologians commenting on the situation. As a 
result, the questions of domestic politics, general religious trends and the question of identity 
have achieved a central place in the evaluation of adequate reasons behind the changes taking 
place. The sociologists’ ability to draw conclusions from a pattern observed has been helpful in 
describing the changes taking place within the religious communities. The anthropologists’ 
ability to see the changes through participating observation has enlargened my view of the 
complexity of reasons that are affecting the religious relationship on the personal level. By using 
the views of these scolars I have however tried to be critical and also point out any shortcoming 
in their treatment of religious matters. 
                          
One of the major problems during my work has been the lack of written material on the issue. 
Both my field studies and my visits to Selly Oak in Birmingham and St. Andrew’s Centre in 
London left me with the impression that very few recent studies were available. This has in some 
way been an obstruction, but it has also been a motivation - giving me the feeling of doing 
pioneer work. My research situation has for such an ambitious work not been ideal. A two 
months field study left me with a lot of impressions, but without knowing either Swahili or 
Arabic I have obviously been separated from certain sources. The libraries at Makumira 
Theological College, Norwegian Lutheran School of Theology, Selly Oak Colleges and St. 
Andrew’s Centre have however been extremely helpful and have provided me with material I 
never thought I would find.  
 This study has been a fascinating journey into the world of sciences. A journey into 
different theories, vital religious life and political cynicism. It has taught me that there are no 
easy answers, and that the answers you get are often useless- if the questions asked turn out to be 
wrong. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
To understand the development of the religious relationship in Tanzania the last decade it is 
important to know the history of the East African coast. The demands and the dissatisfaction 
expressed by the religious groups today are to a large extent based on their interpretation of the 
history of Tanzania. This chapter will deal with the historical development of Islam and 
Christianity, from their arrival to the region to the abolition of the ujamaa philosophy in the early 
1980s.  
 
1.1 Pre-Colonial Times 
The early history of Islam in East Africa can, according to Trimingham, be diveded into three 
parts (Trimingham 1964:1). The first part deals with the early settlement of Muslims along the 
coast, from the middle of the eighth to the middle of the twelfth century, under the rule of Zanj 
(the Persian term for Bantu). The second period which lasted from the thirteenth century until the 
Portuguese were defeated around 1700 is also called the Shirazian period and is distinguished by 
the development of small states along the coast with a distinctive Islamic coastal culture. The 
decline of this culture was caused by  Portuguese intervention. The last period is dominated by 
Omani Arabs which led to the formation of the State of Zanzibar in 1840 and the transformation 
of the Shirazi culture. An increasing number of Asian settlers at this time were an important 
economic factor and the bearers of Islamic sectarism. In 1884 the German Karl Peters and his 
German East Africa Company started a new era in the history of East Africa by introducing the 
colonial rule. 
 
1.1.1 Early Muslim Settlements 
Archeological findings show that from an early date the coast of East Africa has been in contact 
with South Arabia, the Persian Gulf, India, Indonesia and even China. It was probably the search 
for aromatics and incense, used in perfumes, medicine and in religious ceremonies, that led 
traders to the African coast. Equally important was the ivory from the African elephant. Later on 
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gold and slaves became important merchandises. The oldest African source on East African 
history, the Kilwa Chronicle, tells us that a group of Arabs left the Arabian peninsula and settled 
in Maqdishu in the middle of the eighth century (Nimtz 1980:3). Two centuries later, according 
to the same chronicle, a group of  Sunni refugees called the followers of Zaid1 left the Gulf  for 
Kilwa and found there a Muslim settler installed with a mosque and his family (Trimingham 
1964:3).  
These settlements are only two examples from a row of Persian-Arab waves of immigration to 
this part of Africa in different times. The majority of these first settlers were males. These males 
married local Bantu women and became Africans, though with a strong orientation towards their 
eastern origin. "The link with an external civilization was very strong and they attempted to 
reproduce the living of South Arabian and Persian Gulf towns." (Trimingham 1964:10)2 Out of 
these intermarriages developed a new culture, the Swahili or coastal culture. They also created 
their own language, called Kiswahili or only Swahili, which was to become the lingua franca of 
the coast and consisted of a simplified Bantu grammar and mainly Arab words. The other 
nucleus of this culture was their religion, the orthodox, or Sunni, Islam. This religion was gaining 
a foothold in the development of a new  people, the Shirazi people in the south of Somalia 
(Nimtz 1980:4). Ibn Sa`ids writings from around 1250 gives us the information that all the 
coastal towns south of Maqdishu were under the rule of pagan Zanj. The inhabitants of these 
towns were mainly Africans. South of Maqdishu there is, by this time, little archeological 
evidence of direct Persian influence apart from a mosque on Zanzibar and a Palace on Kilwa. 
There are no established Islamic civilizations along the East African coast apart from Maqdishu 
in the middle of the thirteenth century (Trimingham 1964:6-7). 
  
1.1.2 The Shirazi Period and the Portuguese Invention  
The Shirazi culture developed a strong base in the north of the East African coast. But changing 
trade and tribal movements led to greater Shirazian influence further south on the islands of 
Kilwa, Zanzibar, Pemba and Mafia. Also the town states of Mombasa and Malindi which always 
kept a strong Bantuizatoion, was later on forced to be under Shirazi rule. The first important 
Shirazi settlement was on the island of Kilwa. This island was probably bought by cloth, 
suggesting a link between trade and early settlements. The main reason for Kilwa`s prosperity  
                                                 
 1Zaid ibn Ali ibn al-Husain was the Prophet’s grandson. 
2Lapidus 1985 claims that older scholars put too much emphasis on the Persian-Arab influence of the Swahili 
culture. "More recent scholarships stresses indigenous African basis of the Swahili culture."p.529 
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was the exclusive gold trade, which the island controlled. The leader of Kilwa, Al-Hawan,  is the 
first leader known to have gone on a pilgrimage (1331). He is also known to have frequently 
raided the pagan Zanj, calling these raids jihad (Holt 1970B:382-83).  These coast states were 
self-governing and most of the time independent. Kilwa`s expansion was more like a sphere of 
influence than direct control. Most coastal towns had a chief. This chief was often an Immigrant 
Arab or Persian without involvement in clan rivalries. But the traditional system of local 
government was never eliminated. The ruler was always limited by the council of lineage heads, 
the wazee, which represented the different clans (Trimingham 1964:12-14). 
 During the fifteenth century Mombasa succeded Kilwa as the most important state. Both of 
these dynasties were dominated by Shirazi culture with a strong Islamic influence. Through these 
important harbours merchandises, but also culture and religion spread to other coastal towns. 
This was when Islam for the first time was widely spread along the coast of East Africa (Nimtz 
1980:4). "When visited by Vasco da Gama in 1498 the coastal and islands towns... were 
dominated by a privileged class of Muslims living easy lives surrounded by slaves." 
(Trimingham 1964:18)  
  
When the Portuguese explorers arrived at the East African coast they first established friendly 
relations with Malindi. The Malindi ruler needed allies to go against the Sheikh of Mombasa and 
welcomed the Portuguese. In 1505 they together invaded Kilwa and burnt Mombasa. By 1530 
they controlled the whole East African coast. The Portuguese had ambigious intentions with their 
involvement in the Indian Ocean. When da Gama arrived in Calicut and was asked what he 
sought he is said to have answered; "Christians and spices."  The Portuguese viceroy of the 
Indies wrote home of his plan to capture Malacca in 1511:  
 
 The first aim is the great service which we shall perform to our Lord...quenching the 
fire of the sect of Muhammed...And the other is the service we shall render to the 
king...in taking this city, because it is the source of all the spiceries and drugs...For I 
hold it certain that if we take this trade of Malacca away from them, Cairo and 
Mecca will be entirely ruined. (Greaves 1990:411)  
 
The impact of Christianity delivered to the surroundings by the Portuguese was very low. Apart 
from churches built for their own needs, Christianity wasn`t spread among the coastal people and 
no mission was left when the Portuguese were defeated. 
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The prosperity of the coastal states declined during the years of Portuguese dominion, and by this 
also the spread of Islam. The Shirazi towns depended upon the trade, and during these years 
Shirazi families migrated and established new towns on the coast without the earlier success. The 
Portuguese were few in numbers and only possessed a limited control of the area. But the decline 
of the coastal towns was to a large extent caused by the active warriors of African tribes from the 
hinterland. The Shirazi towns were squeezed between pressure from both land and sea (Nimtz 
1980:4). The Zimba tribe in 1587 massacred the people of Kilwa, and the town never recovered 
from this slaughter. Mombasa was the Portuguese strongest point of resistance and after having 
defeated the Zimba they built the famous Fort Jesus as their headquarter on the island in 1592 
(Trimingham 1964:19-20). 
 
1.1.3 The Omani Arabs  
In the middle of the seventeenth century, the Omani Arabs entered the scene and became the 
most influential force in the area. Through alliances with Pemba and Zanzibar they rebelled 
against the Portuguese. Later on Pate asked for help, and Fort Jesus was besieged in 1660. The 
war on Mombasa lasted until 1698 when the Portuguese had to flee the area. But despite the 
Omani`s apparent supremacy internal power struggles delayed the full control over the area 
another century. In the meantime the previous ties between the Swahilis and the Arab-Persian 
world had their renaissance. This time the South Arabian Arabs, the so-called Hadramawt, and 
the Omani Arabs were the ones with most influnce on the Swahili coast culture. Frome these 
areas a new wave of immigrants left for the East African coast. The Hadramawts, being Sunni 
Muslims exceeded the Omanis in influence on the coastal culture, the latter belonging to the 
Abadiyya sect (Nimtz 1980:5). The Shirazi people, being scattered and minimalized by war and 
famine, now had the time to recover. Deserted settlements were inhabited by Shirazis from other 
places. 
 The leadership of Sayyid Sa`id b. Sultan, renewed the influence of the Omani Arabs. In 
1836 the Omanis gained permanent control over Mombasa, and in 1840 he transferred his court 
to Zanzibar. This time the Omanis had more influence over the coast with agents as "tax-
collectors" in all major cities. The golden area of slave trade made Zanzibar the most important 
port on the coast trading with slaves, ivory, cloves and gum-copal. Zanzibar was reckoned an 
autonomus state until the establishment of the British protectorate in 1890. This economic 
revival of the coast benefitted the Swahili culture as well as the spread of Islam through the 
increasing numbers of  trading caravans into the interior (Trimingham 1964:21-23). The origin of 
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these caravans is a mystery  in the history of East Africa. Nimtz seems to give credit to the inland 
people, being more active in trade with the coast (1980:6), while Trimingham seems to presume 
that the Arabs took the initiative to this trade (1964:23). 
 There were three major trade routes into the interior of the country. The southern route 
connected the towns of Kilwa and Lindi with the Lake Malawi area and the areas further west. 
The main route connected Zanzibar with the coastal towns Bagamoyo and Dar es Salaam and 
continued into the Manyema region (present day Zaire) and Buganda. On this route Ujiji and 
Tabora were the major towns in the interior. The northern route connected the towns of 
Mombasa and Tanga with the Kilimanjaro region, the Mount Kenya region and Lake Victoria 
(Nimtz 1980:6). The Arab-Swahilis’ main purpose for these caravan routes was not slave raiding 
expeditions. Their main goal was the buy slaves and ivory for later exportation. The Sultan’s 
authority was limited to the coast, so the trade depended upon cooperation with the inland tribes. 
Large plantations were created along the coast by the Sultan, and this led to peaceful conditions 
with the tribes in the surroundings. Arab traders also built small trading centres and settled along 
the routes. But most of all it was the authority and the advantages that local chiefs on the trade 
route received from the Arabs that led to the expansion of Islam. These chiefs often took Muslim 
names and adopted a nominal Islam (Trimingham 1964:24). The early Islamization process 
along the trade routes followed to a large extent the same pattern as the Islamization of the coast, 
i.e. peaceful, gradual conversion.  
 
1.2 The Colonial Period 
In 1884, Karl Peters formed a German colonization society in what was to become German East 
Africa. This company started making treaties with Arab rulers in an attempt to involve Bismarck 
in the race for the colonies. In 1887 the company was registered as the German East Africa 
Company and  was given the authority from the German state to exploit new areas (Rasmussen 
1993:21). The Industrial and the Agricultural Revolution in Europe and North America had 
created needs for raw materials and commodities, and this also acted as a stimuli for the 
Christian Missionary Movements (Katoke 1994:4). 
 
1.2.1 The Colonial Rule in German East Africa 
When Karl Peters arrived East Africa he was met by Christian missionaries. The Lutheran J. L. 
Krapf, a German sent out by the Anglican Church Missionary Society in London (CMS), left 
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Europe for Zanzibar in 1844. There he was heartly welcomed by  the Sultan Sayyid Sa`id. In 
1846 he was joined by J. Rebman. It was first and foremost the journeys of David Livingstone 
that started the missionary invasion of East Africa. His attacks on the slave trade and his thoughts 
about Christianity and commerce gained influence in important circles in the church and among 
economists (Westerlund 1980:49-50). The first CMS station was opened in 1876 in Mpwapwa 
with the permission from the Sultan of Zanzibar. Several missions followed. Most of them 
started out in Zanzibar, but soon realized that  the Muslim majority along the coast was hard to 
convert and that the climate and the Malaria made their work impossible. However, the 
missionaries moved to the interior where the climate was less humid and where people were 
more open to their preaching (Jasper 1994). 
 It may sound like a contradiction, but after the introduction of the German colonial power, 
Islam spread rapidly into the interior. The reasons behind this are various. The Germans tended 
to think that the culture of the coast, the Swahili culture, was superior to the rest of the area. 
Young literate men, akida, were hired in low-level administrative posts all over the country, and 
Swahili was made the language of the administration. Also in government schools, built to 
educate local government emloyees, the language was Swahili and the teachers were largely 
Muslims. To bring down various uprisings the Germans had to recruit African troops, most of 
these were Sudanese Muslims that stayed in the area employed as policemen or labourers. A 
government survey of the state of Islam in 1912 concluded that an overwhelming majority of the 
employees of  district governments were Muslims, even as far upcountry as Arusha. This led 
among others the missionaries to accuse the German government of supporting the spread of 
Islam (Nimtz 1980:12). 
 The missionaries came to Africa to convert people into a personal Christian belief. In terms 
of numerical strength they did not succed their first decades of presence. Medical work and 
education were very important parts of their work, and the schools were where the majority of 
converts met this new religion. Most of the converts were freed slaves who sought protection in 
the missions where they lived very regulated lives. The Arabs felt their dominion over the slave 
trade threatened, and several missions were attacked. One of the reasons why so few natives 
converted to Christianity was the pressure by the missionaries to abandon their traditional life 
and beliefs in for example the ancestoral spirits. This belief was an important part of the clan 
society, and made the new Christians not only face a religious, but also a serious social conflict. 
Christianity was also clearly identified with the colonial rule at this stage.   
 Another conflict was between the missionaries in the interior and the German colonial rule 
concerning the use of the Swahili language in education and local government. The missionaries 
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felt that Swahili was too closely connected with Islam and the Arab vocabulary, and preferred to 
use local tribe languages (Westerlund 1980:49-50). But the conflict was also about the content of 
the education. The missionaries central aim was to educate Africans into reading the Bible and 
become personal believers, whereas the German educational system aimed at educating civil 
servants (Rasmussen 1993:32). 
 
The spread of Islam in this period was to a large extent dependent upon the spread of Sufi orders. 
The Shadhililya established missionary centers along the coast and taught a new Islamic practice 
and established brotherhoods. The Uwaysiya were active among Swahili and Bantu speaking 
tribes and they were the leading anti-German rebels in the south (Lapidus 1989:865). 
Throughout their reign the Germans had to fight Muslim upheavals. By far the most important 
was the Maji-Maji uprising 1905-07. This was a genuine African upheaval, where Africans of 
diverse ethnicity joined together against colonial rule, but also against the economic imperialism 
of the Indians and the Arab traders. The concept of the upheaval was based on traditional 
religion3, but the teachers of Islam were active and some Islam teaching was involved 
(Rasmussen 1993:22). The uprising was turned down, but in the years to come Islam 
experienced a certain growth. The reasons for this is somewhat vague, but the failure of the 
traditional religion may have led to a vacuum that was filled by Islam. This serious rebellion 
together with Islams continued growth made the German gradually change their approach to the 
Muslims. From 1891 until 1912 the Germans did not officially have a positive or negative 
attitude towards the spread of Islam. But a sharp change is to be seen  around 1912. Their now 
rather hostile attitude is best to be exemplified by their attempt to make the Africans breed pigs. 
The simple philosophy behind this was that when the Africans had developed a taste for pork 
meat4, they would be less eager to become Muslims.    
 This new German policy would probably have lasted if it was not for the outbreak of 
World War I. One of the German allies in this war was Turkey, the centre of the Muslim world. 
The Germans tried to make the Muslims in East Africa their allies against the British and the 
French. The Sultan in Constantinopel, the leader of all Muslims, decleared in 1914 holy war 
against the allied forces and encouraged Muslims everywhere to join the Central Powers. So 
from the outbreak of the war and until they were defeated by the British, the Germans pursued a 
pro-Islamic policy (Nimtz 1980:13).   
                                                 
 3Maji means water or medicine. 
4
 Pork meat is forbidden according to Islamic dietary laws. 
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 The First World War was close to a disaster for the missions in the area. In the outbreak of 
the war all the British and French missionaries were deported and left their mission stations. On 
the local churches this had a dual effect. The weak churches disappeared, and left the area open 
for traditional religion and Islam. The stronger churches, however, had to take care of themselves 
and gained internal strength by this sudden independence. The example given by the Europeans 
can hardly have been a testimony of  the message of the Bible. 
 
1.2.2 The British Colonial Rule in Tanganyika 
The first period of British rule (1916-24) was for the British more a holding action than a direct 
influence over the area (which they renamed Tanganyika). It is in this period Islam achieved its 
greatest numerical growth. Before the war it is estimated  that the Muslims represented 3 percent 
of the population in Tanganyika. By 1924 the estimation was 25 percent. Different from the first 
period of the expansion of Islam, this second wave was mainly caused by African Muslims who 
had converted during the earlier periods. Many Arab and Swahili walimu, Koranic teachers, were 
replaced by Africans. The impact of the Sufi brotherhoods was strong among African Muslims 
and their teaching was to a larger extent than orthodox Islam adaptable to African beliefs (Nimtz 
1980:63f). The War along with the coming of a new colonial power created an uncertain 
religious atmosphere. In addition to this, Tanganyika experienced in the following years several 
epidemics and famine. Nimtz argues that Islam during these crises played a  crucial role for 
many Africans. While Trimingham (1964:27) claims that the peace and stability of the colonial 
rule led to the expansion of Islam, Nimtz states "...Islam`s major expansion occured not during 
tranquil times but, to the contrary, during periods of upheaval and crisis." (Nimtz 1980:15)5. 
 The British introduced a new system of government in Tanganyika. Based on experiences 
in other African countries they opted for indirect rule in local government. This meant that the 
traditional ruling system gained more power on behalf of the Muslim tax-collectors. English 
speaking natives were preferred, and where the Swahilis once had dominated under the German 
rule, a new group of people, often educated by English missions, were to receive the most 
influential jobs in local government. 
 
The missions faced large difficulties in the period previous to the First World War. But 1923-35 
was the glorious period of mission influence in Tanganyika, and that was largely due to their 
emphasis on education. The conflict between the missions and the colonial rule continued, but 
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not to the same extent as under the German rule. The German problem was that the missions did 
not educate Africans for jobs in the government, because they had their own secular Swahili 
education. The British rule took more direct control and made the missions cooperate on a higher 
standard of education in the elementary schools and focused on higher education. The strategy of 
the missions was to gather the Christians in villages to provide the converts with an environment 
different from their earlier surroundings. The missions were often afraid of government 
interference, their teaching emphazizing spiritual matters, but an agreement on education was 
reached in 1925. While the Western influence and emphasis on education benefitted the 
Christians, the Muslims stuck to their traditional education, which was mainly religious 
(Rasmussen 1993:32-33). 
 During World War II, German missionaries were again departed, and the situation from 
1919 appeared once more. This time, however, Swedish and American missions took over the 
administrative responsibility for the churches left by the Germans. Also this period strengthened 
the independent African churches. The inter-war period led the Protestant missions to a closer 
ecumenical cooperation. This was largely due to the spread of Swahili as a common language, 
making it possible to create common liturgies (Rasmussen 1993:33-35).  
 
The process towards independence was partly started by the establishment of Tanganyika 
African Association, TAA, 1929. Their target was to do away with all tribal, sectarian, political, 
educational, cultural,  territorial, and other differences to promote a solid brotherhood of 
Africans. TAA was mainly supported by Muslims. In 1955, a new organization,Tanganyika 
African National Union, TANU, was formed as the continuety of TAA. It was an organization 
that focused on unity, against tribalism and religious differencies, and the primary task for 
TANU was to win independence. According to Westerlund (1980:81f) the Muslims were more 
eager to join TANU than the Christians. Also the brotherhoods supported TANU, and their 
support was very important in the struggle for independence. But not all Muslims supported 
TANU. In 1957 AMNUT, All Muslim National Union of Tanganyika, an organization largely 
consistent of Arabs was formed. To them the matter of education played a major role. They were 
afraid of the secular school system supported by TANU and wanted a more orthodox religious 
education. They also wanted to postpone independence until the Muslims had reached the same 
educational level as the Christians. The socialistic politics of TANU affected the Shia Muslims 
who mainly were Asian businessmen. Their interest group, the East African Muslim Welfare 
                                                                                                                                                        
 5Lapidus supports Nimtz` theory (Lapidus 1989:864). 
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Society, EAMWS, gradually took over the role of AMNUT. Apart from their economic interest, 
the question of education was also crucial to them. They wanted separate Muslim schools 
(Westerlund 1980:81-99). 
  In the early days of TANU, most Christians were reluctant to join the organization. There 
were several reasons for this. One was that civil servants were forbidden by law to join political 
activities and few would give up their jobs to join TANU. The strong anti-colonial attitude of 
TANU affected the often more pro-western, mission-educated Christians. The British 
Government tried to forbid their teachers from joining the organization, but most of the churches 
stood against this pressure, they feared a total Muslim dominance in TANU. Not all Christians 
were opposed to TANU. Christian teachers like Nyerere, who soon became the leader of the 
organization, supported TANU from the beginning. Christian churches also took part in the 
criticism of the colonial rule (Westerlund 1980:108-9). 
 
1.2.3 The British Colonial Rule in Kenya 
Kenya, unlike Tanzania, did not develop as an African society. Kenya became more of a white 
settler society. The trade routes from Mombasa towards the inland were disturbed by hostile war-
tribes like the Masai and the Somali (Trimingham 1964:29). The Swahili inhabitants along the 
coast had always had strong relations with Zanzibar and the rest of the coastal towns further 
south. These ties were gradually made weaker by the colonial power. In 1888 Kenya was aquired 
by the British East Africa Company and made a separate protectorate in 1904. In 1918 it was 
declared a crown colony. Early in this century the country was organized for European 
settlement, and whites from all over the British Empire came to Kenya and settled in the 
highland territories. The natives who lived in these areas were forced into native reserves. The 
best land and the mineral resources were reserved for white exploitation. The white settlers also 
had the access to educational, medical and economical services. 
 But from the British missions  and from the military service emerged a small educated 
black elite that formed the East African Association and the Kenya African Union. The leader of 
the latter was Jomo Kenyatta. These organizations demanded better education for Africans and 
access to land. The Mau Mau revolt broke out in 1952 with black guerillas fighting the white 
colonialists. This African opposition led to better conditions for the natives and in 1963 they won 
independence. The leading party was the Kenyan African Union Party and the first President was 
Jomo Kenyatta. 
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 The Muslim population in Kenya was much smaller than its Tanzanian counterpart. 
Therefore the Muslims in Kenya never had the same influence on the development of the country 
as the Muslims in Tanzania. The Muslim communities were spread around the country, and even 
along the coast the Muslim Swahili society soon was outnumbered by people from the interior 
(Lapidus 1989:869). 
 
1.3 Post-Independence 
After many years of struggle with TANU in the frontline, Tanganyika gained independence in 
1961. Zanzibar was dominated by an Arab elite that won both the 1961 and 1963 elections. This 
regime was overthrown immediately after independence in December 1963 by African 
revolutionaries who confiscated and nationalized Arab land, and in 1964 Tanganyika and 
Zanzibar together formed the republic of Tanzania (Lapidus 1989:866). 
 
1.3.1 The Ujamaa Politics 
The ujamaa6 is an ideology and a political system gradually developed by TANU. Julius K. 
Nyerere who was elected the first leader of the organization had an enormous influence on the 
development of the ujamaa politics. The main aim for TANU in their early days was to achieve 
uhuru, independence. After independence was gained 1961 the long road towards Africanizing 
and remodelling the country began. The ideology of ujamaa was somewhat vague before 1967. 
The political theorist in TANU, Nyerere, stated that  ujamaa was  "...to receive the traditional 
egalitarian way of life which had been violated because of colonialism." (Westerlund 1980:25). 
The ujamaa presented by TANU was  an ideology of contradictions. The traditional way of life 
was to be revived, at the same time nation building was the main goal. Ujamaa was described as 
a socialist ideology (though not a Marxist socialism), but it was claimed to be a genuine African 
ideology. TANU leaders said that Tanzanians did not have to be taught ujamaa, because ujamaa 
was for the Tanzanians the natural way of life.  
 According to Nyerere, the one-party system was more in accordance with African thinking 
than a Western multi-party system. He also claimed that the democratic principles were taken 
better care of in one party, identified with the nation as a whole, than in several parties 
                                                 
6The word "ujamaa" can be translated "familyhood" or be referred to as "the socialism of TANU" (Westerlund 
1980:14). 
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representing only some sections of the community. Nyerere`s thoughts gained support and in 
1965 TANU was established as the single political party in Tanzania.  
 When the famous Arusha declaration was presented in 1967, the content of the 
governments ujamaa politics became more explicit. Capitalism was now the main enemy and 
nationalization was the new line of politics. Agricultural and rural development along with self-
reliance was emphasized. No political leaders were allowed to hold shares in any company and 
they were not allowed to receive two or more salaries. The Arusha declaration represented a 
more radical socialist policy. The following years Asians in increasing numbers left the country 
along with valuable means, frightened of the nationalization of property (Westerlund 1980:25-
28). 
 
Maybe the most radical part of the Arusha declaration concerned life on the countryside. 
Nyerere`s idea was to establish ujamaa villages where common facilities like scools, hospitals 
and shops along with common production should be the mainstain of Tanzanian society. Private 
property should however be allowed, and private gardens in addition to common soil were to be 
available. Traditionally people lived scattered on the countryside and the intention was that  none 
should be forced to move. The government hoped that these villages would develop into socialist 
communities. In 1973, however, when only 15 percent of the population lived in villages, the 
government decided that it was no longer voluntary to live in ujamaa villages. This forced 
"villagization" led to incredible economic costs for the government and caused many villages to 
be established within hopeless ecological conditions. Another problem was that of leadership, the 
leaders attitude towards the idea of ujamaa was often sceptical. (Westerlund 1980:28-29)7.   
 
1.3.2 The Christians and Ujamaa  
As already mentioned the Christians were somewhat more reluctant to join TANU than the 
Muslims. After independence the Christian scepticism continued. One of the major concern in 
the churches, and especially in the Roman Catholic church, was the fear of communism. The 
right to private property was regarded a divine right, and they also feared an atheistic state. At 
this stadium the ujamaa was a rather vague ideology, and the churches, which were the holders 
of considerable properties and were involved in commerce, feared a state after a Eastern 
European pattern. The churches also had strong links to their sister-churches in the West. 
                                                 
 7While Westerlund gives a rather negative picture of the situation in the villages, Rasmussen (1993:80) leaves 
 us with a somewhat more positive presentation of life in the ujamaa villages. 
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TANU`s ideal of self-reliance was distant, if ever wanted in the churches. The most extreme 
example is the Catholic church which in 1969 only had 20 percent of its budget locally funded 
(Westerlund 1980:111-16). 
 Another major issue among the churches was the question of education. By the time of 
independence, 70 percent of the schools were sponsored by the church. The strong Sunni Muslim 
domination in TANU put strong pressure to prohibit teachers from involving in politics. This 
shows some of the tension between the well educated church leaders and the less educated 
Muslims in TANU. Despite assurances from TANU leaders that the churches did not have to 
fear for their influence over own schools, the nationalization of schools was announced 1969. To 
many church leaders this came as a shock. For them the schools were still important places of 
converting people. All teachers were from now on government employees and the teaching of 
religion became subordinated to political teaching. The nationalization of schools was a part of 
the governments equality program, and intended or not, the integration of pupils from various 
parts of the society into the earlier Christian schools made it easier to make Christians take active 
part in the building of ujamaa (Westerlund 1980:118-22). 
 The major change in the Christian attitude towards ujamaa appeared after the Arusha 
declaration. This declaration was politically a step further left, a direction the churches earlier 
had feared. The reasons for the change of attitude must therefore to a large extent have occured 
within the churches themselves. President Nyerere, himself a devoted Catholic, had several times 
urged the church to "play their part" in the building of ujamaa. The gradual Africanization of the 
church led more pastors to take part in the development of the country. For them an important 
part of the gospel was to help the poor and the oppressed. A bishops' statement from the Catholic 
church in favour of the Arusha declaration reffered to Acts 4:32 and gave biblical argumentation 
for ujamaa. This radical change of attitude in the Roman Catholic church must also be seen on 
the background of Vatican II. Gaudium et Spes (1965) focused on solidarity and Populorum 
Progresio (1967) criticized liberal capitalism. Although this new positive approach, it was 
crucial for the church to stress that what it supported was ujamaa, not socialism (Westerlund 
1980:124).  
 The Christian top organizations gradually became close in cooperating with the ujamaa 
government. This also led to cooperation with Muslim organizations that had supported the 
government all along. One of ujamaa`s main intentions was to put aside religious differences. 
The villagization process stimulated this process. Christians and Muslims lived side by side in 
the villages and the relationship improved gradually. The Catholic church even urged its 
members to emphasize that Christians and Muslims believed in the same god (Westerlund 
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1980:129). The success of ujamaa in terms of religious tolerance is also stressed by Rasmussen 
(1993:81).  
 
1.3.3 The Muslims and Ujamaa 
The Sunni Muslims in Tanzania were more or less united in the support of TANU. They claimed 
that ujamaa could easily be identified as a part of Islam, and the principle of self-reliance fit the 
Sunni Muslim society8. The African Muslims also saw the nation building as a means of 
improving their own situation. Nyerere was very popular among the Muslims and held them out 
as examples for the Christians because of their efforts to support the government`s ujamaa 
policy. He also gave credit to the Muslims for relating their religion to this life, and not as the 
Christians focusing on the hereafter. Westerlund uses Mazrui`s studies on the interrelationship 
between Islam and socialism to support Nyerere, stating that Islam is more "secular", more 
"materialist" than Christianity (Westerlund 1980:89). 
 But not all Muslims joined the mainstream Sunni support of ujamaa. Whereas the Sunnis 
sought improvements through ujamaa, the Shia Muslims worked for transnational, pan-Islamic 
unity through EAMWS. The leadership of this organization was held by Asian Shia Muslims, 
mainly Ismailis with Aga Kahn as their founder. Their work was clearly in oppossition to 
TANU`s nation building program. When the one-party system was developed 1965, EAMWS 
was not declared illegeal because it was reckoned a religious organization. The Muslims, unused 
to making distinctions between religion and politics, faced a conflict with two inconsistent 
factions. In a regional conference in Bukoba it was stated by the pro-TANU faction that only 
supporters of the party could be the leaders of Tanzanias Muslims. Gradually more regions 
pulled out of EAMWS, in what was a struggle between non-African Shia Muslims and national 
oriented Muslims. The Islamic Crisis of 1968 was a fact when the government declared 
EAMWS unlawful. Another organization, the Supreme Council of Tanzanian Muslims, 
BAKWATA, was established with very close ties to TANU. By the oppposition it was called a 
branch of TANU. The purpose of this organization was to support Muslims in matters of 
religion, education, socially and economically. By the Shia Muslims BAKWATA was looked 
upon as an organization mainly for African inland Muslims, and without the Shia support 
BAKWATA suffered from lack of economic means, despite its close relation to TANU. At this 
                                                 
8The Muslims in Tanzania received aid from several Arab countries, like scholarships for African students at the 
al-Azhar university in Egypt (Westerlund 1980:87), but their degree of self-reliance was  high compared with the 
Christian churches. 
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time the struggle for political independence and the struggle to "Africanize" Islam walked hand 
in hand in Tanzania (Rasmussen 1993:58). 
 
1.3.4 Civil Religion Under Ujamaa 
The concept of civil religion aims at creating a common faith as opposed to any particular 
religion. Civil religion provides meaning, social solidarity and to a certain degree, political union 
for the nation (Linder 1975:4019). Gleason focuses more on the achievement of national unity as 
one of civil religions principal functions (Gleason 1977:52610).  
 Julius Nyerere explained in an article called "Socialism is Secular" the relationship 
between the ujamaa philosophy and religion. In this article he says that society has nothing to do 
with things that are entirely personal. A man's relationship with God is a personal matter. 
Socialism is not interested in a man's soul or whether he believes in a life after death. Socialism 
is according to Nyerere secular and has nothing to say about whether there is a God. He therefore 
concluded that there was nothing incompatible between socialism, Christianity or Islam 
(Westerlund 1980:64). David Westerlund calls this an attempt to compartmentalize religion, i.e. 
reduce it to metaphysical matters and give it an area of autonomy where society will not 
interfere. Socialism will, on the other hand take care of all earthly matters. 
 Nyerere himself must have known that religion is not simply a personal matter, there is 
always a social aspect to religion11. In a country with several religions of some size present, the 
social aspect of religion is always a sphere of conflict. Nyerere's thought was hence that ujamaa 
had to have increased importance at the expence of religion. Under the primacy of ujamaa, 
religion was subordinated. But Nyerere did not consequently treat religion as an entirely personal 
matter. When he asked the Christians to "play their part" in the process of building a social 
society, he used religion as a motivation (Westerlund 1980:64-65). 
 The most obvious examples of civil religion expressed in Tanzania public life is the 
national anthem. 
 
 God bless Africa  Bless its leaders. 
 Let Wisdom Unity and Peace be the shield of 
 Africa and its people. 
 
                                                 
9In Westerlund 1980:66 
10In Westerlund 1980:66 
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 Bless Africa Bless Africa 
 Bless the children of Africa. 
 
 God Bless Tanzania Grant eternal Freedom and Unity 
 to its sons and daughters. 
 God Bless Tanzania and its people.(in Westerlund 1980:68) 
 
The national anthem was prayed every morning and evening on the national radio, and was used 
on official occasions, national holidays and on more or less important occations. But also the 
Parliamentary Prayer, held in the beginning of each Parliamentary session, contents strong 
evidences of civil religion; 
 
 Almighty God, merciful and full of splendour, Lord of all creatures, Creator of 
heaven and earth, we humbly beseech Thee that our country, The United Republic of 
Tanzania, be under Your eternal guidence and protection. Bless our dear Tanzania 
to be a peaceful country so that all people living in it may have unity and charity 
towards one another...(in Westerlund 1980:68) 
 
In both the national anthem and in the Parliamentary Prayer, Mungu, God, is the central 
character, and nationalism is mixed with religious elements in a way acceptable to both Muslims 
and Christians. An attenuated religion was in this way used to foster national unity, a religion 
free of  dividing elements like prophet Muhammed and the divine Jesus. The documents of  
TANU were not religious but contained several similarities, the document where the ujamaa 
principles are laid down is called the TANU-creed, and it consists of expressions like "TANU 
believes..." etc. An editorial in Daily News12 wrote that to be a member of TANU; 
 
 ...is to accept the spirit and the letter of  Tanu's ideology, much in the same way as to 
be a Christian or a Muslim is to accept the teachings of Christ or Mohamed the 
Prophet.(Westerlund 1980:69) 
 
An important aspect of civil religion was the prayers said in political meetings. Apart from the 
Parliamentary Prayer there were several other prayers and at political meetings people were 
                                                                                                                                                        
11As long as a person follow an established religion and does not create his own religion in isolation. 
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reminded to pray for Africa. The prayers were also important on public holidays which were 
divided equally between Muslim, Christian and national holidays. Nyerere himself seldom 
mentioned the name of Jesus or other aspects of Christianity, so as to maintain his good 
relationship to Muslims. His religious statements as a politician were safely within the limits of 
TANU's civil religion where politics were emphasized and religious aspects had second priority 
(see Westerlund 1980:67-71). 
 
1.4 Summary 
The early history of East Africa is the history of Muslim immigrants coming from South Arabia, 
the Persian Gulf and the Indian sub-continent. Most of the settlers were single males who 
married Bantu women and created the Swahili culture. Important elements in this culture was the 
religion, Islam, and the language, Kiswahili. The Portuguese conquered Mombasa at the end of 
the 16th century. They did not, however, carry out much influence on their surroundings, and 
were soon beaten by the Omani Arabs. It was another two hundred years of peaceful Islamic 
expansion before the first white missionaries settled in the area around 1850. This was followed 
by colonial rule for one hundred years. Under German colonial rule Islam spread rapidly into the 
interior of Tanganyika because of the colonial power’s use of Swahili civil servants. Also the 
Sufi orders played an important part in Islam’s rapid spread. Christianity also gained a foothold 
in the region under German colonial rule, but the First World War was close to a disaster for the 
European missions. The British took the German position after the war. The British emphasis on 
education in their missions led to the glorious period of mission influence from 1923-35 when 
Africans in increasing numbers received the Gospel. 
 The process towards independence was led by TANU who sought uhuru, independence. 
TANU was mainly supported by Muslims since the Christians through their contact with the 
missions were more pro-Western. But gradually the Christians joined TANU and  Julius Nyerere 
was elected the first President of Tanzania, the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar. He 
created the ujamaa philosophy, which focused on the unity of the country. Religious differences 
were put aside and a civil religion, with emphasis on the common features of Islam and 
Christianity, was promoted by the government. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
12
Daily News is a government newspaper and was earlier known to be the voice of the government. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE DEVELOPMENT 1984-1994 
 
 
The religious geography of the coast of East Africa exhibits many interesting aspects. The 
gradual change from an area where the traditional religions once were dominant, to a multi-
religious society with the establishing of two new religions has in many aspects left its marks. 
The traditional religions were local religions with no wish to convert other tribes with a different 
religion. The two new religions, however, were universal religions with the objectives to convert 
the whole world to their special belief. This led to competition between the two religions - the 
race for the soul of Africa. A short historical outline was presented in the previous chapter. This 
second chapter will deal with the new directions in the religious relationship and focus on what 
has happened in Tanzania after the ujamaa politics was abolished. During the ujamaa period the 
relationship between Christians and Muslims was one of peace and tranquility, even if the two 
religious societies had somewhat different approaches to the development of the country. The 
last decade, however, certain elements have sown the seeds of discontetnt between the two 
religious communities in Tanzania. This has also been the situation on the coast of Kenya and 
parallells from the religious  relationship there will be referred to. 
 The forthcoming chapter will try to present the events that have occured, refer from the 
debate, and mention some of the results that the change has led to. A further presentation and 
evaluation of the different Christian and Muslim groups will not be carried out here, but will be 
dealt with in the next chapter. 
 
2.1 The Religious Geography of Tanzania 
C.K. Omari13 wrote in 1984 an article about the socio-political dimension of the Christian-
Muslim relationship in Tanzania. The first thing the article comments on is the use of the 
statistics concerning religious adherence. At first sight, statistics may seem like an unimportant 
matter, but the contrary is reality. Statistics are used for different purposes, and to Muslims they 
are more important than to Christians. Some Muslims tend to believe that physical force  
                                                 
13C.K. Omari is professor of Sociology at the University of Dar es Salaam and one of Tanzanias leading 
commentators on the religious situation. 
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constitutes the basis of the state. This idea is based in the Islamic tradition that once the Muslims 
are in the majority, they are entitled to create an Islamic state. The National Census from 1967 
concludes that Tanzania Mainland consists of 37% Traditional Believers, 32% Christians and 
30% Muslims. In the 1978 census there was no question concerning religion and ethnicity. For 
convenience rather than to give a true picture, the official numbers were that each of the religious 
groups held 30% (Omari 1984:2-5). These numbers were given for political reasons so that no 
group could claim to have the majority. The statistics were simply an attempt to maintain the 
peace. However, the opposite was the result. The situation today is that each group use their own 
statistics, and base their demands on these unofficial statistics. 
 Omari  attacks Ali M. Kettani who presents a statistic which, according to himself, is built 
on the official 1978 census. He claims that the Muslim population is 55%. Omari calls this 
"misleading if not false" (Omari 1984:2), and argues that the census did not have any question 
about religion or ethnicity. He continues his argumentation trying to show that Kettani's numbers 
cannot be true by pointing to the fact that Muslims live in the less developed parts of Tanzania, 
and in these parts the fertility rates are low. Also Dar es Salaam have low fertility rates, and this 
area is predominantly Muslim. On the basis of the 1967 census compared with the fertility rates, 
Omari finds it impossible that Islam should have increased from 30 to 55% in 12 years.  
 J. Haafkens presented on a conference in 1991 different statistics from Tanzania. Statistics 
from the Islamic Foundation (1976) gives the Muslims a 65% majority. The numbers from 
CHEAM14 showed that the percentage of Muslims was 32. The World Christian Encyclopædia15 
gives these numbers from 1980: Christians 44% and Muslims 32,5% (Haafkens 1991:Appendix). 
Omari supports the numbers of Barrett in the Encyclopædia with the explanation that the 
numbers from the Christians are more reliable than the Muslim numbers due to the tradition in 
the churches to always keep complete lists of its attenders each sunday. The main reasons for 
these lists are budgetary and to keep the record of church-growth. The Muslim numbers have on 
the local level tended to include all those with Muslim names, and several Christians and 
Traditional Believers have Muslim names (Omari 1984:5). 
 The representation in government in 1984 shows a small Christian majority, but Omari 
explains this with the educational background of the candidates, traditionally Christians have had 
easier access to education than Muslims. The candidates were chosen because of their abilities 
and not because of their religion. Christians and Muslims cooperated  in politics like they did in 
                                                 
14A map of the Muslim world produced by the Centre for Advanced Studies on Modern Asia and Africa 
(CHEAM), Paris 1984. 
15Edited by David B. Barrett, Nairobi: Oxford University Press 1982. 
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the rest of the society. Omari's conclusion on his article empasizes the good relations between the 
two religions, and their common aim to build "a nation of unity and equality where all religions 
are respected and have freedom." (Omari 1984:18). 
 
2.2 Towards Changes 
Julius Nyerere, after more than twenty years as the President of Tanzania, retired from his office 
in 1985. In his retireing-speech he warned his fellow countrymen that the risk of a religious 
conflict in Tanzania was larger than the risk of ethnical conflicts (Westerlund 1994:147). The 
politics created by Nyerere and his party CCM16, had always stressed religious tolerance and 
cooperation, but Nyerere saw the emergence of a conflict and used his last possibility as 
President to warn people about the conflict and urged them to promote understanding. Nyerere 
was succeeded by the Muslim Ali Hassan Mwinyi from Zanzibar. Several Muslims saw in this 
an opportunity to strengthen the influence of Islam in society through a Muslim President and 
also a Muslim Vice-President. Some Christians feared this, and were suspicious of the new 
President. But Mwinyi continued the Nyerere line and underlined the need of a strong secular 
state (Rasmussen 1993:100). 
 In 1987 signs of the emerging conflict became visible when BAKWATA17 organized a 
nation-wide tour where well-learned Muslim leaders spread their message of "comparative 
religion." This tour led to a series of discussions and arguing between the Imams and "born-
again" Christians concerning biblical and doctrinal issues. The Christian participants were not 
well prepared and did not leave a good impression on the public. The antagonism reached a 
climax in May 1987 when both former President Nyerere and the present, Mwinyi, saw it 
necessary to come out in strong defence of the freedom of religious belief as stated in the 
constitution of the republic (Ludwig 1994:2). The same year BAKWATA asked the government 
to reestablish the Islamic courts that existed in colonial and pre-colonial times. This shows a 
change of attitude within BAKWATA, and this change might be a result of the massive criticism 
that the organization had received from other Muslims who blamed BAKWATA for not doing 
enough for the Muslim community. It is also possible that the increased genuine Islamic profile 
came as a result of the internationalization of the organization. Certain Arab countries 
contributed economically to the building of schools and mosques, sponsored scholarships and 
                                                 
16In 1977 TANU and the Afro-Shirazi Party, ASP, the two ruling parties on the Tanzania mainland and on 
Zanzibar, together formed  Chama Cha Mapinduzi, CCM, The Revolutionary Party (Rasmussen 1994:56). 
17BAKWATA (Bazara Kuu La Waislamu Tanzania) The Supreme Council for Muslims in Tanzania. 
 30 
sent Islamic teachers to the new schools (Westerlund 1994:145). But to some Muslim groups this 
change in BAKWATA was not radical enough. The dissatisfaction among these groups led to 
the formation of BALUKTA, intentionally a Koran-reading society. Their constitution from 
1987 states that their major purposes are to propagate the reading of the Koran and strengthen 
religious and higher education for Muslims.    
 
At a conference on the Chistian-Muslim relationship in East Africa in May 1987, C.K. Omari 
gave a new interpretation of the situation in Tanzania. The article published after the conference 
shows that Omari basically sees the relationship as he did in 1984. He does, however, trace some 
changes. During the election campaign in 1985 some religious denominations were ready to use 
religion in their election campaigns. The party had to react to stop this trend. The Revolutionary 
Party's headquarter used posters and radio announcements and put an end to this new 
phenomenon in Tanzanian politics. The elections resulted in a slight majority of Christians in the 
President's Cabinet and a slight Muslim majority in the Party Central Committee. To Omari this 
result was another proof of the equal religious representation in Tanzanian politics (Omari 
1987:62-63).  
 Omari repeats in this article his fear of Muslims using their own statistics to promote an 
Islamic state. The traditional Muslim idea that when the Muslims constitute the majority of the 
population they are entitled to introduce their own laws in the society, is an argument which 
Omari fears that can easily be used by extreme Muslim groups and cause trouble for the 
government. Christian fundamentalists18 act, according to Omari, different from their Muslim 
counterparts, and their problem is not towards the state but more towards people. Their 
aggressive focus on other people as "lost" and hence targets of conversion, threatens to ruin the 
harmony of the religious relationship. In his article Omari uses Lebanon as an example of what 
might happen if such religious propaganda continues. He does, however, not find any connection 
between the increased Muslim activity and the fact that both the President and the Vice-President 
are Muslims. 
 Another factor that Omari's article points out as influencing the religious relationship is the 
pressure and influence from friendly Islamic countries. According to Omari they try to make 
Tanzania look like an Islamic state. Some Gulf states have also shown interest in helping 
Tanzania recover from her economic problems. This help is by the government considered  
                                                 
18A futher investigation and evaluation of what Omari calles "Christian fundamentalism" will be carried out in 
chapter three. 
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purely political, but when these Muslim states do not separate politics from religion, such 
solidarity may mean both. Some Tanzanians worry that as a result of the help these outsiders will 
dictate their social relations. Omari gives one example of this when a high level Iranian 
delegation visited the country in 1986. The delegation demanded that no alcohol should be 
served and that no women should carry out state functions during their presence. Tanzania had, 
by then, women ministers who would normally have attended such receptions. The government 
gave in to the Iranian demands. Omari comments that in the long run such an attitude will create 
division between people whose relationship are built on different premises (Omari1987:66-67). 
 In his conclusions Omari warns against these new trends, but states that the relationship 
between the two groups remains harmonious. He also emphasizes that the government does not 
favour any religious group but focus on unity and on building a secular state.  
 
2.3 The Tension Erupts 
During the summer of 1988 tension erupted on Zanzibar when the chairwoman of the 
Association of Tanzanian Women UWT, Sofia Kawawa, criticized the Islamic marriage law and 
claimed that polygamy denied justice to women. UWT has close ties to CCM and the linkage of 
Kawawa's statements to government politics led to violent demonstrations in Zanzibar where two 
people died in the clashes. President Mwinyi found it necessary to make a statement where he 
stressed that Kawawa's initiative was her personal opinion and not the politics of CCM. A 
Presidental Committee was set up to examine the circumstances of the violent reactions. The 
result of the investigation was delivered to the President of Zanzibar in secret (Smith 1990:10). 
Zanzibar faced more trouble the same year when Chief Minister Seif Shariff Hamad was sacked 
from government. He was accused of planning to overthrow the government with help from 
mercenaries from the Gulf states. This shows some of the nervous tension present in the Zanzibar 
government concerning the semi-autonomus role in the union and the strong pressure from its 
inhabitants for independence. Demonstrations followed and reached a climax in May 1989 when 
Hamad was arrested after he called for a referendum on the union matter (Ludwig 1994:4). 
 On the mainland, professor Kighoma Malima was appointed minister of education in 1988. 
He claimed that Muslim youths had been discriminated against, and suggested preferential 
treatment for Muslims in the selection process for secondary education. A strong reaction came 
from a fundamentalist group, Warsha, who in an open letter to all Muslims supported the 
favorism for Muslims (Smith 1990:11). The following year Malima was appointed Minister of 
Finance, and this resulted in speculations among Christians about increased Islamic influence in 
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government. At a meeting of the Christian Council of Tanzania, CCT,  a delegate claimed that 
this policy was a part of the ground work for Islamic advancement or jihad, holy war (Ludwig 
1994:2). In an effort "to safeguard unity, peace, calm and understanding in the country" (Daily 
News 14/3 1989) the government the same year announced the ban of the controversial book 
"Satanic Verses."   
 In 1989 the Christian organization “Big November Crusade Ministries”19 was formed with 
the aim to organize the big open air meetings which had taken place in Dar es Salaam every year 
since 1986. The big so-called “Power Crusades” go on for about two weeks and have attracted 
close  to 200.000 people at its peak. The crusades have spread from Dar es Salaam to other parts 
of the country and often foreign preachers have visited the crusades. The German preacher 
Reinhard Bonnke has visited Tanzania several times and has by critics been accused of using a 
“powerful” and militant language when preaching at the open air meetings (Ludwig 1994:7-8). 
The focus of the crusades was often on believers of other religions as “lost” and hence targets of 
conversion. These attitudes from the Christians were noticed by the Muslim community and 
some Muslim leaders accused the crusades of spreading hatred between the two religions. 
 
After this the situation in Tanzania was stable until 1992 when the tension reached new heights. 
One of the reasons was the intensified activities of the Koran-reading society BALUKTA. They 
held public lectures insulting Christianity and Christian leaders and distributed derogatory radio 
and video cassettes, the latter shown in public. This provoked Christian militants who on their 
side gave counter attacks and threatened to publish "Satanic Verses," claiming that this was the 
true interpretation of the Koran. The government was forced to react and Prime Minister John 
Malicela imposed a ban on religious meetings outside mosques and churches (Katoke 1994:15). 
President Mwinyi called for religious toleration on the front page of Daily News20 (15/2 1993). 
He urged Tanzanians to bury religious differences and live together as brothers and sisters. 
BALUKTA rejected this appeal, and according to Israel Katoke Muslim fundamentalists made 
further strategies to endanger lives of Christian leaders and to destroy their properties. During the 
month of Ramadan two containers had been unloaded in Dar es Salaam containing weapons 
disguised as dates needed for the meals of Ramadan (Katoke 1994:16). The Christian weekly 
newspaper, Family Mirror, followed the situation closely and printed; "Iran Funding Muslim  
                                                 
19
The Big November Crusade Ministries was founded by representatives from the Assemblies of God, the 
Lutheran Church, the Anglican Church and other smaller churches (Ludwig 1994:7).  
20Daily News is a government controlled newspaper, but has lately been quite outspoken on conflicts and has 
also frequently criticized the government. 
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Fundamentalists" on their frontpage (Family Mirror no. I. April 1993). The article claimed that 
the weapons were funded by Iran and that certain Muslim groups in Tanzania cooperated with 
organizations in Iran. 
 
Two other political decisions turned out to make the year 1992 even more crucial for the 
religious relationship in the country. In February the government announced that they wished to 
return all schools and hospitals, nationalized in the 1970s, to their former owners which in many 
cases were churches. In June the Kilimanjaro Christian Medical Centre was handed over to the 
Good Samaritan Foundation where the Lutheran church held the majority in the board of 
trustees. Several hospitals were in the following handed back to different churches. This caused 
concern among parts of the Muslim population. A result of this concern was that President 
Mwinyi in October declared that schools were not to be returned, but private organizations were 
encouraged to build new schools. 
 The other, and most radical politcal decision made in Tanzania the last decade, was the 
decision to introduce multi-party-democracy. This was announced in the summer of 1992. Some 
limitations, however, followed the announcement. Parties based on ethnicity or religion were not 
allowed to be formed. The government also emphasized that the state, the political parties and 
the religious leaders had to work together to secure the religious harmony and the social peace 
within this new political system (Ludwig 1994:3). But popular sentiments are very hard to avoid 
in a new-born democracy and the leader of the Democratic Party, Reverend Christopher Mtikila, 
is an example of this. He has openly declared that his mission is to defend Christianity against 
Islam. He was first brought to prominence when he at a CCM conference in 1988 circulated a 
letter opposing Mwinyi's presidency because, he claimed, Mwinyi favored Islam at the expense 
of Christianity. The Democratic Party's manifesto proposes the break-up of the union between 
Tanganyika and Zanzibar and the expelling of all Arabs, Indians and Somalis from the mainland 
(Africa Events, March 1993:22). 
 
2.3.1 Internal Problems for the Religious Communities 
But not only the relationship between Christians and Muslims experienced tension. Also within 
the religious communities conflicts developed. The Supreme Council for Muslims in Tanzania, 
BAKWATA, was repeatedly criticized for not being able to promote effective leadership for the 
Muslims in the country. The organization was also held responsible for chaos and disunity 
among the Muslims. The rival organization, BALUKTA, gained at this time more and more 
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influence (Ludwig 1994:3). The reason for BALUKTA's growth was their increased activity in 
promoting education for Muslims and their organization of pilgrimages to Mekkah. The 
outspokenness of their charismatic leader Sheikh Yahya Hussein was also a considerable factor 
in their increased influence. 
 The churches also faced internal problems. The main problem among Protestant churches 
was the splitting-up of dioceses and that these conflicts sometimes followed ethnic lines. The 
most serious and dramatic incident was the so-called "Mount Meru Crisis" of 1992. The conflict 
among the Meru people started with the demand from a group among the Lutherans to form their 
own diocese. The leader of this faction, Jackson Kaaya, wanted separation from the Northern 
Diocese of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tanzania, ELCT. When this demand was not met 
by ELCT, the property was taken over by violence and several people were killed in the incident. 
The new "Mount Meru Diocese" was recognised by the state authorities, but this led to a sharp 
reaction from the Lutheran bishops. They sent an open letter where they challenged the 
government. The registration was withdrawn by the minister of Home Affairs, A. Mrema. Later 
a new diocese, "Meru Diocese", loyal to ELCT was formed (Ludwig 1994:3).  
 
2.3.2 The Good Friday Upheavals 
Attempts were made by the government to improve the relationship between the two religions. 
Several times during the first months of 1993 representatives from the government appeared in 
the newspapers pleading for religious toleration (Daily News 15/2, 19/2, 22/2, 25/321 1993). In 
March Mwinyi met the leaders of the Catholic, the Anglican and the Lutheran churches in an 
attempt to reorganize the relationship between the church and the state, after the churches had 
expressed concern about the development. The churches complained about the public speeches, 
cassettes and some newspapers carrying derogatory and insulting contents - blaming the 
government for lack of action. The President tried to appease the church leaders and to play 
down the issue, but one month later the government had no other choice but to react (Ludwig 
1994:4). 
 On April 9, on Good Friday, Muslims from five different mosques, under the direction of 
BALUKTA, organized attacks on pork shops in three districts of Dar es Salaam. Previous to this, 
the Imams of the five mosques had written a letter to the District Commisioner demanding a 
closure of all pork butcheries before April 5. The Commisioner arranged a meeting on April 6 
telling the Imams that the butcheries were licensed. The Muslims could not accept this and on 
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Good Friday they attacked the shops causing material damages and injuring the owners (Embu 
1993:4). The government carried out a massive crackdown on the demonstrators arresting close 
to one hundred Muslims during the month of April, including the leader of BALUKTA, Sheikh 
Yahya Hussein. The Minister of Home Affairs, A. Mrema, stated that "Evil factors must be 
crushed" (Daily News 15/4 1993) and Field Force units were put into action as several days of 
rioting and violence persisted. Both courts and mosques were besieged by demonstrators and the 
police arrested people with petrol bombs and other types of explosives (Daily News 11/4 - 27/4 
1993). The front page of the newspaper Family Mirror read; "500 Youths Register For Jihad." 
The following story claimed that Muslim fundamentalists planned a military training-camp in the 
Morogoro region (Family Mirror no. II. April 1993). During this period there were tapes 
circulated which called for further destruction of pork butcheries, poisoning of breweries and 
bombing of dance-halls and liquour stores. On Zanzibar two liquour stores were burnt down after 
petrol-bomb attacks. The government struck BALUKTA off the list (Daily News 29/4 1993) and 
tapes released by the organization were to be surrendered to the police. During the crackdown 
three Sudanese teachers of religion were expelled from the country. Again Family Mirror printed 
a front page about the religious conflict, this time with two cover stories. The first stated that 
Mwinyi was accused of betraying Islam by the Muslim Student Organization because of the 
massive crackdown after the pork-butcheries affair. The other story claimed that BALUKTA 
offered free tickets to Mecca for joining jihad (Family Mirror no.1. May 1994). Most Muslim 
leaders supported the government crackdown and to BAKWATA, to whom BALUKTA had 
become a serious rival, the government action was a relief. As a result of the religious unrest the 
government decided that no new religious organization would be registered without the approval 
from either BAKWATA or the Christian Council of Tanzania, CCT (Embu 1993:5). 
 
2.3.3 The OIC-Crisis 
Perhaps the most serious political and religious issue, that shook the leaders of both religion and 
the nation, was Zanzibar's membership to the Organization of Islamic Conference. The 
membership was first mentioned on BBC before it was picked up by the local press. The news 
was first denied by the union government but later confirmed by the island itself. The issue was 
intensely discussed on the mainland and the crucial political question was whether Zanzibar had 
violated the constitution or not. A committee was immediately brought together to look into the 
matter. Also from the church critical voices were raised, and their main concern was the religious 
                                                                                                                                                        
     21The President of Zanzibar tells Sheiks:"Do not use religion to agitate youths." 
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content of the membership. The Lutheran Bishop Peter Mwasmasika said that if Zanzibar had 
joined the OIC there was bound to be chaos in the country. A church delegation was invited to 
Zanzibar by the Chief Minister Dr. Omar Ali Juma, who tried to explain the membership. Juma 
said that the OIC might be the only organization that could handle the South-South cooperation. 
He also emphasized the economic adventages of membership, including access to IDB’s (the 
Islamic Development Bank) projects. The Chief Minister also stated that "the organization is 
neither strictly Muslim or Arab." (Ludwig 1994:4-5). Omar Ali was supported by President 
Mwinyi who according to Africa Events, argued that the OIC was primarily an organization for 
international economic and cultural cooperation where IDB offered interest-free loans. 
 
 The Tanzanian President tried to argue that Zanzibar's OIC membership was not a 
religious issue, and nor was it a political one, but primarily economic. (Africa 
Events,  March 1993:20) 
 
In March 1993 Tanzania's parliamentary committee on constitutional and legal affairs announced 
to the national assembly that Zanzibar's decision to join the OIC was a violation of the unions 
constitution.Their reference to the constitution was that foreign affairs was a union matter. After 
stormy debates, the Zanzibar government decided to withdraw its membership in August 1993. It 
has been claimed that former President Nyerere "refused to advise the state on the matters of the 
union" (Embu 1993:7) unless they withdraw from the OIC. Anyhow, soon after the withdrawal 
Nyerere told about 80 journalists at a press conference in his home that he was disturbed by the 
government's handling of the issue. He warned that if those in authority continued to violate the 
law, the union was bound to break, and he emphasized that the present union should be 
maintained. But the OIC-crisis increased the influence of those mainlanders who had argued for 
a three-government system where each is running its own affairs under a loose federal type 
government (Ludwig 1994:5).   
 
At the time of the OIC-crisis the government faced another problem as a rumour circulated that 
Tanzania had joined the Islam in Africa Organization, IAO, way back in 1989. A document 
claiming to be an official communique, issued in the Nigerian capital after the IAO-conference 
in 1989, was circulated to all private newspapers in Tanzania. The document alleged that 
Tanzania was represented in the steering committee, and contained, among other facts, the 
information that one of the aims of IAO was the eradication of all non-Muslims religions in 
Africa. Several newspapers followed the case without checking the document any further and the 
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Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly justified parliamentary investigation on the matter. 
The communique turned out to be a forgery. The result of the intense discussions was more 
distrust between the two religions (Africa Events, March 1993: 19-20). 
 
2.3.4 Destruction of Church Properties 
1994 continued the way 1993 ended, with more religious conflicts. Apart from religious 
disagreements and discussions the events took a more serious and sad turn. Shauritanga 
Secondary School outside Moshi, a girl-school owned by the Roman Catholic church, was set 
afire and 43 young girls were killed. After this, several churches received letters with threats of 
church-burnings. The magazine WATU could, in September, tell the story about a church in the 
southern part of the country where the caretaker had noticed the smell of petrol, called the police 
and managed to prevent a fire as the criminals fled (WATU 22-29/9 199422). On the 22nd of 
September St. Mark's Catholic church on Zanzibar was burnt to the ground (Kiongizi, October 
1994). Arsonists also burnt down the African Inland Church in Lamu on the 23rd of October 
(Daily Nation 24/10 1994). 
 The Roman Catholic newspaper Kiongozi, on the front page of the October issue asked the 
question; "Will Christian Churches and Institutions Continue to be Burnt?" The article blamed 
the government and the President for failing to control the situation. According to the newspaper 
people understood silence as support, thinking that the President supported the criminals by not 
taking action against them. The Roman Catholic Bishop Polycarp plead, in the same article, for 
the Christians to remain calm and pray. He said that the criminals are a small group of Muslim 
fundamentalists who, first of all, have personal interest in creating chaos as they are being funded 
by rich countries. He pictured them as a small fire that can create huge damage if  not put out. He 
further said that the Christians must stick together because, if the Christians divide, the 
Fundamentalists have reached their goal and can run the country. As a private citizen, and not as 
a bishop, Polycarp questioned the lack of action from the government, concluding that if the 
government does not react it must be because they support what happens (Kiongozi, October 
1994).  
 
The writings of C.K. Omari from 1984 and 1987 focused on the good relationship between 
Christians and Muslims in Tanzania. In 1987, however, he was concerned about the tendencies 
                                                 
     22In Kiongozi, October 1994. 
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he experienced of religious separatism. In a paper from a lecture given in Bayreuth, Germany, 
October 1994 he says: 
 
 But more disturbing is the way Christian institutions like churches, hospitals and 
schools have been targets of rampant burning and destructions. Some of  the 
suspects have been Muslim radicals who have vowed publicly through their 
magazines like Al-Nur and Mizania that their aim is to make Christians’ living 
impossible in Tanzania. (Omari 1994:8) 
 
In this paper Omari blames weak leadership for not being able to control the religious situation in 
Tanzania. The development in Omari's writings is symptomatic of the development of the 
religious situation in Tanzania. 1984 with the end of the ujamaa period was also the start of a 
decade of increased religious conflict. 
 
2.4 The Experiences of the Church 
Apart from some radical elements among the Christians in Tanzania who were immediately 
provoked by the increased Muslim activity and responded, the large majority of the Church 
remained calm. The close ties between the two main church organizations CCT and TEC23 and 
the government made the Christians trust that the government would react against the new 
disruptive elements. When the leaders of the state were not able to stop the agitation the 
Christian leaders called for a meeting with President Mwinyi to discuss the matter. The public 
speeches, and the derogatory content of some of the cassettes and videotapes that were spread, 
really caused concern among the Christian congregations. 
 Also in the Tanga region the Christians have experienced new Muslim activities. Rev. 
Joyce Kibango, of the Lutheran church in Tanga, has lately noticed a change in the approach of 
the Muslims. 
 
 There have been complaints about Christians from the mosque loudspeakers, and 
also an extended use of biblical criticism among Muslims. They are more aggressive 
now - times are changing. (Kibango 1994) 
 
                                                 
23
Tanzania Episcopal Conference, the Roman Catholic umbrella organization. 
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Tanga Big Mission24 earlier experienced that Muslims tried to disturb their open-air meetings. 
But, after permission was required to hold the meetings the harassments have stopped. Rev. 
Kibango also claims that there have been campaigns going on among certain groups in the 
Muslim community to marry Christian girls so that the girl and her children would become 
Muslims. As a result of that Joyce Kibango received complaints from young girls who did not 
understand the implications of such marriages. Despite this, it is in fact the "normal" 
intermarriages, for generations, between Christians and Muslims that have kept the situation 
from getting out of hand, according to Rev. Kibango (Kibango 1994). 
 Another who has experienced the Muslim activity is Rev. Rafik Daudjee, a pastor in an 
Tanzania Assemblies of God congregation in Dar es Salaam. Daudjee is of Indian origin and was 
born a Muslim. After he finished his Master of Divinity in Nairobi and returned to Dar es Salaam 
as a Christian pastor he has repeatedly been offered money and the opportunity to open his own 
business if he returned to Islam (Daudjee 1994)25. 
 
The official line from the church has been to remain calm and pray for peace. The Bishops have 
repeatedly asked the Christians to pray and not react violently to the challenge from the extreme 
Muslims (Kiongizi, October 1994). But the church has been forced to realize that the religious 
relationship is changing, as expressed by the Roman Catholic Bishop James Sangu in Daily 
News 12/4 1993: 
 
 ..."it is high time Tanzanians stopped boasting to the world that they were living in a 
peaceful country." He said they should rather concentrate on how best restore 
peace, which "is going out of hand." 
 
This advise has been followed by the Christians, and physical reactions towards the Muslim 
fundamentalists have not appeared. The churches have however had to take their precautions, 
and several Christian institutions have increased the number of watchmen after the damaging of 
church property lately. 
 
                                                 
24
An organization with support from the Lutherans, the Anglicans, the Pentecostals and the Assemblies of God. 
      25 The same tendencies as experienced by Kibango and Daudjee, are referred to in a CCT report from the Tabora 
 region (Sendegeya 1995). 
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2.5 The Situation Among the Muslims on the Coast of Kenya 
The Muslim community on the coast of Kenya has had a different development than their 
Swahili counterpart in Tanzania. The Muslim group in Kenya is much smaller and have therefore 
played a much more marginal part in the development of their country. The largest Muslim 
community in Kenya is situated in the coastal region around Mombasa, with Muslims minorities 
spread around the interior. According to Christian sources, the Muslims hold 7 percent of the 
population in Kenya26. The percentage given by Muslims in Mombasa is 30 (Ahmed 1994)27. 
Regardless of the percentage it is a fact that Muslims have been marginalized especially in the 
field of education. This because of the negative attitude that the Muslims developed to the 
missions that introduced the Western education (Maina 1995:5) 
 Kenya has also suffered from tension between the Christians and the Muslim minority the 
last decade. Several of the controvercies have been over issues of education. In 1991 a number of 
schools, among them Star of the Sea Girl's High School in Mombasa which is sponsered by the 
Catholic church, were sued by Muslim parents after expelling girls for wearing hijab, the Muslim 
veil. In all the court cases, the court ruled in favour of the Muslim parents. This controversy 
reached political dimensions when a local Muslim parliament claimed that Muslims were being 
harassed in the coast province for dressing according to the Koran. The conflict ended when 
President Moi intervened and directed that no Muslim girls should have to dress in conflict with 
their faith. Similar controversies occured in other parts of Kenya and this has had implications on 
the Christian-Muslim relationship. Several Muslim leaders have appealed to the Muslim 
communities to build their own schools in order to prevent further discrimination from the 
Christians (Maina 1995:6-8). 
 Other issues that have increased the religious tension is various public statements from 
Kenyan Christian leaders who have showed lack of insight and disrespect for Islam with some 
very unwise statements. Archbishop Manasses Kuria stated, while delivering a sermon in 
Nairobi, that Islam and Christianity were similar because Muhammed was a Christian before he 
founded Islam, and that several Muslim traditions are learnt from Christians. Statements from 
other leaders of the church about increased mission directed against the Muslims, referred to in 
the newspapers, have caused countrywide outrage among Muslims, who accused the Christian 
leaders of creating hatred between Christians and Muslims (Gitari 1994). 
                                                 
26World Christian Encyclopædia, edited by David B. Barratt, states that the Muslim population in Kenya is 6      
percent, whereas CHEAM, Advanced Studies on Modern Asia and Africa, claims that the Muslim population is 
7,3 percent (Haafkens 1991:Appendix).  
27This number is supported by Kettani 1986:176. 
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 When the question of multi-party democracy reached its peak in Kenya in 1992, the 
Islamic Party of Kenya, IPK, was founded in Mombasa. The leader of the party, Sheikh Khalid 
Balala managed, with his fiery speeches, to gain support in the old harbour of Mombasa (with 
the centre of the old Swahili culture as the base of the party). IPK was supposed to be a 
democratic party with the aim of overthrowing the present government, but was denied 
registration because it was reckoned a religious party. The denial of registration led to riots in 
Mombasa with the imprisonment of Balala as the result. This caused even more anger among the 
mainly young followers of Balala who attacked the policestation with Molotow-cocktails and 
stones. Balala was later released, but several clashes between the youths of IPK and the police 
followed. Later Balala left the country and stayed for some time in Somalia where he, on the 
BBC, claimed that he was gathering an army of 700 soldiers (Ahmed 1994). In 1994 he was 
denied continued citizenship in Kenya when he applied for a renewal of his passport at the 
Kenyan embassy in Bonn, Germany (BBC Africa News 4/2 1995).  
 Sheikh Balala gained popularity among the unemployed youth in the old port of Mombasa 
by providing money for several of them to get married. He spoke of the need to follow Islam in 
order to change the hopeless situation that many Muslims experience without any education or 
jobs in times of recession. The leader of the Islamic Youth, IPK's youth organization, in an 
interview affirmed this but would not tell where the money came from other than to say that 
"IPK has friends both inside and outside Kenya." (Ahmed 1994). 
 
Something close to the Salman Rushdie affair occured in Kenya when on July 22 an anonymous 
letter was published in one of Kenya's leading newspapers, The Standard, carrying derogatory 
statements against Muslims claiming that Muhammed often had hallucinations and epileptic fits 
which made him have supernatural visions. Some Mombasa Muslims imposed a death-sentence 
on the not yet identified author, and offered the sum of 400.00 Kenyan Shillings to anyone who 
fulfiled the sentence. After an attempt by radical Muslim youths to storm the building of the 
newspaper, the police provided protection. Muslim leaders called for the government to take 
action against the newspaper for publishing insults towards another religion. The case calmed 
down when the editors of The Standard called a meeting and apologized to the Muslim leaders. 
From the viewpoint of some Christians this Muslim response was an example of intolerance of 
others with a different opinion. This was strengthened when Sheikh Khalid Balala, leader of the 
unregistered Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK), issued a similar fatwah, a religious decree, against 
two Mombasa politicians for their anti-IPK stands (Maina 1995:13). 
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2.6 Summary 
The Christian-Muslim relationship on the coast of East Africa has gone through radical changes 
the last decade. The tension has increased mostly because of the revival of religion that Tanzania 
has experienced after the fall of the ujamaa politics. Especially among the Muslims the focus on 
a more pure Islam, with suggestions to reestablish the old Islamic courts, has been intensified. 
The Good Friday upheavals also showed that militant Muslims are ready to use strong means to 
reach their goals. The government unfortunately did not react early enough to stop the militant 
Muslims and has not been able to do anything about the destruction of church properties. An 
increased focus on more active evangelism can be traced among some Christian denominations, 
but the majority of the churches have so far stayed calm and waited for the government to react. 
This patience has been a successful effort to hinder serious clashes in Tanzania, but it is obvious 
that the church is far from satisfied by the way the government has handled the situation. 
Whether this will have any affect on the 1995 presidential election is yet uncertain. 
 Among the population on the coast of Kenya the same tendencies as those occuring in 
Tanzania can be traced. The Muslims focus on more pure Islamic ideas and express discontent 
with their minority status. This indicates that the Muslim groups in Kenya and Tanzania are 
influenced by the same religious tendencies even if the two national states have gone through 
different political developments. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE MUSLIM AND CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES 
 
 
During the last decade the relationship between the Christian and the Muslim communities in 
East Africa has developed into a relationship of serious antagonism. In this chapter the 
development within the different religious communities will be given a closer examination. The 
first part of the chapter deals with the Muslim community and give a presentation of the different 
Islamic organizations in Tanzania and look at some parallels in Kenya. The chapter also contains 
a presentation of how the Muslims view their own situation, and a short survey of the intellectual 
tradition among the Muslims in East Africa. In the presentation of the Christian community only 
a very short survey of the Lutheran and Catholic churches will be given. A closer examination 
will be given to the development in the Pentecostal churches since I view this development as the 
most interesting with reference to the Christian-Muslim relationship. The tendency of 
charismatic influence on the established churches will also be discussed. What several writers 
describe as “Christian fundamentalism” will be looked upon, and an evaluation of the Christian 
contribution to the change in the religious relationship will be given.  
 
3.1 Muslim Organizations 
3.1.1 The Supreme Council of Tanzania Muslims (BAKWATA) 
The Supreme Council of Tanzania Muslims, BAKWATA, was established in Iringa December 
12 1968 as a result of the Islamic Crisis of 1968. BAKWATA is by far the largest Muslim 
organization in Tanzania and has close links to the government. The birth of the organization 
was caused by a serious conflict between EAMWS28, who wanted a strong pan-Islamic unity 
among Muslims in East Africa, and a more government-friendly faction focusing on national 
unity. In the early days of independence the focus on strong national unity was predominant 
among African Muslims, and the fight for a nation-building Islamic organization was also a fight 
against Arab and Indian interests in the more Shia-directed EAMWS. BAKWATA was 
established and given a Swahili name29, showing the focus on a new nation with an official 
                                                 
28East African Muslim Welfare Society 
29Baraza Kuu la Waislam wa Tanzania 
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language instead of the signals an Arabic name would have given. No membership cards were 
issued by BAKWATA with the thought that all Muslims were automatically members of the 
organization. But the opposition never paid much attention to this new organization, and lived its 
life without much influence during the ujamaa years. 
 Even fully supported by the government BAKWATA faced problems and their problems 
were largely financial. With the money from the Shia Muslims no longer available, "self-
reliance" was the only possible solution. Ideologically this was very right considering the policy 
of ujamaa. Economically, however, it was a disaster. Compared with Christian organizations like 
CCT with a massive Western financial support, BAKWATA made a meagre impression. The 
purpose of BAKWATA was to assist Muslims religiously, socially and in the field of education. 
One of their aims  was to work out religious material for use in primary and secondary schools. 
Up to 1977 only two textbooks for this purpose had been produced by the council. Another 
major problem for the Sunni Muslims was to find competent teachers for the teaching of religion 
in primary and secondary schools. 
 The intention from the beginning was to start publishing a Muslim magazine or a journal, a 
Muslim newspaper was also considered. But none of these plans were fulfiled by 1977. 
BAKWATA instead made use of the state radio, CCM papers, meetings, announcements in 
mosques etc. to be heard by the people. BAKWATA was important among the Muslims being 
the official organizers of pilgrimages to Mekkah. 
 Around 1980 David Westerlund heard rumours from Shia Muslims that BAKWATA had 
been in contact with Saudi-Arabia for assistance, but he was met with suspicion from 
BAKWATA officials when he made requests about this, for that time being, very touchy 
political question (see Westerlund 1980:100-106). 
 The opposition against BAKWATA has again raised their voices the last decade. This new 
criticism is also the result of a more open society where for instance open letters in the 
newspapers are a common feature. One specific argument used against the organization is that it 
is more Tanzanian than Islamic. The council was lately  accused of both failing to lead, and 
being the cause of the chaos among Tanzanian  Muslims (Ludwig 1994:3).  
 Sigvard von Sicard claims that the new Islamic revivalism has also largely affected 
BAKWATA. He says that "Since 1985 the council has become more forceful than before in 
pursuing Islamic interests." (Sicard 1991:8). A result of this has been financial support from 
other Muslim countries. Teachers from the Gulf states, Egypt, Libya and Saudi Arabia have been 
brought to Tanzania to teach in the schools, and several public lectures have been given. The 
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request in 1987 to the government about reintroducing the islamic qadi-courts, shows a change 
of weight from national to pan-Islamic unity (Sicard 1991:8-9). 
 
3.1.2 The Koran Reading Society (BALUKTA) 
BAKWATA's  most serious rival to the hegemony among Muslim organizations has recently 
been the Tanzania Council of Koran Reading, BALUKTA. This organization was registered in 
December 1987 by its leaders Sheikh Hassim and Yahya Hussein. Their major task was to 
promote the reading of the Koran and support the established madrasas, the Muslim religious 
schools, both financially and materially. They also intended to build new madrases, Islamic 
centres and higher institutions of religious learning. BALUKTA also organized Koran-
memorizing competitions and participated in competitions held abroad. Their constitution also 
states that their aim is: 
 
 To publish and print and distribute and to assist in the publication, production and 
distribution of Islamic religious books, literature, films, video and audio cassettes, 
pamphlets, posters, periodicals and journals. (Ludwig 1994:11) 
 
BALUKTA was several times warned by the Administrator General that their activities had to be 
limited to Koran reading. Several Christian leaders complained about the derogatory material 
spread by the organization. In August 1988 the council was asked to give back the document of 
registration, but no action followed and BALUKTA became increasingly aggressive (Ludwig 
1994:11). 
 The Koran Reading Society also started to organize their own pilgrimages to Mekkah. This 
caused more conflicts with BAKWATA which had been appointed by the government to 
organize the pilgrimages (Daily News 17/4-1992). The Christian newspaper Family Mirror 
accused BALUKTA of offering free tickets to Mekkah to Muslim youths who joined jihad. 
(Family Mirror no. 1. May 1993).  
 In October 1992 BALUKTA accused CCM Vice-Chairman, Rashidi Kawawa, of 
swindling Muslims of millions of shilling, being responsible for the Maulid and Idd Prayr 
Committee. They demanded his immediate resignation and confirmed thereby their anti-
government attitude (Ludwig 1994:11). After the rampages of the pork butcheries in Dar es 
Salaam in 1993 both Yahya Hussein and Sheik Hassim were arrested by the police. The trials 
against them in court were postponed several times because of demonstrations in the courtroom 
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by BALUKTA-supporters (Daily News 20/4-1993). The result of these events was the 
deregistration of the organization. Both the two leaders and their supporters were later released 
from prison.   
 
3.1.3 Other Muslim Organizations 
One of the more radical Islamic movements is the Workshop of the Commision of Islamic 
Authors, Warsha30. Their intention is to translate and publish Islamic books  in order to educate 
Muslims. Warsha consists of a considerable number of well-educated young men, some of them 
Shiites. The majority of their followers are in the 20-40 age group. They originally started as a 
group within BAKWATA in 1975 to work with questions of education, but their radical 
demands to have Islamic teaching in the organization's secular secondary schools led to a break 
in 1982. The members of Warsha were after this denied any posts inside BAKWATA.    
 From their headquarters in the Quba-Mosque in Dar es Salaam they continue their 
activities, arranging courses and publishing periodicals and literature. Their most famous 
publication, Uchumi katika Uislamo, is a book about Islamic economy. This book criticises the 
political system of ujamaa, claiming it to be communism. But most of their productions are 
concerned with the five pillars of Islam. Warsha is also trying to change the traditional teachings 
in the madrases, where the basic teaching still is the memorizing of the Koran (Westerlund 
1994:148). 
 
Another rival of BAKWATA is the National Muslim Conference, Baraza Kuu, which has a 
number of university employed Muslims  among its members. The organization was established 
in 1992 and it is trying to replace BAKWATA as the umbrella organization of all Muslims in 
Tanzania. Their activities are being closely watched by the government (Westerlund 1994:149). 
Baraza Kuu is also trying to build up their own schooling and education system, in an attempt to 
succeed where BAKWATA failed (Ludwig 1994:11). The organization caused some trouble 
when they held a demonstration in January 1992 where they occupied the offices of BAKWATA 
in Dar es Salaam (Daily News 6/1-1992). 
 
Through their Ten Year Development Plan, published in 1984, the Tanzania Muslim Youth 
expressed some of the feelings lying latent among many Muslims. The plan emphasizes the need 
for a separate Islamic development in society. One aspect of this development is the increased 
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focus on the implementation of sharia (Sicard 1991:8). As already mentioned this issue was 
followed up by BAKWATA three years later.  
 Other new organizations are the Union of Muslim Preachers and the Union of Muslim 
Students, which after the upheavals in April 1993 accused Mwinyi of betraying Islam (Family 
Mirror no.1 May 1993). Also a University Muslim Trusteeship has been founded at the 
University of Dar es Salaam. Their aim is to emphasize that the teachings of the Koran is a 
complete mode of life. This is done by the organization through research, through the publishing 
of Islamic literature and through establishing investment projects which are compatible with 
Islamic practice. The University Muslim Trusteeship sees, as most other Muslim organization, 
the importance of promoting education among young Muslims to remove the gap between 
Christians and Muslims in this field. The Trusteeship aims at helping well qualified young 
Muslims through awarding scholorships and provide financial assistance (Ludwig 1994:12). 
 
3.1.4 Parallels on the Coast of Kenya 
In Kenya the Islamic Party of Kenya, IPK, was founded in January 1992 when the pressure for 
multi-party democracy reached its peak. It was formed to represent the interests of both Muslims 
and non-Muslims, and to fight for the democratic rights of Kenyan Muslims at all levels. IPK 
was denied registration because it was considered a religious  party by the Registrar General. The 
party has with its charismatic and fierce leader Sheikh Khalid Balala become very popular with 
the majority of the Muslim community (Maina 1995:14). IPK has, however, faced massive 
resistance from the government, which is no surprise as their number one aim is to replace 
President Moi (Ahmed 1994). Sheikh Balala was forced to leave the country after several 
instances of imprisonment, and this has somewhat calmed down the activities of the party. 
 The Islamic Party of Kenya claims that their protest has developed because of the 
treatment that Muslims in the coastal region have received from the government. The schools 
lack equipment, the teachers are unqualified, the region has no university and faces a serious 
water problem. In addition, the Muslim population in this region suffers from high 
unemployment, and the increased tourism in the area has led to an explosion in the building of 
pubs and night clubs which in the eyes of the Muslims is a sign of the demoralization of their 
own society.  
                                                                                                                                                        
30Warsha ya Waanchisi wa Kiislamu.  
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 The leader of Islamic Youths31, Mohamed Abdulwahab Ahmed, claims that IPK fights 
together with their Christian brothers for a more democratic Kenya. Their constitution is also free 
of religious proclamations. Their main enemy is President Moi and the present government 
whom they accuse of differential treatment and corruption. In an interview Mohamed argued 
with reference to the Koran each time the question of legitimation was pushed forward. The 
violent actions, which he did not deny had taken place, were always a response to police 
provocations, and had to be met with "an eye for an eye," with force if necessary, and this was in 
accordance with the Koran according to Ahmed  (Ahmed 1994).  
 During my fieldwork I got the impression that IPK and Balala's position in the old town of 
Mombasa had been very strong, but was now on the decline. Young people I was in contact with 
supported the party and were willing to fight the police if necessary, but it seemed that the 
organization suffered from a lack of structure and from the absence of its leader. The young 
unemployed and demoralized Muslims saw in IPK a chance of improved living conditions and a 
restorement of pride and dignity. The grafitti on the old town walls speaks the language of the 
young people; "IPK - for freedom", "IPK - cool and deadly".  
 
Another somewhat more marginalized group of Muslims in Mombasa is the Coast People's 
Party, CPP. They claim that when the coastal province that once belonged to the Sultan of 
Zanzibar was given to Kenya by the English colonial power, certain "coastal safeguards" were 
granted the coast people as a guarantee for some degree of autonomy. This historical fact has, 
according to CPP, been neglected by the government, and they regard it their mission to grant the 
Swahili people of the coast the possibility to decide their own matters. CPP accuses IPK of being 
a group of rebels without support in the population, and does not blame the government for the 
bad physical and demoralized conditions of the old town of Mombasa, but rather the lack of true 
Islam - which is a religion of peace, not of riots (Nassir 199432). 
 
3.2 Muslim Self-Comprehension 
The new vitality among Muslims, seen in the recent creation of several new Muslim 
Organizations comes as a result of several changes in politics and religion both on the  
                                                 
31
 Islamic Youths is the youth organization of IPK. 
32Stambuli Abdillah Nassir is the leader of the Coast People's Party. He claimed that his father was the 
representant of the Coast People in the conference where the strip of land was given to Kenya. According to 
documents he showed me, both former President Kenyatta and President Moi attended the same conference. 
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international and the national level. In Tanzania it is obvious that the new political situation, with 
multi-party democracy and a political climate where religious organizations are again allowed to 
be formed33, has influenced the Muslim view upon their own identity and their influence upon 
society. Even though the Muslims  believe that they constitute the majority of the population 
(Kettani 1986:172) they admit that they face the problems of a minority community34. The 
Muslims feel that they have been marginalized through history. The dominion of the Western 
colonial powers was seen by the Muslims as a period when  the Christians were favoured and 
when Christian values were deeply rooted in the country through the establishment of the 
Western educational system. Even today, more than 30 years after independence  the issue of 
education is a crucial one to many Muslims. This is clearly seen through the aims of all the new 
Muslim organization presented earlier in this chapter. They all share a major focus on education, 
both religious and secular. Statistics show that the Muslim student intake to the universities in 
Tanzania  is below ten percent and that the academic staff at the University of Dar es Salaam is 
below five percent  (Africa Events March 1993:22). Among Muslims these numbers led to the 
demands of preferential treatments for Muslim youths (see 2.3). A look at the statistics from the 
secondary schools in Tanzania, however, shows that the problem is much more deep-rooted than 
Christians being favoured in the university intakes. The Muslim writer Abdul Mtemvu in the 
magazine “Change” July 1993 presented a survey from 1990 where out of 127 division 1 passes 
only 14 were from Muslim secondary schools. No Christian seminary produced division 0 (fail) 
while 46% of all Muslim students failed the Form 4 examinatiuon (Embu  1993:9). 
 The Muslim backwardness in education is by the Muslims claimed to be a result of lost 
opportunities because of differential treatment through history. The Western form of education 
was introduced by the Christian missionaries and most Muslims connected the schools with 
conversion to Christianity and therefore refused to send their children to these schools. The 
Muslim community was unable to, or not interested in creating their own schools where secular 
education was given in addition to the religious syllabus. The result of this is a serious problem 
for the Muslims since the control of the political power to a large extent is connected with 
education. Due to uncertainty about their present predicament the Muslims in Tanzania seem to 
be looking back at their history for answers. They again and again remind themselves that they 
were the leading force behind the independence movement and the formation of TANU. They  
                                                 
33This will be further dealt with in the next chapter. 
34Tanzania is referred to in Kettani’s book “Muslim Minorities in the World Today” and Tanzania is also in 
Journal, Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs several times referred to as a country where the Muslims face 
minority problems. 
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also remember that Nyerere - in 1962, after realizing that he had come to power  through a strong 
Muslim support - promised the National Assembly that he would rectify the educational 
imbalance, which he considered a colonial legacy. But this promise has not yet come true and the 
Muslims feel that they continue lagging behind Christians in every sense of the word (Africa 
Events March 1993:22). 
 The view that the Muslims have lagged behind and been marginalized by the Christians is 
shared by several Muslim writers. Ali Kettani in his book “Muslim Minorities in the World 
Today” claims that out of 19 million people living in Tanzania in 1982 55% were Muslims. 
 
 There are about two million Christians in the country, mainly a product of the 
Christian missionary  schools. The real power is in their hands. ...Islamic activity is 
discouraged and Muslims find themselves  as second-class citizens in spite of being 
the majority. (Kettani 1986:173)   
 
Kettani in his short survey of Tanzania claims that Islam is making  headway “... in spite of 
official discouragement, even suppression.“(Kettani 1986:173). It is also the complaint of the 
author that only BAKWATA was allowed to represent the Muslims and as a result of that few 
contacts have been left between the Muslims in Tanzania and the Muslims in the rest of the 
world. Similar thoughts of not having been able to keep up with the Western development is 
expressed by Saiyid Hamid, former vice-chancellor at the Aligahr Muslim University in India, 
when commenting upon the ummah of the Muslim minorities. 
 
 With few exceptions, Muslims all over the world are educationally extremely 
backward. In addition, they do not compare at all with Christians in selfless social 
work. ...Over half a Millenium, our case appears to have gone by default. We have 
not check-mated the efforts made over the centuries by non-Muslim agencies to 
malign Islam. (Hamid 1991:178) 
 
This feeling among Muslims of not having the rights that belong to them is expressed by 
Muslims at all levels. In terms of looking back in history, both Mazrui (1986) and Kettani (1985) 
emphasize that  Islam is much older than Christianity in the area and hence more “African.” 
Kettani even asserts that  Islam was present in the coastal region prior to most of the indigenous 
religions which he claims were brought to the coast from the hinterland after Islam was rooted 
among the swahili culture of the coast (Kettani 1985:220). As above mentioned, the colonial 
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period has been presented by the Muslims as a period of  oppression that left Christianity as its 
legacy. But the criticism of the new generation Muslims also focuses on more recent history. The 
history of TANU/CCM is once more being discussed and several Muslim writers try to analyze 
what went wrong with the Muslim influence. The Muslim writer Msaud argues that because the 
Christians were cooperating with the colonial power the process of demanding independence 
was left to the Muslims. He also states that the colonialist propaganda presenting Nyerere as the 
founder of TANU is forgery. Furthermore he claims that the government of  the early sixties had 
the mission to suppress Islam and let more Christians in the government leadership. Msaud joins 
the increasing criticism of BAKWATA as a government controlled organization and claims that 
the organization was formed without the will of Tanzania Muslims and he ends his article: 
 
Muslims should now stand together to resume the lost glory of fighting for our right in all 
spheres and especially the political sphere. (Msaud 1991:91) 
 
 Another Muslim intellectual, Mohamed Said who represented the new Muslim 
organization Warsha at a conference on Dawah in East Africa in Nairobi in 1989, presented the 
thoughts of recapturing lost political power motivated by an analysis of recent history. His major 
focus was on how the government introduced a campaign of intrigue, sabotage, bribery and 
misinformation against EAMWS in the time prior to the Islamic crisis of 1968 (which led to the 
ban of EAMWS and to the formation of BAKWATA). This was done because the government 
feared EAMWS’ efforts to mobilize and unite all Muslims in one strong organization. Said 
claims that EAMWS had plans to build a Muslim University with the support of the Egyptian 
government, and was in contact with Jordan, Kuwait, Iraq and Lebanon for cooperation. These 
contacts were however broken after 1968. Said further states that “Nyerere obviously launched a 
crusade against Muslim unity.”(Said 1989:2) and he is clear in his verdict on history, claiming 
that CCM has alienated itself from its founders and that the de-Islamization of the party has now 
gone full circle. In describing BAKWATA Mohamed Said is even more merciless: 
 
 The word BAKWATA is a word of insult. To refer to a Muslim as a BAKWATA 
member is like calling a Christian a disciple of Judas Iscariot who sold Jesus for 30 
pieces of silver. (Said 1989:3) 
 
Said concludes by saying that the Muslim identity was wiped out of CCM in that the party 
should be a party without religion. It is now time for Muslims to wake up and recapture their lost 
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political power, is the message of Mohamed Said and he refers to the increased activity among 
the Muslims all over Tanzania. More that 100 Muslim organizations, even though only a few of 
them are registered, have according to Said been formed around the country. He says that the 
government is afraid to register the new organizations because they want to protect the power of 
BAKWATA. But this cannot go on, says Said and continues:”Because of the anti-Muslim 
campaign even the most liberal Muslims have become radicalized.“(Said 1989:5)  
 
But not only the previous governments are the targets of the criticism from this new and very 
vocal element among Tanzania Muslims. The present President, who by many Christians has 
been accused of being religiously influenced in his political appointments and extremely lenient 
towards Muslim militants, is also being criticized by these Muslims. They accuse Mwinyi of 
failing to create an environment where the imbalance that the Muslims have suffered could be 
redressed. They are also disappointed that Mwinyi has not appointed more Muslims ministers 
and general secretaries in his government. This way the President is under double fire and is 
divided between the policy and tradition of his party and the new demands from the Muslims 
that feel that now is the time to restore the pride of the Muslims (Africa Events March 1993:22). 
 
3.2.1 The Islamic Intellectual Tradition in East Africa 
In the Islamic intellectual tradition in East Africa the writings and the teachings of Sheikh al 
Amin bin Ali al-Mazrui (1891-1947) is by far the most prominent. Prior to al-Mazrui’s activities 
several ulama, Islamic teachers, had acted as mediators between East Africa and the larger 
Islamic communities in Mecca, Medina, Cairo and as far as Constantinopel, but none of them 
has attracted as much academic interest as Sheik al-Amin. It was left to him to arouse the much 
needed social conciousness and commitment among the Muslims of the East African coast. His 
personal crusade was against the forces hostile to Islam, and he expressed himself through 
private and public mosque seminars, through journalistic ventures and through his scholarly 
publications. His efforts did a lot to provide social and religious leadership that was so lacking in 
East Africa around 1930, when his activities reached their climax (Elmasri 1987:229). 
 Sheikh al-Amin al Mazrui was in socio-economic and political matters considered a radical 
whereas in theological and juristic matters he was decidedly a conservative. He sought to change 
the attitudes of Muslims in the matters that he considered responsible for their backwardness; 
their indifference to modern education, their neglect of women’s education and their economic 
extravagance. Al-Mazrui was eager to emphasize that it was not Islam that was the cause of the 
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Muslim backwardness, but that rather the Muslim neglect of the Islamic teachings caused their 
misery. It would not be correct to say that Sheikh al-Amin was criticizing the entire Muslim 
community in East Africa. What he was critical of was that group of Muslims comprised by the 
Arab and the Swahili population. He compared them to the Asian Muslims who encouraged 
entrepeneurship and thrift, who pioneered women’s education and public philantrophy. He also 
compared them to the Christians who through their adoption of Western education had made 
rapid progress. One of al-Mazrui’s main aims was to encourage Muslims to accept secular 
education. Prior to his efforts there had been a few incidents of priests persuading Muslim 
children to convert into Christianity. This created fear among Muslim parents who refused to 
send their children to the schools because they suspected that secular education would alienate 
their children from their Islamic religion and culture. In the case of sending young female 
Muslims to these schools, the parents were even more reluctant. Sheikh al-Amin through his 
clever and learned argumentation was however able to persuade many Muslim parents that there 
was no contradiction between secular education and Islamic religion and culture. He often 
quoted the Prophet’s own teaching that Muslims should seek education wherever they could find 
it, even if it be in China. It was through these efforts that, from the late 1930s, a generation of 
highly educated Muslims emerged, among them Sheikh al-Amin’s own son Ali Mazrui, who 
turned out to be an internationally eminent political scholar. 
 Another important lasting contribution of Sheikh al-Amin is the more progressive view of 
modern Islam. Al-Mazrui managed to enlighten people to see the true spirit of Islam as a religion 
of social progress. He fought against conservatism and bid’a35 practices, many of which were 
bordering on superstition and unIslamic practices. He also emphasized the necessity of positive 
social organization and welfare in the Islamic community. The importance of economic and 
social activities that brought progress was another issue which was central to Sheikh al-Amin’s 
teaching. All these efforts have made him reckoned as the initiator of the new revivalist and 
modernist movement of Islam on the coast of East Africa (Elmasri 1987:230-232). 
 
It was as a social observer and analyst who sought to adapt the teachings of the Koran to the 
present society that Sheikh al-Amin presented himself through his writings. His radicalism came 
from his reluctance to confine his readings to the traditional Hadramaut literature that 
characterized the East African ulama. He read modernist theology and jurisprudence coming 
                                                 
35Bid’a is an innovation, a belief or practice for which there is no precedent in the time of the Prophet. Thus a 
distinction can be made between “good” and “bad” bid’as. A good bid’a must not be contrary to the Koran, the 
Sunna or a specific tradition (Encyclopedia of Islam vol I 1960:1199). 
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from al-Azhar36 and Egypt in general. Al-Mazrui also himself contributed to Egyptian magazines 
that were preoccupied with the plight and decadence of Islamic societies. Together with his 
Egyptian intellectual contemporaries Taha Husayn (1889-1973) and Ahmad Amin (1886-1954) 
he shared their admiration for some of the more moderate ideas of Muhamad Abduh and 
Jamaldin al-Afghani37. Sheikh al-Amin was especially preoccupied with Abduh’s social 
commentaries on the state of the Muslim world vis-a-vis the Western world. Al-Mazrui 
compared Abduh’s Egypt, which had a Coptic Christian minority which was far more 
intellectually and economically developed than the majority of the Muslims, to East Africa 
where the Christians had made great strides in the educational and economical spheres. Like 
Muhammed Abduh, Sheikh al-Amin found the roots of this decadence in the Muslim inability to 
follow the Islamic path. Their neglect of religious duties had ruined their communal spirit, the 
ummah, so essential for economic, social and political progress. This analysis was the starting 
point for Sheikf al-Amin al-Mazrui’s crusade to reform East African Muslims (Elmasri 
1987:231).  
 To fight the heretical Qadianis38, who started intensive missionary work in the region in 
the 1930s (Westerlund 1980:47) became another important issue to al-Mazrui. He argued that the 
Qadianis were successful because the East African Muslims did not bother to study their religion 
seriously, and because they were so well organized. In addition they had translated the Koran 
into Swahili, which was the only Swahili-translation of the Koran available. Sheikh al-Amin set 
himself the task to translate the Koran into Swahili to correct the Qadiani misconceptions which 
were widely published. Al-Mazrui was, however, not able to complete his translation of the 
Koran before the scourge of tuberculosis struck him dead. Throughout his life as a writer and as 
a teacher he had gathered around him a circle of bright students and among them the legacy of 
Sheikh al-Amin al-Mazrui was carried on (Elmasri 1987:232). 
 
Among the students who followed Sheikh al-Amin was the Zanzibarian Abdallah Saleh Farsy 
(1912-1982), who turned out to be the most prominent of al-Mazrui’s followers. Farsy grew up 
on Zanzibar which in the early 20th century not only was a commercial but also an educational 
centre with long traditions. There was  a constant flow of students between the islands and the  
                                                 
36The al-Azhar University in Cairo, connected with the al-Azhar Mosque is reckoned as the leading university in 
the Muslim world (Opsal 1994:317). 
37The ideas and the writings of Abduh and al-Afghani will be further elaborated in chapter five. 
38The Qadianis was the name given to the followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1839-1908) who claimed to be 
the promised Messiah of the Jews, the Christians and the Muslims. They were also called Ahmadiyas 
(Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics vol. X 1974:530). 
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intellectual centres of al-Azhar, Mecca and Medina. In addition to the religious education, 
Zanzibar had adopted the British educational system where secular subjects had the priority. 
Consequently, relative to other East African colonies, Zanzibar had the highest number of 
literates in both Arabic and Roman scripts. The presence of this intellectually sophisticated 
environment encouraged Farsy to choose a theological career. Farsy was able to study under 
learned Sheiks who taught the Arabic language and Islamic jurisprudence. He applied himself 
conscientiously to jurisprudence and Koranic exegesis, but it was the study of the methodology 
of the Hadith collection that occupied most of his time and energy. He came through these 
studies to be considered the greatest authority on the prophetic traditions in East Africa. Farsy 
continued his master Sheikh al-Amin’s work by sharing his knowledge with the Islamic 
population in East Africa through the Swahili language. Farsy was comfortable with Arabic, but 
saw the education of the masses as his most important task and continued al-Mazrui’s translation 
of the Koran into Swahili. The fight against the heretical views of the Qadianis was also 
continued by Farsy, and in the preface to the new translation of the Koran Sheikh Farsy 
emphasized that this translation preceded that of the Qadianis (Elmasri 1987:236). 
 The most important issue that both al-Mazrui and Farsy devoted themselves to was that of 
defending orthodox Islam in East Africa. This was mainly done by teaching and publishing their 
works in Swahili. But especially Farsy also fought for an increased focus on Arabic teaching in 
the schools. In this capacity he is best remembered for his introduction of the Islamic syllabus in 
the school system which today is still being used. Both Sheikh al-Amin and Sheikh Farsy were 
deeply concerned with the lack of religious knowledge among the Arab and Swahili Muslims in 
East Africa. They both concluded that the lack of community spirit, the badly organized 
madrasas and the low level of education among Muslims had to be dealt with through an 
intensified focus on religious education to the masses and a return to the path of the true 
orthodox Islam (Elmasri 1987:232-236). 
 
Among the present intellectual Muslims in East Africa the Shia Sheikh Seyyid Saeed Akhtar 
Rizvi is the most outspoken and clear-minded. He is one of the initiators behind the periodical, 
The Light, which is published by the Bilal Muslim Mission of Tanzania. The Bilal Mission is 
situated in Dar es Salaam and Rizvi is holding the title of “Chief Missionary” of The Light (he 
was earlier the editor).  
 One of Rizvi’s main preoccupations is the idea of Islamic leadership. He accuses the Sunni 
scholars who through “hundred and thousands of articles, books and treaties” try to show that the 
Islamic system of government is based upon democracy. Rizvi also attacks those Muslims who 
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claim that Islam teaches  and creates socialism. “All this changing with the wind is making 
mockery of the Islamic system of leadership.“(Rizvi 1990:5). Sheikh Rizvi asserts that Islam is 
not the government of the people but it is the government of Allah, by the representatives of 
Allah to gain the pleasure of Allah. He uses the Prophet himself to underline his criticism of the 
modernist Muslims both in East Africa and in the rest of the Muslim world: 
 
 The Holy Prophet is the highest authority of Islam: he combines in his person all the 
functions of legislative, executive and judicial branches of the government; and he 
was not elected by the people. (Rizvi 1990:6) 
 
Apart from writing about the teachings of the Koran and answering questions concerning 
religious practices, Rizvi is best known for his comments on international politics and religious 
events. His articles in The Light reveal a very strong anti-Western attitude shown through his 
analysis of the Western political world dominion. Rizvi tends to interpret most political actions 
carried out by Western nations as moves in what he calles “the ongoing -” or “the 4th Crusade.” 
He claims that the planning of  the nation of Israel started already in 1917 when Great Britain 
occupied Palestine. This was fullfilled when the USA became the new world power after WW II. 
Everything went well for the Western powers until 1979 when Iran after the revolution broke its 
contact with the West and condemned Israel. Following this unexpected event, Rizvi claims that 
the West started their conspiracy against Islam  which led to the Iraqi war against Iran. Also the 
Gulf conflict was created by the USA, when they fooled Saddam Hussein into attacking Kuwait. 
This was done in order to secure the Americans their oil-interests in the Gulf by helping the 
Gulf-states and create a large oil debt to Washington (Rizvi 1991:11). Even the fall of the Iron 
Curtain was a part in the plan to fight Islam, according to Rizvi: 
 
 What was unthinkable a few months earlier became a reality and USA and USSR 
became bossom friends. All these changes took place in order to free the powers of 
“Kufr” for fighting against the forces of Islam. (Rizvi 1991:12) 
 
 As a leading Shia intellectual in the region Sheikh Rizvi is naturally very pro-Iranian. He 
sees the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini as the succession of the first Imams, fighting for the 
oppressed. Iran has taken the leading role in the Muslim world as the force behind liberation 
from the oppressors from the West. “Thus, all Islamic countries such as Iran must spiritually and 
financially support countries which are fighting colonizing countries.“ (Rizvi 1983:23) However, 
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the sorrow of the Muslim world is in Rizvi’s eyes that Khomeini’s revolution has failed to make 
Islam the world’s third force. The revolution has aroused Islamic revolutionary fervour 
throughout the world, but it has not been able to unite the Muslim world, Rizvi states: 
 
 The conservative governments of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea regions are 
not interested in uniting as Muslims although all of them are proud of their own 
devotion to Islam and Islamic leadership. (Rizvi 1983:24) 
 
Sheikh Rizvi is clear in his verdict on the lack of devotion in the other Muslim countries to the 
universal ummah of the Muslims. He claims that the puritanical Saudi government is busy 
strengthening its own power. The so-called Muslim government in Egypt is using the same 
methods as the Shah of Iran used to suppresss the revolutionaries in Iran. In Iraq the greatest 
Muslim revolutionaries are either killed or deported. The list of Rizvi’s complaints about his 
Muslim brothers is long, but most of all he attacks the rich Gulf-states: 
 
  
 The stupendous wealth of the oil-producing Islamic countries has not benefited their 
Muslim masses, let alone benefiting other Muslim countries. It has gone a long way 
to enrich a small number of Shayks, Amirs, Sultans and their families and 
dependants, instead of benefiting Muslims as a whole. (Rizvi 1983:24) 
 
 An attempt to make a summary of Sheikh Rizvi’s view of the Islamic revival and its 
relationship to the West must contain his emphasis on human values and his focus on the 
alleviation of human suffering. The Islamic revival is according to Rizvi not pitted against 
scientific or industrial development, but against the colonial domination of Russia and the USA. 
Nor is it a confrontation between the revivalists and the Western world as such, but it urges 
Muslims living in the West to fight against all evil in the non-Muslim world. This was, according 
to Rizvi, the message of al-Afghani and Abduh, and it is also the message of Imam Khomeini 
(Rizvi 1983:26).     
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3.3 Christian Organizations 
3.3.1 The Catholic and Protestant Churches 
Tanzania is somewhat different from other African countries because of the absence of Christian 
independent churches. Apart from some independent churches in the Southern parts of Tanzania 
which belonged to the "Watchtower Movement" and were quite short-lived, Tanzanian 
Christianity is mainly organized in the churches that were established by missionaries in the 19th 
century. The two main church organizations in Tanzania are the Catholic Tanzanian Episcopal 
Conference (TEC) and the Christian Council of Tanzania (CCT). TEC is the organization that 
represents most of the Christians in the country since approximately two thirds of Tanzania's 
Christians belong to the Catholic church. CCT is an umbrella organization which represents 
various protestant denominations, the Lutherans, the Anglicans and the Moravians being the 
most influential. These two organizations have been the channels through which the government 
has been in touch with the church. Whenever major political decisions affecting the church are 
being discussed, representatives from these two organizations have meetings with either the 
President or a minister. The organizations have, because of their close ties to the government, 
been looked upon as representing Tanzanian Christians as a whole, even if Pentecostal and other 
new churches have not been members of CCT.  
 Both the Protestant and the Catholic churches have throughout history largely been funded 
by the West, and the missionaries set the standards for the services, the liturgy, the music etc. 
The leadership, especially the Catholic hierarchy, was largely made up of non-Africans. African 
music was for a long time condemned because it was associated with dancing, which many 
missionaries concidered morally wrong. The different denominations seldom cooperated, they 
experienced rather a competition in the conversion of Africans. 
 The era of independence slowly changed some of the attitudes of the churches. A tendency 
towards Africanization was experienced both in finance and in leadership. The Protestant 
churches were far ahead of the Catholic churches in these matters, this was partly due to the fact 
that during World War II several Protestant churches were left by themselves when German 
missionaries were interned. The time of independence also strengthened the trend of cooperation 
and ecumenism, and here the Vatican II played an important part. The two churches had several 
joint projects in broadcasting, education, medicine etc. But ecumenism was first of all an elite 
phenomena which did not necessarily show on grassroot level. Gradually Africanization also 
appeared in terms of songs and music, and the theology changed together with the political 
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development of the country as both CCT and TEC developed strong ties to the government  
(Westerlund 1980: 54-55). 
  
When multi-party democracy was introduced in 1992, the churches did not react 
enthustiastically. The relationship between the churches and the new parties was from the start 
very tense, and pastors were discouraged from participating in politics. Opposition parties that 
asked for prayers before their meetings were refused, and some opposition leaders even claim 
that they were not allowed to attend the regular Sunday services in the established churches. A 
result of this was that the churches outside TEC and CCT in the first period after the decision to 
introduce multi-party system somewhat surprisingly established ties to the new political parties 
(Ludwig 1994:8-9). 
 
3.3.2 The Growth of the Pentecostal Churches 
When the different churches in Tanzania are represented in connection with the changes in the 
relationship with Muslims, the Pentecostal churches deserve a closer presentation than the 
Protestant and the Catholic church. The reason behind this is that this church has caused the 
greatest change both in Tanzanian Christianity and in the relationship of the churches to the 
Muslim denomanations the last decade. 
  The Pentecostal church has been present in Tanzania since 1927, but its influence was 
marginal until the 1970s. The Holiness Mission, as the first  Pentecostal organization, started 
their work in the Mbeya region. From 1949 their work was taken over by the Assemblies of God. 
In 1932 the Swedish Free Mission arrived and started their work in the Tabora region. The 
Pentecostal Bible School in Mbeya, which was founded in 1959, resulted in many successful 
preachers from this centre, and evangelization campaigns were started to most of Tanzanias 
regions. The success of the campaigns is by the church partly explained with the political 
situation in Tanzania in the 1970s. The villagization programme during the ujamaa period 
helped to make the church grow. Many villages needed preachers and the Pentecostals were 
much more flexible and could adapt themselves more quickly to the new situation than the 
Catholic and the main Protestant churches, which were located in their old, established buildings. 
The enforced mobility may also have made people more adaptable to new religious concepts and 
doctrines. 
 Pentecostalism spread significantly during the 1970s, and espescially the Assemblies of 
God grew rapidly. The Assemblies developed into a well organized institution and has now an 
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archbishop as its spiritual head and a General Council as its executive organ. The General 
Council meetings decide whether new sections or dioceses will be formed. Up to now there are 
formed 38 sections and five regions or dioceses are represented by their own bishops. 
 After a long period of success the Pentecostals in Tanzania experienced a time of 
splittings. The largest Pentecostal church, the Swedish Free Mission (SFM), faced problems and 
some of its earlier member churches in 1982 formed the Pentecostal Association in Tanzania. 
Around the same time The Tanzanian Assemblies of God experienced a struggle for power with 
the result that a new organization, the Evangelistic Assemblies of God was formed. But it seems 
that the splittings were no hindrance for the further spread of the movement, rather the opposite. 
It is hard to estimate the exact numbers of the Pentecostal churches since very few of them keep 
records, but the total number of Pentecostals in Tanzania could be approximately half a million. 
  
As a result of the Good Friday riots in Dar es Salaam 1993 the government decided that no 
religious organization could be registered without being part of an umbrella organization like 
BAKWATA or CCT. The Pentecostal churches which existed outside the established churches 
had to form their own organization, and in June 1993 the Pentecostals Council of Tanzania 
(PTC) was formed. Even if the decision to form the council was pushed forward by the 
government, the need of a unifying body had been felt for a long time in the Pentecostal 
movement. The PTC has as its aim to represent Pentecostal interests and coordinate the 
churches’ open-air meetings and radio broadcastings. This means that some form of cooperation 
with the government will be necessary and it will also lead to some kind of integration into the 
present political system for the Pentecostal Council of Tanzania (see Ludwig 1994:5-10). 
 
3.3.3 The Charismatic Influence on the Protestant Churches 
Both Islam and Christianity have experienced a worldwide revival the last decades, but the 
results of the revivals have been different. The Christian revival has to a large extent affected 
churches in Tanzania where the focus on charismatic gifts goes far beyond Pentecostalism. 
Especially the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tanzania (ELCT) has changed its attitude 
towards this phenomenon. Charismatic gifts like visions, prophecies and healing by prayer are 
nowadays widely accepted among the Lutheran churches. Especially healing by faith is more and 
more integrated in the church activities, as explained by bishop Mwakisunga: 
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 We don`t use any paraphernalia, herbs or medicine but simply prayers of faith. And 
thank God, many sick Christians are coming to pray instead of consulting diviners 
and medicine-men. Many have received healing from God, this includes those who 
are demonically possessed. (Ludwig 1994:7) 
 
The new trend in evangelization is the open air meetings that seem to have become a regular 
happening. Every year at least one big "crusade" is taking place in Dar es Salaam. Behind these 
arrangements are representatives of the Assemblies of God, the Lutheran Church and the 
Anglican Church. The three churches work together in the "Big November Crusade Ministries." 
This organization was formed in 1989/90 and has since 1990 also worked outside Dar es Salaam. 
In 1991 there were crusades in 12 regions of Tanzania. The big "power crusades" go on for about 
two weeks and in Dar es Salaam there have been at the peak 200.000 people attending. Preachers 
from outside Tanzania are often invited and the German Reinhard Bonnke is a regular visitor 
(see Ludwig 1994:5-10).  
 
3.4 Christian Fundamentalism 
3.4.1 Omari's View on Christian Fundamentalism 
The sociologist C.K. Omari has also noticed the change among the Christian churches in 
Tanzania. In his writings from 1987 the chapter "New Trends" has a sub-heading called 
"Fundamentalism or Fanatism" where he handles what he calls Christian fundamentalism. Omari 
is not very exact when he describes the phenomena, but my understanding is that his 
interpretation of Christian fundamentalism or fanatism is the trend represented by the charismatic 
and Pentecostal churches. What Omari criticizes is first of all the more active and outspoken 
evangelization that is a common feature among these churches. 
 
 Fundamentalist attitudes towards people of other faiths are rigid and tend to create 
antagonism among people of one nation. If this is allowed to continue it will in the 
long run destroy the existing good Christian-Muslim relationship. (Omari 1987:66) 
 
He also says that these Christians do not have a theological basis of wanting any political change, 
so they are not, like the Muslims, in that sense a threat to the stability of the nation, but rather a 
threat on the personal level (Omari 1987:66). 
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 In an interwiev during my field study in 1994 Omari explained the Christian revivalism 
with a gap that is left by the mainline churches. The mainline churches have not fullfilled certain 
religious principles, and thereby left a vacuum where other new churches have gained a foothold. 
He also said that this revivalism among Christians is not going to get involved in politics, they 
will separate themselves from politics because they are preparing for the future. 
 
 This world is not yours, so look for the future. The revival among Christians is anti - 
perhaps not modernity in sense, but in participating in civic order...My estimates are 
that the charismatic revival will continue because it appeals to the poor, and it may 
go on for a while, but it won't survive the next century because it does not answer all 
the questions. (Omari 1994B) 
 
Social problems might therefore from Omari’s point of view be one of the explanations of the 
revival of more fundamental Christianity. Omari continues by saying that the poor cannot “eat” 
the religion therefore they will sooner or later seek other material gains. There is, however, one 
side of the Christian revivalism that Omari has problems explaining. The interesting thing about 
the Christian revivalism is that it appeals not only to the poor but also to the intellectuals in 
Tanzania. Omari says that this is a phenomenon that he has to look further into but his theory 
about the revivalism is so far still the same; "... social problems may be one of the causes, but 
perhaps more a religious vacuum." (Omari 1994B) 
 
3.4.2 Ludwig's View on Christian Fundamentalism 
Frieder Ludwig in his chapter "After ujamaa - Is Religous Revivalism a Threat to Tanzania's 
Stability" also deals with the new elements in Tanzanian Christianity. Like Omari, Ludwig 
accuses the new Christian trend of being aggressive towards other religions: 
 
 A new feature of Tanzania's Christianity is the increasing influence of 
pentecostalism and so-called power-crusades, in which sometimes a very aggressive 
language is being used. The charismatic preachers emphasise personal holiness and 
personal salvation; thus the doctrine is individualistic and exclusive.(Ludwig 
1994:6) 
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His main point is to focus on the attitude of the new Christian trend, what he calls "the new 
aggressive charismatic approach" (p.8). Ludwig also criticizes the cooperation the Big 
November Crusade Ministries has with the German preacher Reinhard Bonnke, whom he 
accuses of using a "powerful or militant language" (p.7). Ludwig also questions Bonnke's view 
upon Africa as a "field which is ready for harvest" (p.7) and claims that this is a view which does 
not leave much room for dialogue with other religions. Bonnke's attitude is often imitated by 
local preachers and Ludwig quotes one Vicar General in the Anglican church after Bonnke's visit 
in 1993; 
 
 People want excitement and feeling. In our churhes we are still worshipping in the 
old ways of our forefathers, but our Christians also want to clap and sing and dance 
and give witness. (Ludwig 1994:8) 
 
Ludwig concludes that this certainly is a new element in Tanzanian Christianity. 
 
3.4.3 Mtikila and The Democratic Party 
Israel Katoke's writings from 1994 tell about what he calls "Christian militants" that threatened to 
publish the book "Satanic Verses" in the heated first months of 1993, but Katoke is not specific 
when he speaks of these Christians (Katoke 1994:15). One Christian who, on the other hand, is 
often spoken about is Reverend Christopher Mtikila, pastor of a Full Salvation Church and leader 
of the Democratic Party. Because of the strong language he has used criticizing the ruling party 
and his outspokenness in the court cases which sometimes follow, he is a well known figure in 
the Tanzanian press. Mtikila grew up in a mission in the district of Ludowa, and later worked as 
a clerk before he got into business where he claims to have been very successful. In 1982 he had 
a "born-again" experience and have since been a pastor in the Full Salvation Church. From 1988 
onwards he started criticizing the government and the President, and in the summer of 1992 he 
was allowed to form his own political party, called the Democratic Party. Most important of his 
political issues is the union with Zanzibar which he calls Nyerere's betrayal of his own people 
(Ludwig 1994:9). He is also known for his degrading statements on people of other ethnic 
origins than Tanganyikan, and has openly declared that his mission is to defend Christianity 
against Islam (Africa Events, March 1993:22). 
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3.4.4 Evaluation of  Omari's View 
In the following I will make a personal evaluation of the views on Christian fundamentalism 
represented by Omari and Ludwig. Professor C.K. Omari speaks in sociological terms when he 
is describing the new trends in Tanzanian Christianity. He claims that in the charismatic 
movements people tend to focus on the hereafter and the fact that Christians are "not of this 
world." He seems to think that the poor that join the charismatic movement look for easy 
answers and a way out of their earthly misery, and will leave the movement as soon as they 
realize that their everyday life were not changed. His conclusion is that social problems is one of 
the reasons behind the revivalism of what he calls Christian fundamentalism. According to 
Walter Hollenweger this view is an old sociological theory trying to define the charismatic 
movements as sects which are trying to overcome the feeling of deprivation, and it is not 
important whether the deprivation is really overcome or merely allayed. Hollenweger rejects this 
theory by referring to more recent sociological works and uses Christian Lavile d'Epiay as an 
example. D'Epiay in his ambitious studies of the Pentecostal movement in Chile shows that the 
Pentecostal church not only creates the hope for a better world to allay the misery of everyday 
life, but creates a social framework that takes care of the members of the congregation by 
concentrating on finding work for its church members and focusing on care for the sick and 
teaching of basic education as parts of the gospel (Hollenweger 1972:465-67).  
 It is also a question whether Omari's sociologist terms is an adequate way of describing 
what is going on in the Pentecostal movement in Tanzania today. Is it possible to describe 
religion, the human faith in a personal God, only in terms of human reactions like Omari does? 
He claims that people come to the charismatic churches because of deprivation, in a search for 
security. But is it not possible that people who face serious problems search for the restorement 
of ties that go beyond material security,  and that they will stay in the churches even though they 
cannot “eat” religion? Is it not possible that when all material security is gone, people will turn to 
the fundamental necessities of life, which to many people is religion? A weakness in Omari's 
theory is that he leaves these possibilities out and reduces the strength of religion as a force in 
itself. From my point of view, any theory trying to describe the religious situation in Tanzania 
that does not take seriously the spiritual content of religion must be regarded as incomplete. 
 Omari does, however, himself show that his theory is incomplete by referring to the fact 
that in Tanzania the charismatic revival also appeals to the intellectuals. This tendency was new 
to Omari and he did not have any sociological explanation of this phenomenon. To me this is a 
sign that the charismatic movement is a strong and unpredictable movement that contains 
elements which have been missed by many Christians regardless of social and intellectual status. 
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Hollenweger describes it as the "second wave" when, after the poor and intellectually deprived 
have started the movement, the intellectuals and the economically well-off join the Pentecostals 
(Hollenweger 1972:462). There are also several examples from the history of the Pentecostal 
movement that the charismatic revival has started among the intellectuals and economically well-
off (Engelsviken 1975:35-38 ).  
  
Omari continues to explain the situation by claiming that a gap is left by the church to be filled 
by other denominations, and here Omari is in line with Hollenweger who argues that the growth 
of the Pentecostal church is partly due to the inability of the established churches to 
communicate its faith (Hollenweger 1972:462). The established churches in Tanzania today 
experience an attraction towards the charismatic movement, and both the Anglican and the 
Lutheran churches have joined the Big November Crusade Ministries on this background. What 
especially the Lutheran church experiences is an acknowledgment that all of the biblical 
principles have to be taken into consideration in the life of the congregation, also the charismatic 
gifts. The fact that the Pentecostal churches have a tradition of focusing on these elements, which 
are new to many Christians, has given them a rapid growth. People have, through the charismatic 
elements in Christianity, experienced that the church can cover fields where the traditional 
religion was once dominant, like healing of the sick and exorcism.  
 
These elements are new elements in the Christianity in Tanzania, having earlier been left out by 
the established churches. My understandig of Omari is that he considers the charismatic 
revivalism as the filling of a religious vacuum and a result of social problems. The interesting 
question is, however, whether Omari sees these new charismatic elements as only a new 
fascinating approach adopted by the congregations to attract people to the church, or biblical 
elements that, properly carried out, will lead to continued growth. Partly he touches this issue by 
saying that he does not think the growth will outlast this century, because by then people will 
find out that the movement did not answer all their questions. 
 
 Omari's theories are interesting but somewhat incomplete because they only describe 
human reactions and does not take into consideration the spiritual content of Christianity that can 
change the life of human beings and, as a result of that, make the church grow.  
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3.4.5 Evaluation of Ludwig's View 
Frieder Ludwig criticizes the attitude of the charismatic movement, more than the essence of it. 
His chapter is to a large extent descriptive, but his critical attitude towards a man like Reinhard 
Bonnke is obvious. What Ludwig first mentions and later repeats is the aggressive attitude of the 
charismatic movement. Here we face a large problem in analyzing Christian movements. The 
attitude in evangelization will always be influenced by the theology of the movements, and 
depends on which aspects in the theology of religions the movements choose to follow. Ludwig 
does not draw any lines in a discussion concerning theology of religions. The attitude of 
evangelization is, however,  always built on some - conscious or non-conscious - theology of 
religions. The charismatic movements practice an exclusive theology of religions, i.e. they focus 
on the necessity of personal conversion. Those who reject this personal conversion will be 
entirely lost. Therefore, evangelization is utmost important for the movement, being viewed as a 
matter of life or death. To them active evangelization is the fullfillment of the missionary 
command of the Bible. To others, who view the question of salvation differently, active 
evangelization will easily be understood as “aggressive approach.” In commenting on the matter 
we have to draw lines between sincere and aggressive evangelization and attitude, and here we 
will always be ruled by our own background, experiences and cultural context. The Christian 
faith demands us as Christians to share the gospel and to be eager to win other people for our 
faith, but the guidelines which we shall follow in doing this is to a large extent left to ourselves to 
consider. The personal witness is often an important part of evangelization, but we still face the 
problem, what are the limits that a witness has to work within. Kenneth Cragg once said that 
mission and theology belong together because the faith is always brought by someone else39, the 
way we deliver the message is influenced by our view upon evangelization. A factor that 
necessarily has to be taken into consideration, regardless of line chosen in the theology of 
religions, is respect. Respect of the personal faith and religious background of other human 
beings is the most important element. Evangelization is spreading the good news and that is 
possible without patronizing the target of evangelization. In a society like Tanzania, where 
Christianity and Islam are the two major religions, one should be extra careful not to ruin a good 
relationship, which is the basis of further evangelization. 
  
Ludwig also criticizes the Big November Crusade Ministeries' cooperation with the German 
preacher Reinhard Bonnke. Again it is Bonnke's aggressive language and attitude that is the case 
                                                 
39At a seminar at the Norwegian Lutheran School of  Theology March 1 1994. 
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of discussion. Bonnke is a famous world evangelist and  he is known to regard Africa as a 
special field of his mission. Bonnke is not himself interested in discussing theology and dialogue, 
his attitude is more pragmatic. In Oslo Spectrum in 1993 he told the audience about an 
experience he had in a theological debate on TV. When Bonnke was asked about his opinion on 
the matter discussed, he answered that he was not there to "split hairs" (discuss theology) but he 
was there to "populate heaven."40 Reinhard Bonnke's arrivals in other African countries have 
caused upheavals. When he arrived Kano in Nigeria in October 1991 fatal clashes between 
Christians and Muslims occured because the way the campaign was announced provoked some 
Muslims. According to the Nigerian Tribune 300 people were killed in the clashes. The governor 
in Kano reported that 35 people were injured and 74 arrested while a church, a mosque and 15 
cars were burnt. Newspaper reporters claimed that they counted 120 burnt-out shops (Rasmussen 
1993:96). One cannot blame Bonnke personally for incidents like the one in Kano, but it ought 
to make one consider the extremely powerful forces one is dealing with. The Bible encourages 
us to maintain peace, and that should in most cases be possible without compromizing the 
Gospel. The Tanzanian preachers who want to imitate the style of Reinhard Bonnke must pay 
attention to their religious context - they have to consider the consequences of what they preach, 
they cannot, like Bonnke, just leave their country after a crusade. 
 
But the development among the non-established Christian groups is moving in a positive 
direction. After the formation of the Pentecostal Council of Tanzania the movement has agreed 
on following certain general lines. The constitution of PTC states as one of its objectives to: 
 
 ...take measures to ensure its non involvement in politics, ensure cooperations with 
all persons, as well as the Government and other public organs, in its endeavours to 
save and deliver man from all forms of oppression and to secure the promotion of 
peace and national unity. (Ludwig 1994:10) 
 
 
Also the Big November Crusade Ministries has achieved an agreement with the government 
after the ban of  religious open air-meetings. John B. Lutembeke, secretary of the Crusade 
Ministries puts it this way: 
  
                                                 
 40The Pentecostal World Conference in Oslo 1993, "Populate Heaven" is also the title of one of Reinhard 
Bonnke's books. 
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 When we preach, we don't have to provoke other religions. We don't have to attack 
other people's faith. That is a condition. We have to promote unity - we must not 
preach against it. (Ludwig 1994:10) 
 
Ludwig concludes his chapter by giving credit to the Pentecostals for setting up an umbrella 
organization which secures a more moderate attitude. He also registers that there is a tendency 
that the Pentecostalists and Power-Crusaders are being more integrated in the established system 
of state/church relationship from which they have been excluded for a long time (Ludwig 
1994:10). 
 
My view is that the trend among the Christian denominations in Tanzania is positive. The fact 
that is indicated in Omari's theory that the mainline churches have left a gap is taken seriously by 
both the Lutheran and the Anglican churches. They are trying to fill this gap by presenting a 
Christianity where charismatic gifts, healing by prayer, singing and to some extent dancing has a 
natural place. This mode of worshipping has a long tradition in Africa, and in the search for their 
own way of expressing the Gospel it is a natural thing for Africans to bring their tradition into the 
church. In other parts of Africa this kind of contextualization has occured in the independent 
African churches (Oosthuizen 1979), but in Tanzania these elements have found a place in the 
established churches, even though it is to a lesser extent than in the independent churches. Like 
their brothers in most other countries The Pentecostals in Tanzania are influenced by the power-
crusades and other attitudes inherited from the United States, where the Pentecostal movement 
had its origin. But the fact that it was black Americans, descendents of African slaves that started 
the movement, makes it reasonable to talk about a circle that has now been closed more than 
about foreign influence. Rev. Rafik Daudjee, a pastor in the Tanzanian Assemblies of God's 
English-speaking congregation in Dar es Salaam expressed great satisfaction with the way the 
crusades had become a cooperation between the different churches (Daudjee 1994). The 
cooperation shows that the churches in Tanzania are dynamic and alive, willing to move in new 
directions to live out the Gospel. 
 
3.4.6 Evaluation of Mtikila and the Democratic Party 
What is a matter of concern in Tanzania today is when politicians like Rev. Mtikila are being 
linked with the church. His racist views cannot be accepted by the church and his attitude 
towards Muslims can endanger the good relationship on which moderate politicians are trying to 
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build a nation where people of different religions can exist side by side in peace. According to 
Africa Events (March 1993:22) Mtikila's followers went on rampage after a mass rally - beating 
up Indians and Arabs and attacking their shops. Reporters claimed that even Africans wearing a 
kanzu, a Muslim cap or a baibui, veil worn by women, were targets of the bullies. Such incidents 
do not only disturb the political order in a country, but it also weakens the credibility of the 
church as long as Mtikila is still a pastor. 
 
3.5 Summary 
The last decade has clearly brought changes within both the Muslim and the Christian 
communities in Tanzania. Among the Muslims it is clear that the focus on more pure Islamic 
values has increased. Among the Christians a stronger devotion towards living out more 
perspectives of the Bible is visible. One might say that the religous revival is obvious in both 
camps even though the results of the revival are different. What is clear is that the two religious 
communities are drifting away from each other compared with the situation when the ideas of 
ujamaa were predominant. The Muslims now raise their voices because they feel that they have 
been neglected in terms of education and economic development, and their aim is to recapture 
their lost opportunities. Among the intellectual Muslims there are signs of influence of ideas 
from both moderate and more radical elements of Islam. Among some of the Christian 
denominations a fear of the Muslims increasing their influence in society is present. The biggest 
threat to peaceful religious coexistence from the Christian side is the increased focus on 
evangelism, which in some cases has led to confrontations with Muslims. The general trend 
among the Christian churches towards influence from the Pentecostal movement has led to a 
renewed vitality among the churches. There is, however, a danger that radical elements may 
abuse the new elements in the church to create antagonism. But the term Christian 
fundamentalists is hardly adaptable to the large majority of the charismatic Christians in 
Tanzania. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
NATIONAL REASONS BEHIND THE CHANGE 
 
 
In this chapter different scholars present their views of the reasons behind the changes in the 
religious relationship in Tanzania. The common ground of these scholars is that they, in their 
variety of explanations, view internal changes in Tanzania as the most important factor behind 
the conflicts. Professor C.K. Omari from Tanzania claims that weak leadership is the main 
reason behind the increased hostility between the two religious groups. David Westerlund argues 
that religious matters were played down for the benefit of focusing on national unity . This is by 
Frieder Ludwig interpreted as if the conflict between Christians and Muslims also through the 
ujamaa years was present, but after the fall of the ideology again became visible. The 
anthropologist Kjersti Larsen is giving a wider range of explanations of the change in the 
relationship. She claims that the fact that religion has become a public and a political matter has 
affected the religious relationship. She also focuses on social problems as a reason behind the 
increased Islamist tendencies found in Tanzania.   
 
4.1 C.K. Omari: Identity and Religion in Politics and the Question of Leadership 
To reach a deeper understanding of the political development in East Africa there are certain 
issues that have to be looked further into. Which factors are important in the development of a 
country and what makes people react the way they do? It is interesting to lend an ear to the 
current discussion among sociologists about the African identity. According to Omari (1994) 
there are two major factors that have to be considered when discussing African identity. The 
former is religion and the latter is ethnicity. In this presentation I will focus on religion’s part in 
politics, using C.K. Omari’s article "Identity and Conflict in Africa with Reference to Tanzania" 
(1994) to present his theory and discuss the content of it. The discussion concerning ethnicity in 
politics is very interesting when referring to certain African countries, but in Tanzania the ethnic 
dimension in politics is relatively small compared to the influence of religion. 
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4.1.1 African Identity 
Mazrui (1986) is in his book "Africans - a Triple Heritage" analyzing the Africans, their identity 
and their civilization. To him the cultural heritage of Africa can be divided into three parts which 
he calls the triple heritage; the Indigeneous, the Semitic and the Western. Interesting in this 
context is that Mazrui separates the three main religions in Africa into these categories. He 
claims that the indigenous religion is the basic African religion, but adds that Judaism and Islam 
also can be considered true African religions. Christianity, however, is considered a religion 
from Europe, rejected by its own (Mazrui 1986:37). In the discussion about the true African 
identity, Mazrui is opposed by Omari (1994), who refers to Mbiti (1986) and himself, claiming 
that Christianity also can be reckoned a true African religion, using Ethiopia and North Africa as 
his examples (Omari 1994:1). To Omari it seems important to stress that Christianity and Islam 
cannot be contrasted in a way where one religion is considered more "African" than the other. 
What is made perfectly clear in his article is that religion is one of the factors that influence 
people’s identity in Africa, and here he finds support among both Mazrui and Mbiti (Omari 
1994:2). This point is also supported by Kjersti Larsen (1995) who affirms the importance of 
religion as a part of people’s identity.   
 
4.1.2 Religion in Politics 
C.K. Omari’s article on identity and conflict in Africa (1994) deals with the influence of religion 
in Tanzania politics. He refers to Brown`s analysis from 1989 showing that Western scholars 
have underestimated the importance of religion in Third World`s politics (Omari 1994:7). Brown 
claims that Western scholars have used other paradigms41 and theories when explaining the 
political life of Third World countries. Omari agrees with these results, saying that religion’s part 
in Third World politics is considerable, especially when it is related to access to power and 
authority in society. Omari claims in the following that religion is in Africa being used for two 
main purposes. First it is used as a means to access to power and authority. Secondly this often 
leads to access to resources available. This latter point is very important in developing countries 
which often have a limited access to resources. It is a pattern which Omari finds in several 
African countries, and he claims that especially religions which do not separate politics from 
religion, can use religious ideology, through politics, as "a road to the accumulation of wealth by 
few in the leadership group and their relatives." (Omari 1994:8). 
                                                 
41Paradigm will in this chapter be used in the sense that it denotes a pattern of observing and explaining a 
political or religious situation. 
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4.1.3 Access to Power and Authority 
Omari’s next move in his article is to apply his theory to the situation in Tanzania. He starts by 
referring to popular statements that circulate in Tanzania. Some have claimed that under Nyerere, 
the Christian religion was predominant in politics and development. Accordingly others now link 
the domination in politics to Islam under Mwinyi. Omari underlines that these arguments are 
emotional and need further examination. An example of these emotional tendencies is when 
small radical Islamic groups, mainly externally led, claim that the majority of the population are 
Muslims. They state that the President is a Muslim, and therefore the other key ministers should 
also be Muslims, and there should be an Islamic state. These claims, when linked to the 
appointment of Muslim ministers to key positions, might according to Omari lead to a linkage 
between religion and politics.  
 But what Omari finds even more disturbing is when Christian institutions have been 
targets for burnings and destructions and the suspects of these raids are Muslim radicals who 
have publicly stated that their aim is to make living impossible for Christians in Tanzania. When 
such incidents have not been met by sharp reactions from the government, many Christians 
naturally conclude that religion has permeated politics. The same thing happens, according to 
Omari, when the government accepts grants and aid from predominantly Islamic countries which 
also are prepared to export Islamic fundamentalist ideology (Omari 1994:8). 
 Omari continues by referring to the fact that historically Muslims have lagged behind 
Christians in education and other aspects of development. When Nyerere’s regime nationalized 
all schools in 1969, the aim was to give Muslims equal opportunities in the field of education. 
But cultural constraints have obstructed Muslim youths, especially girls, from attending higher 
education. If higher education and political experience were to be the only criteria for 
appointments to the higher posts in government, few Muslims would satisfy such demands. The 
result is, according to Omari that some people get into politics through religious identity, without 
proper qualifications or experience.  
 
 As a result, some have proved competent and some have not. In fact those who were 
known to be incompetent but were appointed nevertheless, have shown their true 
colour. (Omari 1994:9) 
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On the part of religion as a means to access to power and authority, Omari concludes that the 
religious identity becomes the easy way of  government activity. A high level of corruption and 
incompetence is the result of very little principles and ethical considerations. Religion is, 
according to Omari, being blamed instead of individuals.  
 
4.1.4 Access to Resources Available 
The second part of Omari’s theory deals with the accessibilty to the resources available. During 
the ujamaa period, leadership positions were constructed not to have access to the available 
resources. Codes were established to minimize corruption and equity was emphasized. Anyone 
holding a public office was for instance not allowed to receive two or more salaries. After the 
collapse of the ujamaa policy and the adoption of free-market ideology, there has according to 
Omari been a lack of ethics in politics. The liberalization process has been without guidelines, 
and for some, leadership in politics  has been the road to accumulated wealth. The liberalization 
of the economy came at the time when the government was identified with Islam. As a result, 
Islam has been associated with the corruption in the government. Omari claims that again 
religion is being blamed instead of individuals (Omari 1994:9). 
 
4.1.5 Conclusion 
Omari’s conclusion is that what is happening in Tanzania is not a result of a change within the 
religious communities, but rather a result of weak leadership. After the fall of the ideology from 
Eastern Europe and the introduction of Western ideologies based on secularism42, Omari claims 
that religious identity is gaining importance among people in Tanzania. This process may lead to 
the development of conflicts between Christians and Muslims in the struggle for access to power 
and the resources available. Omari further suggests that Islam is quite clear on its role in politics 
on ethics and ummah (community), but in Christianity involvement in politics is the decision of 
the individual. Muslim fundamentalists want to rule the society through sharia, while the 
Christian fundamentalists would like to separate themselves from politics. Omari’s theory is that 
such an attitude among the religious groups can lead to a government equipped with people who 
are only interested in their own situation. Omari`s final conclusion is that the only possibile way 
to avoid the now emerging problems is to build a strong secular state on the principles of 
                                                 
42Omari claims that a weakness attached to Western secularism (which is the basis of capitalism and multi-party 
democracy) is that it does not take the centrality of religion into consideration (Omari 1994:3). 
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governance, accountability, well developed transparence and an informed civil society (Omari 
1994:10).  
 
4.1.6 Evaluation of Omari’s View  
C.K. Omari’s theory about the reasons for the changes taking place in Tanzania contains certain 
important points that makes it worth further examination. The strength of his theory is that it 
underlines that religion is an important part of the African identity and that the debate on religion 
and politics in Tanzania is mainly built on emotions. My own experiences during my field work 
support these observations. Omari is also based in history when he explains that Muslims have 
never had the same possibilities as Christians in the field of higher education. Several people I 
met during my stay in Tanzania also agreed that the current President is lacking the strong 
leadership qualities that his predecessor Julius Nyerere possessed, and this point is well covered 
by Omari. I also find his point concerning the fall of the ideology of Eastern Europe and the 
introduction of free-market economy a relevant observation which has obviously affected the 
religious relationship in the country . 
  
The weak side of Omari’s article is however the simplicity of his conclusion. To blame the 
leadership of the country alone for the problem of religious involvement in politics seems 
somewhat easy. Implicit in such a conclusion is the thought that with a strong national leadership 
Islamist tendencies would never have gained a foothold in the country, regardless of tendencies 
in other Islamic societies. This thought is being opposed by both Smith (1990) and Sicard 
(1991), who argues that the external influence of new Islamic ideas in the area is considerable. 
Both the leaders of the country and the religious leaders have a great responsibility resting upon 
them to guide the people in political and religious questions. But also these leaders are influenced 
by trends, political as well as religious which are rooted outside their area of dominion. The 
political situation of Tanzania is influenced by the political situation in the rest of Africa and in 
the rest of the world, which Omari himself mentions. Religious revivalism as a tendency that is 
experienced all over the world will necessarily affect also Tanzania, regardless of who is in 
political control of the country. Omari’s criticism of the Tanzanian leaders’ lack of action against 
extreme religious groups is supported by most religious leaders in Tanzania and also by me, but 
to draw the conclusion that weak leadership is the major reason behind the change in the 
religious relationship in Tanzania is from my point of view to exaggerate the importance of the 
leaders. 
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 The nucleus of my criticism of Omari is  again his vague treatment of the term religion. He 
never makes a closer examination of the function of religion. He claims that religion is used by 
the leaders to increase their own power, and that might be correct in several African countries, 
but he denies considering religion as an independent force with a spiritual aspect that might 
influence people more than the political leaders of the country. From my point of view Omari in 
his article describes religion only as a sociological factor used to achieve power. By doing this he 
does not take the strength of what is happening in the religious communities seriously. The 
increased devotion among Muslims towards the Friday-prayers and the focus on the moral code 
of Islam (Larsen 1995), together with the search within the churches for ways of worshipping 
God in all aspects of life, goes in my opinion far beyond the search for personal power.  
 This new religious vitality also unfortunately contains some more militant elements which 
focus on the political side of religion more than the spiritual. These militant elements have 
caused a lot of damage to the relationship between Christians and Muslims. Omari himself 
questions the fact that Muslim extremists have not been prosecuted by the government after the 
destruction of church properties. But to draw the conclusion that the leaders are to blame and not 
religion, is to free the guilty from their responsibilities towards their religion. If what the Muslim 
extremists do is in the name of Islam, the Muslim community must feel responsible and handle 
these groups or at least publicly condemn their actions and work against them to promote what 
they consider the true form of Islam. Alternatively Islam must be blamed if what happens is in 
accordance with a common view of the religion. Also Christian groups that use means of 
promoting a gospel that is not in accordance with the message of the Bible have to be made 
responsible for what they do in the name of their religion.  
 
My personal conclusion is that Omari’s article helps us gain insight in the present situation in 
Tanzania, by elaborating interesting points like religion as a part of African identity, the 
emotional level of the debate inside the country and the weak national leadership. But I question 
his emphasis on one particular domestic reason, the weak national leadership, as the major cause 
behind the emerging troubles in Tanzania. This is done in sociological terms, describing religion 
only as a means of achieving personal advantages. Omari also frees the religious communities 
from the responsibility of actions done in the name of religion, by blaming the leaders of the 
country and not the ideology of the perpetrators. 
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4.2 David Westerlund and Frieder Ludwig: Compartmentalized Religion 
In chapter one a brief summary of the concept of civil religion was given in order to explain the 
efforts made by Julius Nyerere and TANU to play down conflicts and focus on unity through the 
socialist concept of ujamaa. David Westerlund claims in his book "Ujamaa na dini" (1980) that 
what occured was that religion was compartmentalized, i.e. it was given a metaphysical area of 
authonomy where society  could not interfere. All earthly matters were taken care of by 
socialism, and the intention was that the creation of a united society with a civil religion should 
be so important that the focus on religious differences ceased to exist. 
 
4.2.1 The Special Treatment of the Christian and the Muslim Groups 
It was mentioned in chapter one that the national anthem and the parliamentary prayer were 
important parts of the civil religion promoted in Tanzania. Another important element in the 
creating of the socialistic policy of Tanzania, the Arusha Declaration, was also used by Nyerere 
to focus on civil religion, unity and devotion to the concept of ujamaa. Commenting on the 
Declaration Nyerere once said that the dedication to the Arusha Declaration was like a young 
Christian’s or a young Muslim’s act of dedication to his or her religion. But Nyerere said that the 
dedication in itself was not enough, it had to be followed by actions. The illustration made with 
reference to Christians and Muslims was frequently repeated by the former President, but a 
similar reference to believers of the traditional African religions was never made. The fact that 
only Christians and Muslims were mentioned was probably no coincidence since most of the 
politicians of TANU were either Muslims or Christians (Westerlund 1980:69). 
 This pattern of always referring to Christians and Muslims when focusing on national 
unity, leaving out both African religions43 and other religious minorities is further investigated 
by Westerlund. In the programme for the Union Day Anniversary celebrations in 1967 it was 
decreed that celebrations of the second day should start in the morning with prayers "in churches, 
mosques etc." The fact that only mosques and churches were mentioned and that the other 
religions were brought together under "etc" is to Westerlund another indication of the special 
concern for Islam and Christianity shown by the government (Westerlund 1980:70). A third 
example of this concern was the large number of public holidays that were introduced in 
Tanzania after independence. These public holidays were supposed to be celebrated by  
                                                 
43Traditional African religions were the religion of more than one third of the population in the 1967 census 
(Omari 1984:5). 
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everybody, but Westerlund questions whether Traditional Believers and Hindus participated 
wholeheartedly in the holidays motivated by Christianity or Islam. The demands from Christians 
and Muslims concerning religious festivals had to be met by the government since both groups 
could create problems for the regime. If the Hindus or the Traditional Believers felt 
discriminated against this was hardly a serious problem since none of these religious groups were 
in a position to cause the government any problems (Westerlund 1980:72). 
 
4.2.2 The Attempt to Include the Social Aspect of Religion in the Ujamaa Philosophy 
It was mentioned in the first chapter that TANU was supposed to be secular in all its work and 
that the party documents never raised the question of metaphysics or religion at all. The 
politicians of TANU could choose their own private religion, but as politicians they were not 
supposed to promote any specific religion. According to Westerlund this was not always 
successfully upheld. The politicians often acted religiously as politicians, and religion was 
frequently a part of politics. In this matter Nyerere was no exception. Westerlund points out that 
Nyerere was very conscious as to when religion was mentioned, for example during his visits to 
Peking in 1968 and to the Kremlin in 1969 there were no religious statements made by the 
President. In other contexts like radio broadcastings in Tanzania where the religious message 
was more favourably received, Nyerere sometimes included references to God, but Westerlund 
points out that these references were relatively few compared with for instance President Kaunda 
of Zambia, and he interprets this as a sign that there were greater risks for religio-political 
conflicts in Tanzania (Westerlund 1980:70). 
 Julius Nyerere and the leaders of TANU intentionally reserved religion to deal with 
metaphysical matters, but they still realized that there was a social aspect of religion that had to 
be dealt with in the process of making people join in the building of a strong socialism. In a 
speech at the university of Cairo in 1967, "The Varied Paths to Socialism," Nyerere compared 
the Koran and the Bible with books on socialism. He distinguished the two religious books from 
the political ones because the latter were written by man and no man is infallible. By this 
statement Westerlund claims that Nyerere puts the focus on the Tanzanian civil religion - the 
word of God is not only expressed in the Bible but also in the Koran, thus Nyerere again 
underlines his main aim, unity. But even more interesting is a statement made by Nyerere later in 
the same speech:  
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 The human equality before God which is the basis of all the great religions of the 
world  is also the basis of the political philosophy of socialism. (Westerlund 
1980:71)  
 
Westerlund claims that this is an example of how Nyerere tries to connect the social aspects of 
religion with the central concept of socialism, here on the basis of the belief in human equality. 
As Westerlund himself puts it: 
 
 ...it can again be interpreted as a statement of civil religion, a search by a President 
in a religiously divided country for a least common denominator that could provide 
a religious legitimation for socialism or its kernel, (the belief in) human equality. 
(Westerlund 1980:71) 
 
In the same manner some editorials in the TANU-controlled newspapers praised the Muslims for 
aspects of their religion that were in accordance with the aspects of socialism. In 1974 Daily 
News stated that man’s equality before God was the symbol of the month of Ramadan, with no 
difference between rich or poor. The newspaper further used the opportunity to call for temperate 
behaviour with reference to Nyerere’s repeated criticism of heavy drinking, urging people to cut 
down on alcohol and conserve energy for productive work. Credit and encouragement was also 
given to the Christians in terms of promoting the thoughts of ujamaa. At the opening of Mwena 
Leprosarium in Mtwava Region, financed by the Benedictine Fathers, Nyerere focused in his 
speech on the fact that he did not find it wrong that most patients would be Muslims. 
 
 I believe it is a recognition that whatever our particular beliefs about God and His 
prophets we can best worship him by living together, and working together, in 
harmony and in His service. ( Westerlund 1980:74) 
 
Westerlund again finds this an important statement of civil religion, as he does in Nyerere’s 
speech to the Maryknoll Sisters from New York where Nyerere encouraged the Catholic church 
to welcome all who were fighting to promote social justice, and urged the church not to reject 
people who refused to acknowledge the divinity of Jesus. By this Westerlund understands that 
Nyerere considered socio-political goals as more important than dividing religious ideas such as 
the divinity of Jesus (Westerlund 1980:74). 
 
 79 
4.2.3 Conclusion 
In his concluding remarks in his chapter about civil religion David Westerlund summarizes the 
two major points elaborated in this chapter. First the special treatment for Christians and 
Muslims which shows that that the government was aware of the problems lying latent in the 
relationship between the two religions. Secondly the fact that the political leaders in Tanzania 
realized that religion could not be completely divorced from politics and therefore attempted to 
argue that the socio-political consequences of Islam and Christianity were the same as the socio-
political consequenses of ujamaa, hence authoritative norms of ujamaa, like equality and 
brotherhood could be given not only a political but also a religious dimension. 
 
 The purpose of civil religion was to strengthen social solidarity, to decrease tensions 
between various religious groups, especially between Muslims and Christians. In 
other words, the civil religion aimed at creating or promoting national integration 
and the supremacy of ujamaa. (Westerlund 1980:75) 
 
Westerlund concludes by saying that this kind of civil religion only can be created if people are 
willing to accept the primacy of politics and the attenuation of religion, and can exist only where 
the task to build the nation is more important than to build religion. Westerlund suggests that the 
civil religion perhaps can be viewed as a compromise between the conflicting tendencies in 
Islam and Christianity where the Muslims were urged not to mix religion with politics and the 
Christians were asked to play their part (Westerlund 1980:75). 
 
"Ujamaa na dini" was written by Westerlund in 1980 without reference to the development the 
following decade, but Frieder Ludwig claims that Westerlund’s focus on civil religion and 
compartmentalized religion shows that the conflict in Tanzania is not only a new conflict brought 
to the country by the general global revivalism or rich Arab states exporting ideas of Islamism. 
Ludwig sees the now emerging conflict as a result of history and says: 
 
 As the emergence of an African Christianity cannot be explained only by the gifts 
from rich European missions, the new Islamic revivalism cannot be sufficiently 
understood by referring to "oil wealth which is being pumped into Tanzania." 
(Ludwig 1994:15) 
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Ludwig’s interpretation of Westerlund’s conclusion aims at focusing on the conflict in Tanzania 
as a conflict that has existed as long as the two religions have been present in the area. According 
to Ludwig the conflict never ceased to exist, but by Nyerere’s statesmanship and his ability to 
make his ideas the agenda of the day, people focused on the building of a socialist society and 
reduced the religious conflicts. Ludwig quotes the former economic adviser of Nyerere, Jumanne 
Wagao, who claims that "...the fall of Ujamaa ideology is the main cause of the growth of 
religious militancy in Tanzania as the people grapple for alternative ideologies to help them pull 
out of stark poverty." (Ludwig 1994:15) By this Ludwig claims that the conflict mainly has 
internal reasons, and that the conflict was present but invisible  also through the ujamaa period.  
 
4.2.4 Evaluation of Westerlund’s  and Ludwig’s Views  
David Westerlund’s thorough analysis of the relationship between religion and the political 
philosophy of ujamaa in Tanzania is an impressive study of Julius Nyerere’s attempt to build a 
lasting socialist society with religions existing in peace, participating in the building of a 
common philosophy. Nyerere’s political thoughts did not, and neither did the political ideas from 
Eastern Europe, survive the 1980s. But religious leaders in Tanzania still hope that his thoughts 
about peace between the religions will outlast changing political paradigms.  
 The central question of this evaluation is whether Frieder Ludwig is right in his claims that 
the religious conflict in Tanzania mainly is of national origin, and has existed all through the 
ujamaa period, and if Westerlund’s thesis supports this. My opinion is that Ludwig is only partly 
right in his claims. If we consider the history of Tanzania, the period after independence was for 
the Muslim community characterized by a struggle between two factions. On one side was 
EAMWS44  which consisted of Sunni and Shia Muslims where the Ismailis, who were Asian 
Shia Muslims, held the leadership positions (Westerlund 1980:179). This faction was oriented 
towards pan-Islamic ideas and had strong historical ties to Asian and Arab countries. This faction 
was however in the Islamic Crisis of 1968 outruled by the African Sunni Muslims who were in 
strong support of TANU and later created BAKWATA to be the voice of  Tanzanian Muslims. 
 Is it then right to say that the conflict between Christians and Muslims still existed through 
the ujamaa period? Yes, in the sense that the Asian Muslims and their thoughts still existed even 
without any influence on the debate in Tanzania. No, in the sense that an overwhelming majority 
of the Muslims in Tanzania, being African Muslims, supported TANU and the line of avoiding a 
focus on religious differences. Those who supported the building of a society where religion to 
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some extent was compartmentalized, and where a civil religion was introduced, were to a large 
extent the Muslims themselves. They chose the line of peaceful coexistence with the Christians 
by avoiding thoughts of a Muslim state or separate Muslim courts. The majority of Tanzanian 
Muslims accepted that their religion could exist within the limits of the ujamaa philosophy, an 
Islam where African tradition was stronger than the ties to the countries from where Islam was 
exported to East Africa. 
 
The next question I will raise concerns what has happened to the Muslim community after the 
fall of ujamaa, and I will explain why  I find Ludwig partly right in his considerations. After the 
fall of ujamaa Tanzania Muslims have experienced a change of focus in the thinking about their 
religion’s place in society. Since the socialist ideas of TANU/CCM, where Islam was made a 
part of the program to build society, is history - Muslims have had to re-evaluate Islam’s 
importance in the creation of a new society. The last decade has witnessed a clear tendency 
among Muslims towards a focus on pan-Islamic ideas, experienced clearly on Zanzibar during 
the OIC-crisis. My partial agreement with Ludwig is situated in the fact that these pan-Islamic 
ideas were an important part of the philosophy behind EAMWS. Traditionally the bearers of 
these thoughts in Tanzania also have been oriented towards  the Asian and the Arab world, 
which is also the tendency in the Muslim revival today. The reason why I will question Ludwig’s 
focus on the present conflict in Tanzania is the radical change in the influence from outside 
countries. The change in the economy of the Arab countries, and thereby also their ability to 
influence the situation, together with the theological revival of Islamist ideas, are new tendencies 
which have not been a part of traditional Islam in Tanzania earlier. Even if some of the 
mentioned tendencies have been present in Tanzania through history, the radical new strength 
and the simultaneous influence from so many angles make me view the new tendencies, to a 
larger extent than Ludwig, as a result of external influence. This influence, which will be further 
elaborated in chapter five, appears in my eyes to have changed character the last two decades, 
and together with the fall of the political ideologies of Eastern Europe, it has affected Muslims in 
Tanzania towards re-evaluating Islam’s influence in society. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
44East Africa Muslim Welfare society. 
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4.3 Kjersti Larsen: Social Problems and Identity 
Kjersti Larsen is an anthropologist from the University of Oslo and has spent several of the last 
twelve years on Zanzibar working with her field studies. The last decade she has noticed a 
change in people’s attitude towards religion in Tanzania, and during an interview45 she 
elaborated her analysis of both the change on Zanzibar and the situation on mainland Tanzania. 
Kjersti Larsen’s focus is on how religion lately has become a public issue that explains conflicts 
that earlier were discussed in different terms, and she also claims that social problems are one of 
the reasons behind the Islamist tendencies in Tanzania. She also sees religion as a strong 
influence upon people’s identity, and therefore fears the fact that conflicts are explained in a 
religious language in Tanzania today. 
 
4.3.1 Religion as a Public and a Political Issue 
The most important change in the religious everyday life of people in Tanzania is according to 
Kjersti Larsen that religion has become an independent issue. Religion has always been an 
important part of people’s life, but recently religion has become a political matter.  
 
 In the 70s and in the 80s all political discussions had references to socialism, 
capitalism, imperialism and neo-colonialism - explained in marxist terms. Marxism 
was the language, the ideology through which the conflicts were understood and 
articulated. Now the situation is that the language through which political opoinions 
are expressed, is religion. (Larsen 1995) 
 
Kjersti Larsen underlines that this change in political language is an interaction between internal 
and external factors where the changing political landscape of Tanzania has played an important 
part. During the ujamaa period religious issues were played down and made private issues. On 
Zanzibar President Kharum destroyed places where people used to make sacrifices and public 
religious feasts were kept to a minimum. But with the Presidents following Kharum, religion 
more and more has become a public matter and today society is open to religious behaviour on 
all levels and this is reflected in the way people dress, the number of attenders at Friday prayers 
and in politics. Larsen also emphasizes that this is a trend that can be traced all over the world  
                                                 
45According to Kjersti Larsen very little written materiale is available concerning her interpretation of the recent 
religious development in Tanzania. Her Doctor thesis will be finished during 1995. 
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among both Christians and Muslims - religion is made a public matter and has got into politics. 
The result of these changes is that conflicts are denoted in terms of religion. Instead of blaming 
capitalism for the problems in Tanzania, Muslims now blame Christians and vice versa, for 
being the cause of the problems in the country. According to  Kjersti Larsen people in Tanzania 
speak and react according to this paradigm and scholars describe the conflicts in the same terms, 
hence the two reinforce one another.  
 
4.3.2 The Change in Religion 
The fact that religion has become a public issue, together with a change in international 
relationships have created a somewhat new religious climate in Tanzania. Kjersti Larsen affirms 
this and says that Islam in Tanzania, like any other religion or ideology is in constant change. To 
her the global situation of Islam is important to understand what has happened to Muslims in 
Tanzania. Kjersti Larsen mentions the Gulf war as a serious incident which affected also people 
in Africa. Even if Muslims on Zanzibar did not agree with Saddam Hussein and his actions, it 
was important for them to support Iraq more than the USA. The Gulf conflict in a sense affected 
their own position in the world, because through media the conflict was made a conflict of 
religions, and Larsen herself was surprised to see how fast Western media coded the conflict in 
terms of religion - showing pictures of crowds of Americans going to church and furious 
Muslims demonstrating against the “Great Satan” - the USA. Kjersti Larsen’s understanding of 
this is that religion has become an issue in politics, which contributes to coalitions being  made.  
 But also in the exercise of Islam in Tanzania Larsen has noticed a gradual change.  
 
 It is now possible to practice religion in public. This makes people more oriented 
towards the written religious text while they earlier focused more on the oral 
tradition which gave more room for personal interpretation. (Larsen 1995) 
 
More written material is available, pamphlets containing simple Islamic teachings and 
commentaries on the Koran, and this is being read by people. Kjersti Larsen emphasizes that this 
does not necessarily imply that people have become more religious now than earlier, or that they 
have become more focused on pan-Islamic ideas. But she admits that the articulation of Islam 
has become stronger. This affects not only the young men that traditionally stand in the frontline 
of a more fundamentalistic view on Islam, but Larsen has experienced that also women to a 
larger extent than before read the Islamic literature. Her experience is that the attitude among 
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Muslims has changed, even if people not necessarily have become more religious, and she sees 
this development as twofold. To some Islam has become a political tool, as seen in the present 
political election campaigns. To others Islam has become political in a wider sense, as to the 
question of identity, of who they are and of their position in the world. This also affects the 
question of who they are to associate themselves with, and from whom they are to differ. 
 
4.3.3 Social Problems - Islam Solution 
The next issue that our conversation touched was the following: Which conflicts lie behind the 
problems that according to Kjersti Larsen are explained in different terms at different times? She 
emphasized that some of the problems in the region are constant whereas other problems change 
according to the times. But the general problem in all Third World countries is poverty. Larsen 
states that economic problems always have been a part of East Africa’s reality. An increasing 
problem in Tanzania is that some of the educated youth, who have achieved dreams and 
promises of good jobs and improved living conditions, today face unemployment. This is mainly 
an urban problem since the possibility of providing for the family through farming always is a 
solution in the countryside. As a result, young unemployed men, often with some education, 
express their aggression towards society through the demands for a different social order. 
 
 Islam becomes an opposition, a very good language to express that you disagree 
with the present government. The Muslims (in Tanzania) find support for their 
frustrations in several other countries where similar movements agree that Islam 
represents a different model (of society) and an opposition against what they see as 
an exploiting system. (Larsen 1995) 
 
Kjersti Larsen will to some extent compare the emerging problems in Tanzania with those of 
Egypt and Algeria in that they are rooted in social conflicts, but she made it perfectly clear that 
the violent expression found in Egypt and Algeria, makes them very different from Tanzania’s 
problems. She also said that what is happening in Tanzania now, the aggressive public debates, 
the burning of pork butcheries and other similar incidents really frighten people. Most of the 
population who have lived in peace with one another are shocked by these experiences and 
Larsen claims that the extremists are a small group of people without much support among the 
majority of the Muslim population. 
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4.3.4 Identity and Language of Conflict 
In a search for the nucleus of the problems developing in Tanzania the question of identity turned 
out to be the most important issue of our interview, and Kjersti Larsen presented her thoughts 
about identity and religion in Tanzania with several focuses. First she expressed that the people 
of Zanzibar look upon themselves as Africans, but they still find their ideals in other parts of the 
world. The material welfare of the West is to Africans, like it is to people in the Middle East, an 
ideal.  
 
 But when it comes to the moral universe, the focus is drawn towards the Middle 
East, and this is also the case for the esthetical ideals which are very important. 
(Larsen 1995) 
 
 
Kjersti Larsen sees religion as a moral system with strong connection to feelings about identity. 
A very important aspect of Islam is that the religious practices are exercised within a community, 
and the community has a lot to do with the forming of people’s identity. Identity is according to 
Kjersti Larsen created in the process where one relates oneself to a certain group of people, and 
by that also distinguishes oneself from someone else. Thus the Muslim identity is created around 
a religious society or community. 
 What Kjersti Larsen finds to be of great concern in Tanzania today is when conflicts are 
articulated in terms of religion. 
 
 On the one hand you have people who are religious, and on the other leaders who 
choose to use a religious language. When these meet, and the leaders use religious 
language to  people with a religious conviction, this is  extremely efficient because 
strong symbols are being used. This does not affect people only rationally, but it hits 
people here - in the stomach - because it is something that affects your whole 
identity, your complete conviction of how things are. (Larsen 1995) 
 
Kjersti Larsen concludes by saying that on Tanzania mainland things are much more 
complicated than on Zanzibar because "the others,"  i.e. the Christians, are so much closer.  
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4.3.5 Evaluation of Kjersti Larsen’s View 
Kjersti Larsen’s analysis of the religious situation in Tanzania, with a special focus on Zanzibar, 
contains many interesting aspects. My interpretation is that Larsen has noticed several changes in 
the religious situation but will mainly characterize them as changes that have taken place because 
of political changes, both domestic and international. Her first point, that religion now has 
become a political issue after years of socialist politics trying to separate religion from politics, is 
in line with Westerlund’s theory about compartmentalized religion. The strength of Larsen’s 
view is that she connects what has happened in Tanzania with what has happened in the rest of 
the world. Religion has all over the world more and more become a public matter and an issue in 
politics. The fact that a change of pardigm has appeared among scholars and commentators is 
also an observation worth considering. Larsen’s own examples from the Gulf war is a good 
example of the change of paradigm, where a conflict that earlier would have been given a 
political explanation now was partly explained as a conflict of religions. Conflicts usually hide a 
struggle for influence, and with the race between capitalism and socialism behind us, the 
religious influence, with its implications of economics and coalitions, has gained political 
importance. It is important, especially to theologians, to be aware of Larsen’s warning and not 
interpret all conflicts which appear to be religious as conflicts concerning theology and 
transcendent matters. But on the other hand, the focus on religion as an important part of what 
constitutes human identity, should encourage theologians to take part in the political debate 
which until now largely has been led from a secular point of view. 
 In the change that has occurred in people’s exercise of religion in Tanzania, Kjersti 
Larsen’s analysis needs further examination. She explained that people’s focus on outward, 
exercised religion had increased, but that people not necessarily had become more religious. 
Larsen also questioned whether the Muslims had been more preoccupied with pan-Islamic ideas. 
These are interesting statements that raise several questions. First of all what does it mean to be 
religious? Kjersti Larsen’s view as an anthropologist is interesting. She claims that regardless of 
political suppression, the religious life of the Muslims on Zanzibar has remained constant, a view 
which I consider as giving credit to the spiritual side of religion as opposed to religion only as an 
institutional or cultural practice. But at the same time she admits that the intensity in the 
articulation of religion has become stronger, and this must mean that people focus on religion in 
more areas of life, in the way they dress, the celebrating of public holidays, the way they think 
about the state etc. To me this increased activity shows that people are more religious in the 
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sense that the practical side of religion has become more important. From this follows a wish for 
religion to have increased influence on daily life, and this increased focus on Islam in a wide 
sense also increases Islam’s influence in politics, which is noted by those who are not Muslims 
and by them interpreted as an increased religiosity. 
 When the question of pan-Islamic identity was raised Kjersti Larsen first was somewhat 
reluctant to admit that an increased focus on this was an issue in Tanzania. Personally I think that 
the description of the focus on the new Islamic organizations in Tanzania (see 3.1) shows that 
this is a tendency that is quite clear, at least among certain groups of Muslims. Larsen gradually 
affirmed this during our conversation when she mentioned the increased circulation of Islamic 
literature on Zanzibar (this also happens in mainland Tanzania). This literature focuses on 
orthodox Islam, which to a much larger extent than traditional Islam, is preoccupied with the idea 
of the ummah, the universal society of believers. Another point is that this literature to a large 
extent is financed by nations who view the unity of all Muslims as a very important part of Islam, 
and the increased activity of some of these Arab countries’ embassies in Dar es Salaam is 
influencing the Muslims in the region (Sicard 1991:8). 
  
Larsen’s next point, where she claims that social problems has led to a more extreme or 
fundamentalistic form of Islam, is also found among other scholars as Kari Vogt (1993). Vogt 
also agrees that the leaders of the Islamists are educated people from urban areas (Vogt 
1993:240). Kjersti Larsen considers Islam as a good way of expressing discontent with the 
existing society, and the same thought is also expressed, somewhat simplified, by Bill Musk who 
claims that a common feature of the Islamists is that they are all "fundamentally against 
something or someone" (Musk 1992:45). When Kjersti Larsen views the social problems that 
lead to the development of Islamist ideas as a domestic reason behind the change in the 
relationship between Christians and Muslims in Tanzania, she is right in the sense that the 
problem of unemployment and poverty is a part of Tanzania’s internal problems. But the solution 
to the problem for the people involved, a radical Islam with the aim to change society, is from 
my point of view an ideology which in today’s version is imported and has not earlier been 
present in the history of Tanzania. 
  
Larsen’s final point, her focus on the religious language being used as a language of conflicts, is  
important. When certain groups, Christians or Muslims, use a religious political language in 
order to achieve or in order to increase their own influence, the result can easily become 
disastrous. This has for a long time been avoided in Tanzania because the religious leaders have 
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focused on the spiritual aspect of religion. Through history there has been very little serious 
struggle between the two religions, and their internal problems have until recently been solved in 
a peaceful way. It is clear that in the political situation that Tanzania faces, there is a danger that 
religion will be a central issue in politics, and even an issue of conflict. There is a big 
responsibility resting upon the shoulders of the religious societies to choose the right leaders, and 
there is a big responsibility resting upon the shoulders of the leaders being chosen. Their task 
must be to focus on the fact that religious coexistence is still possible. It is important that the 
Muslim community, where the focus on politics is implied in the focus on religion, realize that if 
they intend to have a peaceful coexistence with the Christians, the militant Islamist tendencies 
must be stopped. The religious language, is, as Larsen emphasizes, so strong that if the wrong 
persons will have the possibility to feed either Christians or Muslims with hatred in the name of 
religion, Tanzania can become a new Nigeria or a new Sudan. 
 
4.4 Summary 
The scholars presenting their views all agree upon one thing, the fall of the ujamaa politics has 
played an important part in the change in the Christian-Muslim relationship in Tanzania. But 
even if they do agree on this issue, they all interpret the consequences of the new political 
situation differently. Omari claims that after the fall of ujamaa the national leadership of the 
country has been weakened. The new leaders have as a result of the introduction of free-market 
economy been tempted by briberies and have according to Omari shown very little ethical 
consideration46. This has given religious extremists the possibility to gain a foothold. Frieder 
Ludwig claims that the end of the ujamaa politics has made visible the struggle between the 
religions that all the time has been present. To Kjersti Larsen it is clear that the new political 
situation has influenced the religious relationship by offering a more open religious climate. 
People’s possibility to exercise religion freely has increased religion’s part in the constitution of 
people’s identity, and hence become more important, both in private life and in politics. 
 The origin of the religious extremism is also viewed differently by the three scholars. 
Kjersti Larsen claims that social problems are the main reason behind the Islamist tendencies in 
the region. The reason why a militant Islam is the answer to frustrated Muslims is according to 
Larsen that the new political climate has a tendency to explain conflicts in terms of religion  
                                                 
46
On June 2 Aftenposten could bring the news that the Norwegian government has frozen the development aid to 
Tanzania because of the high level of corruption in the Tanzanian bureaucracy. 
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instead of in different political terms. Frieder Ludwig holds the view that it is old conflicts 
between Christians and Muslims that have now become visible, even if it is influenced by 
foreign ideas. C.K. Omari seems to consider the Islamist tendencies as a minor threat to the 
religious relationship since he blames the leaders in Tanzania for the extremists’ actions. 
 The different views presented by these scholars give us insight into the variety of reasons 
behind the change in the Christian-Muslim relationship. It is obvious that domestic changes have 
prepared the ground for a change in the religious relationship between the two groups. But these 
scholars do not examine more deeply the ideas that are the driving force behind the new Muslim 
vitality. The scholars claim that the domestic reasons are the most important, still, they all agree 
that foreign influence plays a part in what is happening. Larsen claims that the Muslims’ 
religious ideals come from the Middle East and Omari even claims that most of the Muslim 
extremists are foreign led. But what is the ideology behind these new Muslim tendencies, and 
how strong is the international network that is pursuing these interest? These are the question that 
will be further looked upon in the next chapter.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
GLOBAL MUSLIM INFLUENCE 
 
 
This final chapter deals with the global Muslim revival that has influenced Tanzania’s religious 
geography lately. A general survey of the background behind what I have called “the general 
Islamic revival” includes a presentation of some of the main reasons behind the new worldwide 
Muslim vitality. It also contains a presentation of the main ideologists behind the Muslim 
resurgence. A presentation of different  international Muslim organizations that are active in East 
Africa is preceded by a closer examination of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. This is 
done in order to present the most prominent and influential international Muslim organization, 
and to explain why the OIC-crisis was so crucial to many Tanzanian Christians. The presentation 
of the organizations will be followed by an evaluation of the influence that different Muslim 
countries have had in the recent development of the Muslim communities in Tanzania. Finally I 
will look upon the question as to whether this influence is a pan-Islamic influence promoted by a 
united Muslim world, or merely a pursuing of the different countries’ own interests. 
 
5.1 The General Islamic Revival 
The Islamic resurgence that can be traced all over the world is hard to grasp because it is not 
restricted to any region, legal or theological division or any socio-economic class. The attitudes 
of the different movements are many and within the Muslim community there are different 
perspectives of the resurgence. This is shown by the different names that the revival-oriented 
Muslims use to describe themselves or their movement; ba'ath, renaissance, sawah, awakening, 
ihva al-din, awakening of religion, usuliyyah or salafiyya, fundamentalism, tajdid, periodical 
renewal of faith, islah, reform, asliyyin, original ones, and mutudyyinin, the pious (Woodberry 
1995:1).  
 The way the Muslims name their movements shows that their focus is somewhat different 
and this is not well covered by the label "fundamentalism"  that Westeners often use to describe 
the different movements. In a sense all Muslims are fundamentalists. The Koran is believed by 
Muslims to be a dictate of the Koran in heaven, the will of God written in the Arab language to 
be received and obeyed by mankind. This is the fundament in which every Muslim believes, the 
whole religion rests upon the direct revelation from Allah to Muhammed. And this is where 
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Salman Rushdie made his serious mistake, he questioned the revelation, he insinuated that it was 
Muhammed's own desire that was the force behind the revelation. The Satanic verses47 were not 
from Satan and the rest of the revelation was not from God, this is the message of Rushdie 
(Musk 1992:183). To Muslims this is the most serious blasphemy and a sign that the author has 
left his religion - and that is the basis of the fathwa, Komheini's death penalty. Rushdie 
challenged the fundaments of Islam and he was answered by the Muslim world.  
 The somewhat vague "Fundamentalist" label has been adopted by the media and is used to 
denounce all extreme actions carried out by Muslims. Some scholars, like Jan Opsal, use the 
term "Islamists" denoting the reformists who see Islam practised in the Medina- period as the 
pure Islam which Muslims have to return to (Opsal 1994:210). But regardless of labels and 
different focuses there are some elements that have influenced the whole Muslim world and 
these elements will be looked into in the following. 
 
5.1.1 The Sense of Trauma 
J. Dudley Woodberry focuses on four major reasons when he explains the Islamic resurgence, 
and his first point is the "sense of trauma" that is felt in many Muslim communities. The 
frustration and humiliation of years under colonial rule is the most important root of the trauma 
experienced by Muslims (Woodberry 1995:3). The Medinan period under the caliphate of 
Muhammed himself denotes to Muslims the pride and the glory of Islam's strength. The concept 
of the Koran is that God is sovereign, and therefore success follows his believers. This was 
proved to Muslims when the spread of Islam, through the Arab people, resulted in the the largest 
imperial expansion ever known. And this was done within one hundred years after the death of 
Muhammed. Despite the fall of Bagdhad to the Mongols 1258, new Muslim empires like the 
Ottoman empire of the Middle East and Safavid’s rule in Persia ensured that Muslims in general 
lived under a Muslim ruler and were governed by Islamic law up to the eighteenth century 
(Musk 1992:48-50).  
 In a recent analysis of Arab writings between 1945-70, focusing on the search for identity 
in the Arab world, it is made clear that the Western military occupation of Arab lands and the 
encroachment of its industrial and technological supremacy has provoked change and efforts to 
shape an Arab identity (Donohue 1983:47-48). The analysis shows that a variety of reasons 
caused the change in the Arab world and that one of the attitudes expressed in the articles was 
                                                 
 47The rewriting of sura 53 occured after Muhammed was told by God that he had been "fooled" by Satan in the 
revelation to the first version of the sura (Musk 1992:183). 
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the need to protect Arab speciality by rejecting cultural imperialism (Donahue 1983:57). Ibrahim 
Ibrahim, professor of Arab studies at Washington's Georgetown University claims that the 
reasons why Muslims are critical to the West are many, but they are not theological. "It is a 
grievance of colonialism. We have been humiliated. The West defined the world for Muslims." 
(Time, June 15, 1992:24). This humiliation has been succeeded by anger. Bill Musk wonders if 
the most common denominator in the expression of Islamic reformists is not that they are all 
"against" something or someone. The reformist movement has become a protest movement, 
against dependence upon the West, and against secular political leaders. The theological basis of 
this protest is sura 8:6048 (Musk 1992:45-46). 
 
 Against them make ready 
 Your strength to the utmost 
 Of your power, including 
 Steeds of  war, to strike terror 
 Into (the hearts of) the enemies... 
 
The powerlessness felt by many Muslims today, experiencing the results of years of colonialism 
was already expressed by al-Afghani (1838/9-97), one of the ideologists of the modern Muslim 
reform-movements, in the following paradox: The Christians who follow a kingdom that is not 
of this earth have become the rulers of the world. The Muslims follow the religion of the sword, 
of victory and power, but have become slaves under foreign rule. Al-Afghani concluded that 
both had misconceived their religion, claiming that the Christians had taken into possession the 
structure of the Roman empire, while the Muslims had fallen into fatalism and mysticism (Holter 
1976:22)49. 
 This sense of trauma developed during colonialism into a search for identity. In previous 
times many different people had been united politically under Muslim empires. The colonial 
powers ignored to a large extent people living together with different alliances and drew 
boundaries that separated people like the Kurds and the Arabs. The political powers also 
transferred nationalistic ideas based on ethnicity and language. The result was that individuals 
had to consider whether they were basically Muslims, Arabs or Egyptians for example, and had 
to conduct themselves according to different combinations of loyalties (Woodberry 1995:4). 
                                                 
48The first words of this verse appears on the logo of the Muslim Brotherhood (Musk 1992:46). 
49In Opsal 1994:208. 
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 These conflicting loyalties have after independence led to political instability. The Western 
education system created an educated elite that took over the modernist worldview. This elite 
was in the front line when the post-war climate made independence possible. The new leaders 
were foreign-orientated ideologically and grew distant from the mass of their own people (Musk 
1992:61). This political instability often resulted in the suppression of the opposition by the 
ruling government, which led to an even deeper division. But the most serious conflict between 
the traditionalists and those influenced by the West was the conflict of values (Woodberry 
1995:4). The traditional Islamic values were set aside by the people who embraced the modernist 
thoughts. Modernization and industrialization widened the gap between the “haves” and the 
“have-nots” even more. 
 
 Modernisation means, in the reformist's view, "Westification". Patterns of western 
dominance are deeply fixed in the colony's institutional make-up. A legislature is 
established with a separate executive power and independent judiciary. Where do 
the laws come from? Most of them are from the human mind, not from God as 
revealed in the Qur'an and sunna. (Musk 1992:60) 
 
The most important channel of the continued imposition of a Western worldview has been the 
Western education which is adopted in most countries. Also recruitment of non-Western nations 
into Western debates like capitalism versus communism has enforced a Western way of thinking 
upon the Muslim states (Musk 1992:60). But what most revivalist Muslims are really concerned 
about is the state of their own community of believers. The secularism and apostasy that follow 
the influence from the West are the main enemies threatening to disintegrate the ummah of the 
believers. The feeling of powerlessness is especially hard for the Sunni Muslims who never 
developed a theology of suffering (Woodberry 1995:3). To them the humiliation of colonialism 
and dependence upon the West is a sign that God has left them, and only a revival back to the 
principles of the Koran and the will of God can bring renewed power. 
 
5.1.2 Opportunities to Respond 
After the sense of trauma, Woodberry holds "the opportunities to respond" as the second source 
of the Islamic resurgence. After World War I most Muslim areas were colonies or protectorates 
under Western control. The technical superiority of the imperialists made the possibilities of 
resurgence limited (Woodberry 1995:5). But the politics of the colonialists changed, for a 
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complex variety of reasons, in the post-war era, and within 25 years 99 percent of the Muslim 
countries gained independence. By many reformist Muslims this was seen as a possibility to 
reestablish the Islamic state and go back to the way things were governed before. This was 
however not how things turned out. The adoption of western political ideologies by the educated 
elite left a lasting colonial legacy in the post-colonial Muslim states, which often resulted in a 
hybrid between a Western secular state and a legitimate Islamic state (Musk 1992:57-59). But 
the new state gave much more room for political and religious movements than was the case 
under colonial rule. The reformist Muslims did not achieve what they wanted after 
independence, but they had the possibility to be a part of the formation of the country and to 
convince others what was the true path of Islam. 
 Another factor that has given the resurgence an opportunity to respond is the oil. The oil-
crisis of the early 1970s with the rise of oil prices made billions of dollars flow into Muslim 
countries. This did not only show that the Arab countries could again play a part in international 
politics with increased self-respect, but it also gave these countries economic freedom. This 
freedom was used to pursue Islamic interests such as the building of mosques and other Islamic 
institutions, and it was also used to support other Islamic countries in the same manner. Among 
the states with increased influence were those with a Fundamentalist Islamic government like 
Saudi Arabia, with its "moderate" attitude and Libya with its more "radical" approach. Both these 
countries used their accumulated wealth to support Fundamentalist causes (Woodberry 1995:5). 
 
 Undoubtedly, the rise in pitch of Islamic spokesmen in the area can be explained in 
part by internal politics and the astounding wealth generated by petroleum in the 
past decade. It would be an error to attribute all to these aspects, but it would be 
equally erroneous to neglect them. (Donahue 1983:48) 
 
 
5.1.3 The Historic Precedence 
The third root of the Islamic resurgence presented by Woodberry is the historic precedence. He 
argues that the search for the pure Islam has occurred repeatedly in Islamic history at times of 
crisis, and contemporary Muslim fundamentalists find their roots in these historic models. The 
search for roots goes all the way back to Muhammed, who as the greatest prophet began 
preaching the message of Allah when the tribal humanism of the Arabs was crumbling. The life 
of Muhammed will always stand as the ultimate example of pure Islam for Muslims.  
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 Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz (d.720) was the first major reformer of existing Islam who preached 
the return to the example of Muhammed when the Ummayad dynasty (660-75) was on the 
decline. This led to the development of two different schools of law in the names of Abu Hanifa 
and Malik. After this first reform movement Muslim reformists have raised their voices each 
time the leaders or the people have turned away from the example of the Prophet. Among the 
most famous reformists is ibn-Hanbal (780-855) who developed his school of law and theology 
and led popular uprisings against the Abbaside Caliphate (750-1258) (Woodberry 1995:5-6). 
When the Ottoman Turks gained control over the Middle East their empire secured the influence 
of Islam in the region. But when the empire was on the decline Abd al-Wahhab (d.1791) called 
Muslims to practice a primitive Islam and rebuked the errors and laxity of the times. The 
movement raised the question of authority within the Muslim community and criticized the 
empire's use of the sharia which was restricted in some matters and supplemented by traditions 
in others (Holt 1970A:380-81). The ideas of al-Wahhab were adopted by, among others, al-
Afghani (d.1879). Al-Afghani is by many reckoned as one of the founders of of the modern 
reform movement (Opsal 1994:208), and his thoughts and ideas will be further elaborated later in 
this chapter. 
 
5.1.4 Local Factors 
The last of the roots that Woodberry presents as a cause of Islamic resurgence are the local 
factors that are found in the different Muslim areas. Local factors have greatly influenced the 
form which the resurgence has taken. First of all there is the difference between the Sunni and 
the Shia Muslims. The two different schools of Islam practice different traditions which 
sometimes affect the nature of the resurgence, and sometimes lead to different results on simular 
conflicts. For instance both Sunni Egypt and Shia Iran faced a conflict where the ruler of the 
country was the obstacle to resurgence. In both countries Fundamentalists joined more secular 
forces in the fight against the head of the state, which in Egypt was King Faruq and in Iran was 
the Shah. Once successful in the revolt, the secular and the religious forces turned against each 
other in both countries. In Egypt the more secular faction was the strongest and in Iran the 
religious party took control of the government. But the struggle for power has continued in both 
countries. In Egypt the Islamists fight for the fulfilment of their cause, and in Iran the more 
moderate forces have increased their power after Khomeini’s death. 
 In Sub-Saharan Africa both Islam and Christianity have increased their influence at the 
expense of African traditional religions. The Muslim resurgence is most clear in countries where 
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Christianity and Islam are close to equal in size, with a struggle to be the most influential factor 
in the running of state affairs as a result. The war between the two factions in Sudan and the 
attempt to institute sharia-laws in Nigeria50 have been the most serious conflicts. 
 In Central Asia the resurgence has taken the form of resistance to Russification and a fight 
for independence and the return to old political and religious ties by Uzbecks, Kirghis and 
Kazakhs. The success of the Afghan mudjahidin has shown the tenacity of the religious element 
in the fight for independence (Woodberry 1995:7). 
 
5.2 The Reform Movement 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, together with Muhammed Abduh 
(1849-1905) are reckoned as the main ideologists behind the modern Islamic reform movement. 
The trauma of colonization, the powerlessness and humiliation it resulted in, was the background 
on which these Muslim reformists developed their theology. The solution that al-Afghani 
suggested was to return to the basic fundamental organizing of society that the Koran suggested. 
The guidance as to how to organize such a society was found by al-Afghani in the sharia, the 
juridical philosophy of Islam. In this juridical system was the power to change society, but this 
was, according to al-Afghani, neglected by the priesthood of his time. Muhammed Abduh 
worked together with al-Afghani for some time and he developed the theology of the movement 
in his book about the unity of  theology. The unity of God is to be reflected in the organizing of 
society. The true religion has always been the same and therefore Abduh wanted to return to the 
principles that were followed by the generation of Muhammed. This new movement was called 
salafiyya, derived from salaf assalihin, the pious ancestors. The name denotes the return to the 
fundaments of Islam, found in the example of the Prophet and in the time of the first four caliphs 
(Opsal 1994:208-209). 
 The central aim of the salafiyya-movement was to update the Muslim world in the fields of 
development where it had lagged behind. The idea was that a return to the fundamental 
principles of Islam would lead to development both materially and in the field of knowledge. To 
Abduh it was important to emphasize that there was no contradiction between Islam and true 
knowledge because all true knowledge was found in the Koran. To make this development 
possible the movement was ready to put aside certain traditional dogmas, and this made them 
controversial in some circles. To Abduh and al-Afghani it was also important to stress the fact 
                                                 
50With the result that more than 100 churches were burnt in 1987 (Woodberry 1995:7). 
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that the Muslim ummah, the fellowship or society, was universal, superior to any ethnic or 
geographical boundaries. These pan-Islamic ideas had been without political significance when 
they were reintroduced by al-Afghani and Abduh. 
 The Muslim reformists did agree that the solution was to return to the examples of 
Muhammed and the period of the first four caliphs. They also agreed that Islam had to answer 
the challenge of the new times more dynamically than the traditionalists51 did. Problems did 
however emerge over the question of how to put into practice the original principles. One faction 
chose the direction of following the principles as closely as possible, with the thought that it was 
deviation from these that had led the Muslims in the wrong direction. This group is called 
Fundamentalists or Islamists. Another faction chose to reinterpret these principles without being 
bound to the consequences that these principles caused in a completely different time. This group 
is called Modernists (Opsal 1994:209-210). 
 
5.3 The Muslim Brotherhood 
The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 by the Egyptian school-teacher Hassan al-Banna 
(1905-49). He felt that Muslim youth were taught a very corrupted form of Islam and concluded 
that the Al-Azhar theologians and scholars had failed as the spokesmen of a pure and dynamic 
Islam. The goals of the brotherhood grew out of al-Banna's view about what had gone wrong in 
the world of Islam. The diagnosis that al-Banna presented was that of a country in religious, 
cultural, political, economical, social and moral decadence. The answers of the Muslim 
Brotherhood were to a large extent an echo of the salafiyya-movement, a return to the pure Islam 
of the original believers and a return to the words of the Koran. Their slogan, al-nizam al-islami, 
creation of a Muslim order, in practice meant an Islamic state. The major change of the existing 
state was that the sharia laws had to be implemented, and the state had to return to the revelation 
as the source of life and politics. Al-Banna  felt that Egypt was at a crossroad, either the way of 
the West or the way of Islam had to be followed. In his political fight for the way of Islam al-
Banna ended his life as a shadid, a martyr, when he was murdered by the secret police in 1949 
(Musk 1992:91-95). 
 But the Muslim Brotherhood could not be halted by the assassination of its founder, and in  
                                                 
51Traditionalists is the name given to those Muslims who in addition to the tradition from the Koran and the 
hadith, adopt elements from local history and tradition into their religion. This results in a variety of local 
customs, and a tendency to focusing on local and national issues at the expense of pan-Islamic ideas (Opsal 
1994:207). 
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1952 they joined a coup against King Faruq. Faruq’s successor, Nasser, carried out a policy that 
was far from the ideas of the Brotherhood, and after a militant brother failed to assassinate 
Nasser, several people were executed or put into prison. Among the latter was Sayyaid Qutb 
(1906-66) who during many years in prison developed an ideology that not only, like al-Banna, 
motivated for reform, but proclaimed the necessity of an Islamic revolution (Opsal 1994:211). In 
his most famous book "Signposts on the road" (1964), Qutb divided society into two kinds, the 
order of Islam and the order of jahiliya. The latter order was the type of order which had existed 
in Arabia before the time of Muhammed. The definition jahiliyyah that Qutb used was however 
borrowed from Mawdudi52 and the term does not describe a period in time but a condition that is 
repeated every time society turns away from the Islamic way (Haddad 1983:85).  
 
 Today we are in a similar or darker jahiliyyah, than the contemporaneous to early 
Islam. All that surrounds us is jahiliyyah, people’s visions, beliefs, their habits and 
customs, their source of knowledge, art, literature, rules and laws, even what we 
consider as Islamic education, Islamic sources, Islamic philosophy and Islamic 
thought - all of it is the product of jahiliyyah. (in Haddad 1983:85) 
 
Moral reform was the urgent need of the hour, and a jihad against Westernization had to be 
achieved. Qutb called for the establishment and the proper mainteinance of God's will through 
the sharia laws. Among the ones that Qutb blamed for secularism and turning away from God 
were the President, communism, Christians (colonists) and Jews (Zionists). Qutb told his fellow 
Muslims to stop imitating the pattern of the West, presented by “the people of the book.” He said 
that the only pattern Muslims should imitate was the pattern of the Koran (Musk 1992:103-5).  
 After his experiences of persecution and imprisonment, Qutb developed a more militant 
ideology in the form of proclamations preached directly to the opposition. Qutb argued that 
freedom of choice comes only after the forces of oppression have been removed, therefore the  
jihad is crucial if the dawah, the call to Islam, is to proceed freely. 
 
 Islam is not a theological system that is realized when appropriated as an  
                                                 
52
Abul Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979) is one of the most influential Muslim writers the last century. He published 
around 100 books which have been translated to several languages. His efforts marked the introduction to a new 
era of Islam confronting the modernist world view. Mawdudi has been of greatest inspiration and influence to 
post-war Muslims all over the world (Berg 1983:introduction). Mawdudi lived his life in India/Pakistan and 
Mawdudi’s relative distance in geography and direct influence to the Muslims in East Africa (together with the 
limited space in this chapter), does not allow me to further elaborate his thoughts in this thesis. 
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 ideology...and then its mission ceases. Islam is a pragmatic activistic system of life. It 
withstands other systems which are based on power and is supported by material 
power. For Islam to establish its divine system, it is inevitable that these material 
powers be destroyed and the powers that administer the systems that resist the divine 
way be annihilated. (in Haddad 1982:82) 
 
Qutb sees the liberation of society as imperative to setting people free and to impose the 
kingdom of God on earth. Jihad is reckoned a liberating force, a promotion of the righteous 
society, and militancy is defended as necessary (Haddad 1983:81-82). This "liberation theology" 
of Qutb soon ran out of patience with the compromised politics of Nasser, and further clashes 
with the government followed. This moved Qutb to develop a further ideology on the issue of 
reformed Muslims attacking other Muslims. Qutb's answer to this53 was to form a "state within 
the state," a small society of believers who dedicated themselves to the cause of building the new 
Islamic society. This is, according to Qutb, an imitation of the Prophet's withdrawal from Mecca 
to Medina. Qutb declared in the trial against him: 
 
 We are the umma of the believers, living within a jahili society. Nothing relates us to 
state or to society and we owe no allegiance to either. As a community of believers 
we should see ourselves in a state of war with the state and the society. The territory 
we dwell in is Dar al-Harb (House of war). (in Musk 1992:107) 
 
Sayyid Qutb was regarded as a too strong threat to the Egyptian government and was sentenced 
to death and executed in 1966. Within a year after his death Egypt suffered a humiliating defeat 
against Israel in the six-days war. To Qutb's followers this was his prophecy come true - "the 
semi-secular Arab socialism of  Nasser... had been defeated because they had turned away from 
the will of God." (p.104) (Musk 1992:104-6). 
 
5.4 The Glorious Revolution in Iran 
The so-called glorious revolution in Iran is often connected with the person Ayatollah Khomeini, 
and he did play a central part in the events in Iran in 1979. But apart from Khomeini, others had  
                                                 
53In the development of this theory Qutb was largely influenced by the 14th century Sunni theologian Ibn 
Taimiya (Musk 1992:106). 
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spread the thoughts of reform among the people of Iran. The most prominent among them was 
Ali Shariati who was born in a small desert town in the northeastern part of Iran in 1933, and was 
killed during a visit to Great Britain 44 years later. Shariati started his education in Iran, but was 
offered the opportunity to study abroad and returned to Iran with a doctor's degree from the 
critical school of French sociology. His return was not popular with the government, but after 
some time he received a teaching position at the University of Mashhad. There he soon became 
the most popular teacher among the students, but not among the pro-monarchy leaders of the 
university who found him far too radical. 
 Shariati's sociological interpretation of Islam was very popular with the young people. He 
lectured with an authoritative understanding of  Western scholars, but emphasized the spiritual 
bankruptcy of Western humanism. He evolved a faithful, but politically challenging approach to 
the exegesis of the Koran. Shariati was not concerned about the traditional Islamic teachings, his 
concern was rather how to adopt the teachings of the Koran to the needs of the contemporary 
Iranian society. The aim of his teachings was to make people see that they had to return to the 
early Shi'ism of Ali54 which in contrast to the institutionalized official Islam that was presented 
by the government. Ali Shariati wanted his listeners to realize the rich heritage that belonged to 
them as Muslims and be critical of the ideologies exported from the West. To Shariati the people, 
the mass, was the adressee of the Koran. The Koran is introduced with the name of Allah, and 
ends in the name of al-nas, mankind, therefore the message must be lived out by the people 
(Musk 1992:137). According to Shariati an Islamic government had to be built on tawhid, the 
unity of Allah. For people to subordinate themselves to something else was reckoned as shirk, 
idolatry. As long as the will of Allah is the sole guide for humanity, an earthly tyranny becomes 
impossible - and all people become equal (Opsal 1994:215). 
 
The thoughts of government and revolution - an Islam with a touch of Marxism, were shared by 
Rühalla Musavi Khomeini (1902-89) who in 1979 was declared ayatollah, the religious leader of 
the Iranian people. Khomeini became famous through his lectures and writings where he 
combined topics of spiritual and ethical nature with analysis of the apostasy caused by the 
government. As the Shah developed closer ties with the West55, and left the traditional values of 
Islam more and more, Khomeini felt it imperative to speak out against the secular government. 
After a series of speeches against the government, the major clash occurred in 1963 when the 
Shah sent paratroopers against Khomeini and his supporters in Qum, killing several students. 
                                                 
     54Ali, the son on law of Muhammed, was the first of the Imams (Musk 1992:105). 
55Especially USA and United Kingdom who assisted the Shah in a military coup in 1953 (Musk 1992:140). 
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When the arrest of Khomeini was known the day after, serious riots occurred all over the 
country56. The following year Khomeini was sent into exile, first to Turkey, then to Iraq and 
finally to France where he stayed until his return to Iran in 1979. While in exile Khomeini 
continued to write in his struggle against the regime in Iran. 
 Through his writings Khomeini wanted to prepare the religious students for the take-over 
of political power. He stressed the need to subordinate political power to Islamic goals and 
worldview. Sharia had to be the order of the day. Those who one day should be the rulers of the 
Iranian society were those who were experts in the understanding and interpretation of the 
Islamic laws. This is what became the one-phrased message of Khomeini, vilayat-i faqih, 
government by the experts in Islamic law. He was also very clear about the standards he 
expected from the future Islamic leaders. To be the representatives of Allah, the clergy had to be 
totally disinterested in this world and totally devoid of wordly ambitions (Musk 1992:139-145). 
 The popularity of Khomeini, his appeal to the Iranian Muslims, consists of several aspects, 
and some of them deserve more attention in this context. First of all his play upon the tension 
between Iranian nationalism and Islam as universial is interesting. His own person has an ethnic 
marginality which is often commented upon57 and during his stay in France great efforts had to 
be made to persuade him to talk about the situation in Iran (Fischer 1983:160). This shows the 
universial, pan-Islamic view of Islam held by Khomeini. Also the ascetic and spiritual attitude of 
the Ayatollah impressed people. The monotonous way in which he spoke showed a withdrawal 
from this world, a refusal to be seduced by materialist concerns. Finally Khomeini, unlike other 
top-rank ulama, used a popular language of confrontation, a language of the ordinary man, 
attacking intellectuals, the rich and the elite (Fischer 1983:161-162).  
  
 We must improve ourselves spiritually and improve our way of life. We must become 
more ascetic than before and completely shun the goods of this world...Prepare 
yourselves to be of use to Islam, act as the army for the Imam of the age, in order to 
be able to serve him in spreading the rule of justice. (in Musk 1992:145) 
 
 
                                                 
56
The government said that 200 were killed, but Islamic leaders claimed that more than 15.000 lost their lives 
(Musk 1992:142). 
57Khomeinis great grandfather moved to India, but his grandfather moved back to Iran. Still Khomeini as a 
young man signed his poems “Hindi.” This gives Khomeini a somewhat Indian background (Fischer 1983:160) 
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5.5 Muslim International Organizations 
5.5.1 The Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) 
The philosophy of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) is built on the Koranic concept 
of ummah. The meaning of this Arab word has always been a matter of discussion between Arab 
scholars. The Muslim scholar Abdullah al Ahsan in his book "OIC-An Introduction to an Islamic 
Political Institution," introduces us to the meaning of the word by interpreting it as "a 
confederation round a religious nucleus." (al Ahsan 1988:2). According to the Koran, mankind 
was one single ummah because it originated from and followed the same source, Allah. Later a 
division was made between followers and rejectors of the divine guidance. The Koran states that 
the followers of each prophet is an ummah (S 10:47). But the word ummah in the Koran is not 
only applied to a group of people, it is always linked with the idea of a well-knitted group of 
people, hence the word describes the way some people believe in certain ideas. 
 The Koran establishes tawhid, the unity of Allah and the prophethood of Muhammed as 
the foundation of ummah. 
 
 O our Sustainer, make us surrender unto You "muslimayn" and make out of our 
offspring a community (ummah) that shall surrender "muslimatan" itself unto You, 
and show us our ways of worship, and accept our repentance. (s 2:128) 
 
Through these two ideas a physical identity developed when Muslims every day turned to Mecca 
in prayer. Whoever accepts this identity is a member of the Muslim ummah. But al Ashan leads 
us one step further into the meaning of the concept, quoting from sura 5:48: 
 
 ...unto everyone of you (mankind) have We appointed a law and a way of life 
(shir'atan wa minhajan)... 
 
A more precise definition of ummah would therefore have to include an element of the Islamic 
law, sharia, and al Ashan ends up with a final definition; "In general then, the ummah is a 
community of law based on certain ideas." (1988:7 see 1-7). 
 When Muhammed established his community in Medina through his document known as 
the "Constitution of Medina," he presented a revolutionary idea concerning people's identity. In 
the pre-Islamic Arab society each individual fought and made sacrifices for the honour of his 
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tribe. The tribe, in return, provided security and protection for the individual. After accepting 
Islam, each individual had to abandon this idea because the new faith demanded his supreme 
loyalty (al Ashan 1988:8). This means that each Muslim is not first of all an Arab or a citizen of 
a country, but he is first of all a Muslim, and together with the rest of the world's Muslims he is 
connected to the pan-Islamic concept of ummah. This is the philosophy upon which the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference  is built.   
The abolition of the Caliphate in 192458 left the Muslim world in confusion. Several conferences 
were held in the following years with the primary goal of reestablishing the Caliphate, but 
without success. In the years to come the world saw the emergence of several political blocks, 
the communist block in eastern Europe, the anglo-American cooperation, but no Muslim block, 
and the question is why? Abdullah al Ashan points first of all to the Islamic secularization, 
predominantly in Turkey and Egypt where to a large extent the adoption of Western thoughts and 
political ideologies were dominant. The fact that many Muslim nations had suffered from being 
colonies left them economically and politically weak. 
 There were, however, two issues that to some extent activated the Muslim countries. First 
it was the independence of those Muslim states which were still under colonial rule and secondly 
it was the establishing of the state of Israel in 194859. But it was another decade before the 
Muslim states were able to act. In 1962 the Saudi Arabian crown prince Faisal sponsored a 
conference in Mecca that led to the formation of the Muslim World League whose primary aim 
was to fight secularism and spread the Muslim dawah, mission. In the mid-60s the now king 
Faisal tried to propagate the idea of an organization representing all Muslims, but he was met 
with criticism from the regimes in Cairo and Baghdad. 
 It took two very important events to make the Muslim world organize. The first was the 
defeat of leading Arab nations in the war against Israel in 1967. But the incident that really shook 
the Muslim world was when the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem60 was partly damaged on august 
21 1969. Protest rallies all over the Muslim world led to the first Islamic Summit Conference in 
Rabat 1969. Here it was decided that ministers of the 24 participating countries should meet the 
following year. The third conference of the ministers in 1972 declared that the name of the new 
pan-Islamic organization should be the Organization of Islamic Conference (al Ashan 1988:11-
21). 
                                                 
58The Turkish Grand National Assembly abolished the Caliphate on the 3rd of march 1924, leaving Muslims 
without an international platform (Holt 1970 A:102). 
59
Abdullah al Ashan in his book consequently refers to the state of Israel in quotation marks, i.e. "Israel" (1988) 
60
Jerusalem is the third holiest city in Islam. 
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Although the OIC was established in response to one particular event, the damaging of the al-
Aqsa Mosque, the leaders that met in this conference carried with them a desire from most 
Muslims to establish a permanent political organization. The OIC-charter is built on the Koranic 
concept of ummah and the objectives of the organization are to build a strong solidarity between 
Muslim nations and to increase human well-being, progress, freedom and justice for their people 
throughout the world.  
 There are four major components of the organization. First there is the Conference of 
Kings and Heads of State and Governments, which is the highest authoritative institution within 
the IOC. The Foreign Ministers Conference is the main decision-making institution which meet 
annually61. The General Secretariat is the executive organ of the OIC and consists of more than 
one hundred officials.  The fourth pillar of the OIC is the Islamic Court of Justice. This court 
consists of eleven members educated in traditional Islamic Jurisprudence and they are concerned 
with all cases agreed upon by its members, disputes among member states, the interpretation of 
the charter and issuing of fatwahs approved by the Foreign Ministers Conference (al Ashan 
1988:23-28). 
 In addition to the four major components, the OIC occasionally creates committees and 
commisions concerning important matters to the organization. In 1975 the Al-Quds Committee 
was founded to pay special attention to the Palestine issue. The year after Al-Quds Fund was 
established  in order to: 
 
- Prevent and resist Judaization policy pursued by the "Israeli" occupation authorities; 
- Preserve and maintain the Arab character of the city of Jerusalem; and 
- Support the struggle of the Palestinian people in Jerusalem and in the rest of the occupied          
territories. (al Ashan 1988:30-31) 
 
In general the Palestine issue has been very central in the OIC. In addition to an office working 
for the boycott of Israel62, an office was created to promote the military coordination between 
PLO and the front-line states (Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon) on the one hand and the other 
Islamic states on the other. All Islamic states were encouraged by OIC to support the PLO with 
military expertise and equipment. 
                                                 
61The foreign ministers have since 1980 met during the U.N. General Alssembly sessions in addition to their 
annual meeting (al-Ashan 1988:26). 
62
Working together with a similar office at the Arab League (al Ashan 1988:60) 
 105 
 
 The jihad activities of the OIC  can be divided into three fields; military, diplomatic 
and economic. The OIC decided to undertake in all Islamic countries a 
psychological mobilization of the people through official, semi-official, and popular 
uses of the mass-media. Member states were invited accordingly to open offices for 
volunteers wishing to participate in the jihad for the liberation of the holy land, and 
to open offices for the PLO. (al Ashan 1988:60) 
 
Another fund within the OIC is the Islamic Solidarity Fund with the intention of raising the 
moral and intellectual standards of Muslims all over the world by building mosques, hospitals 
and similar institutions. The other objective of the fund is to provide relief in case of emergencies 
such as natural disasters etc. The Islamic States Broadcasting Organization wants to spread 
(dawah) and promote awareness of the Islamic heritage. Among several organs within the OIC 
concerning education, development and research, one finds the International Islamic Law 
Commision, whose main occupation is to conduct research in various fields concerning the 
sharia. 
 
The most important and also the most active institution within OIC is the Islamic Development 
Bank (IDB). The bank was established in 1975 and serves to ”...foster the economic development 
and social progress of member countries and Muslim communities individually and jointly in 
accordance with the principles of shari'ah.” (al Ashan 1988:37). Its functions are to grant loans 
for projects and enterprises and provide financial assistance for member countries. The bank also 
operates a special fund for assistance to Muslim communities in non-member countries. In 1983 
the capital of the bank was 1937 million US dollars, and up to 1989 the IDB had spent 3.5 billion 
Usd in various operations in African countries. The bank also has scholarship programmes for 
Muslims in non-member countries to study in membership countries. Recent statistics show that 
IDB offers scholarships for 43 students from Kenya and for 50 students from Tanzania63(al-
Gabid 1993:309). 
 
Membership-countries of the OIC have increased in number from 24 countries in 1969 to 46 
countries in 1986. The member countries are from Africa and Asia. Article eight of the charter 
defines membership to include only Muslim states, but the charter does not define what it means 
                                                 
63 Arild Bakke claims that many African students have been offered scholarships and hoped for a degree in 
science or arts, but have only been offered religious studies of Islam (Bakke 1994:83). 
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by a Muslim state. According to OIC publications it means a state where Muslims comprise the 
majority of the population, but in practice the IOC has not followed any consequent policy. An 
examples of this is Uganda where the majority of the people is not Muslim. Lebanon is a 
member state even though the President, according to the constitution, has to be a Christian. This 
shows some of the problems of the organization. The third Islamic Summit Conference was held 
in Kabahin Makka in Mecca where no non-Muslim is allowed to enter, so the Lebanese 
President had to leave the Summit (al Ahsan 1988:45-47). 
 
5.5.2 Other International Muslim Organizations 
Rabitah al-Alam al-Islam, The Muslim World League (MWL) started its work in 1962 and has 
its headquarters in Mecca. The organization is very influential in the Arab world and the General 
Secretary holds the status of a Saudi Arabian Minister. The Muslim World League is 
preoccupied with several tasks, among them politics, culture, education and development aid. 
But most important to the organization is dawah, or spreading the message of Islam. The MWL 
also contributes to the building of mosques, radio and television broadcasting, translation of the 
Koran and other Islamc literature. According to the former General Secretary Hamid al-Radadi 
the organization employs around 1000 delegates, who are spread all over the world to work 
among Muslims and try to convert non-Muslims (Bakke 1994:88-89). The sessions held by The 
Muslim World League evaluate the situation in the Muslim world and discuss which causes the 
organization shall focus on in the years to come. The 32nd session was held in Saudi Arabia in 
1993 and the problems facing ”The Islamic Nation” was the agenda of the day. King Faisal (of 
Saudi Arabia) spoke of unity among the Muslim nations as the only possible solution to solve the 
problems in the Muslim world, and to secure a place in “the new world order.” This also 
included unity against “The Common Enemy.” Inspite of the tragedies in the Muslim world, 
King Faisal saw the end of communism as a sign that atheism was on the retreat, and he said that  
“a new era has emerged in today’s work, an era which Muslims have been waiting.”  The 
chairman of the council also called upon the Muslim countries to implement the sharia and help 
Muslim brothers wherever they may be (Al-Islam March 1993:28). 
  
 The government of Libya with its devoted Muslim leader Colonel Gadaffi has also increased its 
influence in religious matters in the Muslim world during the last decades. This is partly a result 
of the founding of  the organization Islamic Call Society, which was founded in 1972 and is a 
government-led organization aiming to: 
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- Send out Muslim missionaries and establish scolarships for foreign students who want to study     
in Libya. 
- Support the building and the running of Muslim centres in different parts of the world and          
finance the building of field hospitals. 
- Educate and inspire Muslim workers through conferences and production of literature. 
 
In the period from 1982-1986 the organization employed 587 missionaries, and 28 of them were 
sent to Kenya and 6 to Tanzania. In the same period of time 518 scholarships were given to 
foreign students for studies in Libya and Kenya received 8 of these scholarships (Bakke 
1994:90). 
 
A more recently established international Muslim organization is the Islam in Africa 
Organization, IAO. This organization was founded during the Islam in Africa Conference in 
Nigeria 1989. This conference was attended by most African countries and was visited by the 
Secretary-General of  Islamic Council in London and the Secretary-General of the OIC (both 
these organizations sponsored the conference). The communique released after the conference 
calls the Muslims in Africa to unite in the universal ummah of Muslim believers, even if they 
have been separated by colonial borders. The conference urges Muslims in Africa to establish 
“strong economic ties” to other parts of the Muslim world, in order to evolve an economic 
system based on Islamic principles. Another task mentioned in the communique is that the 
conference encourages Muslims all over Africa who have been deprived of their rights to be 
governed by the sharia to intensify their efforts to reinstate the Islamic juridical system. The 
communique ends by stating that a permanent body known as the Islam in Africa Organization 
will be formed to fulfil the objectives described in this communique (Alkali 1993:433-434). 
 The resolution to establish IAO opens with the Koranic verse: “Verily, this your (Islamic) 
Ummah is one...“ and continues by  focusing on the unity, both spiritually and materially, of the 
Muslims in Africa and of the Muslims all over the world. The resolution states the organization’s 
objectives are cooperation with other national and international Islamic organizations, promotion 
of dawah throughout Africa, translation and distribution of Islamic literature and otherwise 
fulfilment of the communique stated above. The permanent headquarters of the IAO was decided 
to be in Nigeria, and a steering committee was established with representatives from nine 
different African countries, among them Tanzania (Alkali 1993:435-436). 
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Another Muslim organization working to promote the message of the Prophet in Africa is the 
Shia organization Islamic League. This organization also sees religious education as crucial if the 
ummah of believers is to expand. Islamic League also promotes cooperation with the Sunni 
societies in order to gain more influence, as they are deeply concerned about the progress being 
made by Christian missionaries in Africa. A report from the committee named “Dawah in 
Africa”, suggests that criticism of the West is the common ground upon which Sunnis and 
Shiites can start their cooperation (The Light October 1988:32-28). Islamic league is closely 
connected with the Bilal Muslim Mission in Tanzania. 
 
5.6 International Muslim Influence in Tanzania 
5.6.1 Influence from International Islamic Organizations in Tanzania 
The intention behind OIC was to create a Muslim organization that could be a political 
organization uniting the Muslims and promoting Islam by helping its members (and also Muslim 
non-member countries) economically through education and development aid. OIC has 
established a reputation as a helping hand to poor countries through their development bank, and 
it was this reputation  President Mwinyi referred to when he argued that the OIC-issue was not a 
religious issue, nor a political issue, but merely an economic one for Zanzibar64. The problem for 
the President was to explain how Zanzibar, as a part of Tanzania, could have permanent 
membership in a political organization (being a Muslim organization that also includes religion) 
which only have other national states as members. The religious foundation upon which OIC 
rests has been presented above, and this religious foundation was the major concern of the 
Christian leaders in Tanzania who saw OIC as a symbol of international Islamic unity. The OIC-
crisis in Tanzania revealed how deep-rooted the conflict of interests is between the two religious 
communities. It also showed that some  Muslims are ready to take a step closer to the 
international Muslim community with which they have had very little contact during the ujamaa 
period. Kjersti Larsen claims that to join OIC was a natural thing for most Zanzibarians to do 
because they feel close to the Muslim communities further East. She also claims that Zanzibar is 
in desperate need of economic aid and, has previously received aid from for example Oman 
which has sponsored scholarships, teachers and hospitals on the island (Larsen 1995). Economic 
                                                 
64
The Muslim periodical International Impact refers in its February/March edition 1993 to a list of seven 
arguments used by Mwinyi to argue in favour of Zanzibar joining the OIC. These arguments contain information 
that some of the OIC member countries have Christian Presidents, that Tanzania has received aid from religious 
organizations before etc (p.11). 
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coalitions always imply influence from the economically strong partner. A stronger influence 
from the leading countries of OIC was what the Tanzanian Christians feared would be the result 
if Zanzibar joined the OIC. Tanzanian Muslims in 1989 received 50 scholarships for students 
who wanted to study in other Arab countries, showing some of the influence that OIC represents 
even without Tanzania being a member country.  
  
But the Islamic influence from international organizations in Tanzania exceeds that of OIC. The 
Muslim World League has recently opened an office in Dar es Salaam. This has according to 
Sigvard von Sicard influenced the more radical elements in Tanzania to pursue Islamic ideas like 
that of Tanzania becoming an Islamic state (Sicard 1991:7). It has also led to an increased focus 
on the implementation of the sharia among certain Muslim groups (Sicard 1991:8). MWL like 
OIC in their charters and meetings emphasize unity and cooperation among Muslims as the only 
solution to stand against the dominant West and the Christian impact. The embassy of Libya has 
also increased its activities in Tanzania considerably the last decade, and teachers have been 
brought in to teach in the newly established Islamic schools (Sicard 1991:8). The Islamic Call 
Society from Libya has missionaries present in the area and offers scholarships for religious 
studies in North Africa.  
 Islamic League, the international Shia organization, is also active among the Indian and 
Arab communities on the coast of East Africa. These groups which are largely influenced by the 
ideas of the revolution in Iran have for a long time been marginalized in Tanzania. But the views 
held by these groups  have lately begun to spread again. As seen in chapter three (3.2) Muslims 
in Tanzania search their future in the history of the Muslim community in East Africa. In the 
time before TANU,  the Arab pan-Islamic oriented Muslims of the coast were the most 
influential Muslims and they had the economic means to establish schools and religious 
education65. The Islamic League has also sponsored scolarships for students from East Africa to 
Iran and Iraq (Sicard 1991:10).   
  
Another Islamic organization that caused concern to the Tanzanian government during the OIC-
crisis was the Islam in Africa Organization. A fake communique claiming that the aims of the 
organization were to eradicate all non-Muslim religions in Africa and ensure that only Muslim 
leaders were elected to political posts, caused great concern among the Christians in Tanzania.  
                                                 
65
This is still evident on the coast of Kenya where the Aga Khan society has the best educational services in the 
area. 
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The communique also claimed that Tanzania was represented in the steering committee of the 
organization. All this was denied by the government and explained as a falsification. When the 
official communique was published in 1993, it did not mention anything about the eradication of 
all non-Muslim religions, but it stated that “...a Steering Committee, with membership drawn 
from the following countries...has been set up:“ (Alkali 1993:436), and the following list 
included the name of Tanzania. A report from the Interfaith Unit, a branch of the Christian 
council of Tanzania, claims that after the IAO declaration in 1989 the Tabora region experienced 
an increased activity by militant Muslims. The report claims that these Muslims were either 
immigrants or foreigners, and only the reaction by moderate Muslims living in the region  
avoided a direct confrontation between these new Muslims and the Christians in the area 
(Sendegeya 1995:4).  The report from CCT claims that this new influence was a direct result of 
the conference in Nigeria66.  
 
5.6.2 Influence From Other Muslim Countries in Tanzania 
It is obvious that different Muslim countries have played a part in the changes that have taken 
place in the Muslim community in Tanzania during the last decade. In the same way that the 
Christian congregations in Tanzania are supported by missionary agencies from the West in 
terms of economy and theological ideals, the Muslims in Tanzania are influenced by Muslim 
countries from North Africa and the Middle East. The question is, however, whether this foreign 
Islamic influence is one of the reasons behind the change in the Christian - Muslim relationship. 
Have foreign Muslim countries spread Islamist ideas that are threatening a peaceful co-existence 
with Christians in Tanzania? 
 One sign of the increased economic help that Muslims have received from foreign 
countries is the explosive increase in the building of mosques in East Africa. All these buildings 
cannot have been put up by the national Muslim organizations, which hardly have money to 
fulfil simple aims such as publishing periodicals. The fact that some of the most beautiful (and 
expensive) mosques have been put up where no people live, but often close to a public place67 
also indicates that the mosques have not been put up by the local people who would probably  
                                                 
66
The report from CCT carries in its appendix the communique that supposedly was released after the 
conference in Abuja, Nigeria 1989. This communique contains several points that are absent in the offical 
communique published in 1993.  
67
Like one beautiful mosque on the road between Nairobi and Mombasa, situated where there live no people, but 
close to a gas-station with a restaurant. This is also where all the tourists stop on their way from Mombasa to 
their safaris or to Nairobi. 
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prefer a mosque close to where they live. This indicates that some of the mosques are built for 
the purpose of giving prestige both to Islam and to those who have financed the mosque. Even if 
some Christians have complained about the loud noise from the mosque loudspeakers, I would 
hardly characterize this form of economic aid as very harmful to the Christian-Muslim 
relationship.  
 What has caused tension in the religious relationship is however the adoption of radical 
Muslim ideas among some Muslim groups. It seems as if each of these different groups are often 
supported by specific radical factions from abroad. Sheikh Rizvi, the leading intellectual of the 
Shia community in Tanzania openly defends the revolution in Iran and looks upon it as an ideal 
for suppressed Muslims throughout the world. Rizvi always holds a very general style of writing 
in his articles. He does not comment upon Tanzania or East Africa as examples nor does he 
suggest what must be done there in order to fulfil the revolution. But if his writings are to be 
taken seriously, a Muslim state with the clergy as political leaders and the full implementation of 
sharia appears to be his ideal of Tanzania. With the latest news about the situation of the church 
in Iran in mind, it is natural that these thoughts frighten the Christians in Tanzania and create 
antagonism. The Muslims claim that they constitute the majority in Tanzania, and if this claim 
leads them to pursue an Islamic state after the pattern of Rizvi’s thoughts, the Christians 
automatically feel their position threatened. BALUKTA, which has caused the most serious 
religious upheavals in Tanzania so far, has by several sources been accused of being funded from 
Iran68. The Iranian influence must therefore be mentioned as one of the reasons behind the 
worsening of the Christian-Muslim relationship in the country. 
 The Light reported in 1989 from President Mwinyi’s three days visit to Iran and claimed 
that Tanzania and Iran expressed satisfaction over the trend of expanding relations between the 
two countries. The two countries looked, according to The Light, forward to bilateral, economic, 
scientific and technical cooperation, and hoped to develop their relationship through the holding 
of regular sessions (The Light no. 3, 1989:14). 
  
Saudi Arabia, as a leading Muslim nation, is another country that influence Muslim communities 
throughout the world. It was mentioned by Westerlund that the changes taking place in 
BAKWATA around 1980 were probably due to Saudi Arabian influence in the organization. It 
sounds reasonable that the conservative Muslim government in Saudi Arabia supports the more  
                                                 
68
Even New Africa Yearbook 1995-1996 in its section on Tanzania refers the rumours that BALUKTA was 
financed by the Iranian government (Rake 1995:431). 
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moderate Muslim groups in Tanzania. An increased focus on Islamic ideas has followed such an 
influence, and this has caused a change of focus among some of the moderate Muslim groups. In 
BAKWATA this has led to demands of the reestablishment of the separate Muslim courts. 
Scholarships have been granted to several scholars from East Africa for religious studies in Saudi 
Arabia. The increased number of new ulamas that have emerged from these studies has 
radicalized certain elements of the Muslim society. This is shown in the new vitality among 
Muslim organizations during the last decade (see 3.1). Saudi Arabia is also known to be very 
active within the Muslim World League, which has had influence on some Muslim groups in Dar 
es Salaam. Also the OIC is largely dependent on the economic contributions from Saudi Arabia 
(Islamic Watch Feb./March 1993:3-7). 
 
The foreign influence is however not restricted to the exchange of ideas across the Indian Ocean. 
Several countries in North Africa have played an important part in the recent developments in 
the Muslim world. The ideas behind the modern Islamic revival are to a large extent the product 
of Egyptian intellectual Muslims. Intellectuals in East Africa have for  a long time been in 
contact with ideas coming from Egypt (see 3.2.1). There has however traditionally been contact 
between the more moderate Muslims groups. But the general Islamic revival has also made the 
moderate groups more interested in pure Islamic ideas, which the development within 
BAKWATA clearly exemplifies. The majority of the Muslims in Tanzania feel that they have 
lagged behind the Christians in most areas in modern society and they view this new Islamic 
vitality as an opportunity to restore the influence they feel that they have lost. In an attempt to 
explain the revivalist tendencies in Tanzania, Peter Smith puts it this way: 
 
 In the Islamic World there has been a renewed vitality which has shown itself in the 
strong affirmation of an Islamic identity and in an opposition to other ideologies. 
The heroes and role models were found in people like Colonel Gadaffi, the militancy 
of the P.L.O. and later in Ayatollah Khomeini. The writings of Abu A’la Mawdudi 
and his diciple Sayyid Qutb have also been influential. For them the Islamic model is 
no longer seen as an alternative model of society but as an imperative. (Smith 
1991:8) 
 
   Another North African country, Sudan, has lately established itself as an Islamic nation, 
with the government placed in the Muslim north. Sudan has had several controversies with 
Kenya the past few years, accusing Nairobi of supporting the Christian “rebels” in the south of 
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Sudan. Sudan has been accused by Kenya of supporting the radical Muslim elements (like IPK) 
in Mombasa (BBC W.S. 11/4 1995). Teachers from Sudan have also been present in Tanzania, 
and the fact that three such teachers were expelled from the country after the Good-Friday 
upheavals in Dar es Salaam 1993 (see 2.2.2) indicates that they were heavily involved with the 
militant elements in BALUKTA. The influence from Libya has traditionally been viewed as a 
radical one, often mentioned in the same breath as the influence from Iran (Islamic Watch 
Feb./March 1993:6). 
 
5.6.3 Pan-Islamic Influence among Tanzanian Muslims? 
As shown above, I view the international Islamic influence as an important reason behind the 
change in the Christian-Muslim relationship in Tanzania. What is left is the question whether we 
can talk about a massive pan-Islamic influence as a united effort from the Muslim countries. If 
this is the case then the situation for the Christians in Tanzania could be very alarming. A 
massive pressure, ideologically and economically, from a united Muslim world could easily lead 
to a clear Muslim dominance in the region. If one considers the intention of the Islamic 
organizations, and the united voice behind the criticism of the West (which indirectly is often a 
criticism of the Christians) one might think that this is the case. The intention behind OIC was to 
create a Muslim political body that could pursue Islamic interests and unite the Muslim 
countries. The idea was also to have a body that could solve internal problems among Muslim 
states. Has the organization succeded? 
 The Muslim periodical Impact International in its January issue used three pages reporting 
from the seventh Islamic Summit in Marocco. The reporter, M. H. Faruqi, is merciless in his 
verdict on the present state of OIC. He asserts that the 13.500 word communique which the 
summit delivered hardly contained any important resolutions at all, and was barely referred to 
even in the media in Muslim countries. Impact International claims that the sessions chiefly 
contained internal quarrels where few discussions dealt with the issues and problems that the 
Muslim world really is facing. The most clear example of OIC’s reduced ability to reach unity 
was the Palestine issue. This issue, earlier so important to the organization, was reduced at the 
meeting in Marocco from “liberating the city of Al-Quds” to simply “the question of Palestine.”  
The Muslim periodical claims that the once leading nations in OIC were passive: 
 
 The prince of the previous conferences, Prince Saud al-Faisal, looked lost and 
unsure. The country which had, under his father late King Faisal Shaheed, played a 
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brave role in helping to bring together the assortments of Muslim regimes under one 
Islamic umbrella, has gradually resigned its Islamic role...The Iranians looked 
isolated and somewhat demoralized. They seemed more interested in their national 
rather than broad Islamic interest. (Impact International January 1995:18) 
 
Another issue that shows the divisions in the Muslim world is the fear among national leaders of  
the militant Islamists. The Impact reporter somewhat ironically stated that “the Islamic kings and 
presidents in Casablanca seemed more worried about “the Islamic threat to civilisation” than 
even Henry Kissinger or Chaim Herzog.” (Impact International Jan. 1995:19) This issue was not 
even on the agenda of the summit, but King Hasan of  Marocco introduced it in his opening 
speech and was later joined by Mubarak of Egypt, Sifi from Algeria, Syria’s Vice-President and 
King Husein from Jordan.  The Impact journalist suggested that those who were most concerned 
about the Islamic threat were those who were already at war with such elements in their own 
country, and probably wanted to conceal their misdeeds and corruption. 
 The deep-rooted problems in the Muslim world were best expressed when the question of 
the location of the next summit was discussed. The summit is scheduled to take place in Iran, but 
as the Impact journalist reported: 
 
   But such is the petty state of inter-OIC relations that a summit conference in Iran is 
seen by some other member-states as something quite important to be fought against. 
The majority of the Arab states are, on the other hand, united only in their 
subservience to Western powers, but divided bitterly amongst themselves: Kuwait 
and Iraq, Iraq and Iran, Iran and the UAE, Yemen and Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia 
and Qatar, Qatar and Bahrain, PLO and Jordan, Jordan and Syria, Egypt and 
Sudan, Libya and Algeria, Algeria and Marocco, Marocco and Mauretania et 
cetera. The differences are small, but their egos are over-large. (International Impact 
Jan. 1995:18) 
 
 
The Toronto based pro-Iranian Muslim newspaper, Crescent, is even more harsh in its criticism 
of the present OIC. The newspaper claims that OIC summits have been used as a cover for the 
“...Muslim rulers collective display of impotence and surrender.“ (Crescent no. 18, 1994 ). It 
even goes as far as claiming that the Saudi-financed OIC finally has revealed its real purpose: to 
fight Islam. Crescent’s main criticism of the leading Muslim states is due to their suppression of 
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the Islamic movements in their own countries. The claims from the newspaper are that the 
regimes in Egypt, Algeria and Saudi Arabia are in the pockets of their masters in Washington 
and Tel Aviv. Things can get as sarcastic as this when different Muslim factions comment 
oneanother: 
 
 If the Arab regimes had their way they would offer OIC membership to Israel as 
well, no doubt arguing that Jews are, after all, “religious cousins” of the Muslims. 
(Crescent no. 18, 1994) 
 
This harsh criticism of the leaders of the leading Arab nations is shared by Sheikh Rizvi and The 
Light, representing the Bilal Muslim Mission in Tanzania. Rizvi claims that no other nation than 
Iran has chosen an independent path, which it did on breaking relations with Israel and the West. 
Saudi Arabia has, according to Rizvi, lost all credibility in the Muslims’ eyes because of its 
cooperation with the USA. As mentioned in chapter three, Rizvi claims that neither of the 
leading Muslim nations are really interested in uniting the Muslims. From Sheikh Rizvi’s 
writings it is clear that the hostility between Iran and Saudi Arabia is the major conflict in the 
Muslim world. This conflict again creates coalitions where for instance Sudan has been helped 
by Iran, and following that, help from Saudi Arabia to Sudan has been stopped (The Light Feb. 
1992:60). Saudi Arabia seems to have friendly relations with Egypt, Algeria and Jordan at 
government level, but all these countries fight Islamist movements in their own countries. Iraq 
seems to have appeared as an outsider among  the Muslim states with a leader that seeks respect 
in the rest of the Muslim countries by opposing the West. This makes the picture of the Muslim 
world one full of intrigues, not so very much unlike the picture of the Cold War that, until 
recently, was fought between the West and Eastern Europe.    
  
The conclusion of this short investigation into the ongoing discussion among the Muslim 
factions is that OIC and other organizations promoting the unity of the Muslim states have so far 
failed. The deep conflicts between the different Arab nations and the different Muslim groups 
have obstructed the Muslims in their efforts to promote the universal ummah which is pictured in 
the Koran. The Islamic revival has led to a new vitality among Muslims and it has increased the 
belief in Islam as a political force, but it has so far not been able to promote peace and unity 
among the Muslims themselves, rather the contrary. 
 This does not, however, mean that the influence from other Muslim countries will cease to 
exist in countries like Tanzania and Kenya. But it shows that there is no united Islamic influence 
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that reaches these countries. Thoughts from the global Islamic revival about Islam as a universal 
belief, and about Islam as a political factor have reached Tanzania and affected the Muslim 
communities. But the cooperation between the groups in Tanzania and the foreign countries have 
created domestic problems in Tanzania. BALUKTA was supported by Iran, but faced massive 
resistance from BAKWATA which has contacts with more moderate Muslim countries. Every 
Muslim nation is trying to put forward its own interests, promoting its own view upon Islam. The 
different countries will try to secure their own interests and are of course interested in 
connections with the political leaders in Tanzania. This is where Omari’s criticism of lack of 
ethical guidelines in the government becomes important. This is also what the Christians in 
Tanzania fear, that their politicians, as representatives of Tanzania, will promote Muslim 
interests, a danger which is present with Islam’s lack of separation between religion and politics. 
The OIC-crisis revolved around exactly this crucial issue: who shall influence our political 
leaders? 
 
5.7 Summary 
Through a presentation of the general background and the leading intellectuals of the global 
Muslim resurgence, I have tried to show that the ideas behind the revival were a focus on a more 
pure Islam as seen in the examples of the first Muslims. It also contained an increased focus on 
pan-Islamic thoughts. This worldwide Muslim revival has resulted in the formation of several 
international organizations. Among them is OIC, a body which has the intention of representing 
the whole Muslim world. OIC has a clear religious foundation and this was the Tanzanian 
Christians’ primary concern when Zanzibar joined the OIC. I have further shown that the 
international Muslim organizations together with the leading Muslim countries have carried out 
considerable influence on large parts of the Muslim community in Tanzania. The radical Muslim 
influence of countries like Iran and Sudan have affected small radical groups like BALUKTA, 
which in turn has disturbed the previously peaceful religious relationship. My theory is however 
that the strong focus on pan-Islamic thoughts that the international Muslim organizations 
represent, is facing serious obstructions because of the conflicts existing between the leading 
countries in the Muslim world. This has also affected Tanzania. Even if the Muslims in Tanzania 
have become more aware of the universal ummah they as Muslims belong to, the influence from 
foreign Islamic countries reflects the existing conflicts and obstructs a united pan-Islamic 
influence. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
Summary 
In the introduction I launched four questions in order to explain the changes that have taken 
place in the Christian-Muslim relationship in Tanzania the last decade. The first question sought 
a presentation of the events that have disturbed the peaceful religious coexistence. The second 
question asked for a presentation of the changes within the Muslim and the Christian 
communities. The third question was directed at the domestic political changes in Tanzania and 
the fourth question was concerned with the foreign Muslim influence on Tanzania. 
 
Chapter two answered the first question by giving a presentation of the increased religious 
tension that Tanzania has experienced. The recent Muslim activity, which started with 
preachings in the streets, carrying derogatory statements about the Christians, introduced the 
visible part of the religious conflict. Even if the political leaders already at this stage warned 
Tanzanians about the consequenses of religious conflicts, it was too late to stop the development. 
Radical Christian groups responded with an eye for an eye, attacking the Muslims with false 
accusations, and this fostered even more antagonism. Christian leaders were concerned to see 
how several Muslim ministers were adopted to high posts, but chose to keep a low profile. The 
tension erupted on Zanzibar where the mixture of increased religious freedom and the struggle 
for political independence led to riots. Also the mainland faced upheavals when BALUKTA 
attacked the pork butcheries in Dar es Salaam and put the whole country on security alert. 
 The political implications of the increased Muslim focus on their religious identity became 
evident through the OIC-crisis and the discussion concerning Tanzania’s membership to IAO. 
The development within BAKWATA with an increased focus on genuine Islamic ideas indicates 
that Tanzanian Muslims recently have become more aware of their belonging to a universal 
system of belief. The destruction of church properties also shows that radical Muslim elements, 
with the aims to establish Islam as the leading religious and political authority, have gained a 
foothold in Tanzania. The same tendencies as observed among the Muslims in Tanzania are also 
present among the Muslims in Kenya. There, IPK played the role that BALUKTA had in 
Tanzania, causing upheavals in Mombasa and being denied registration from the government. 
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The second question aimed at explaining the changes that have taken place within both the 
Muslim and the Christian communities. Among the Muslims several new organizations have 
appeared in addition to BAKWATA, which is the official Muslim organization in Tanzania. 
Most of these new organizations have been started by radical groups which have criticized 
BAKWATA for being more Tanzanian than Muslim. This criticism indicates that their aim is to  
focus on the more universal values represented by Islam. The organizations also express 
discontent with the present situation in Tanzania where they claim that the Christians hold the 
leading positions in the country and have a much easier access to higher education. This new 
activity seeks to restore the strength of the Muslim society by focusing on both secular and 
religious education. They claim that through a more devoted focus on Islam, the Muslim 
community will restore its pride and again play a leading part in the development of the country. 
These Muslim spokesmen look back in history for ideals from the independence movement 
(where they claim that Muslims were leading) and from theological ideas imported from other 
Muslim countries. The Muslim intellectual tradition in the area, represented by Sheik al-Mazrui 
and Sheikh Rizvi, showed that influence from the leading Muslim theologians in Egypt and Iran 
has been, and is, present among Tanzanian Muslims. The parallels on the coast of Kenya again 
shows that these trends of focusing on more pure Islamic values have not been restricted to take 
place only in Tanzania, but is present among Muslim groups throughout East Africa. 
 The Christian community has also experienced some changes the last decade. The 
Pentecostal movement has experienced a considerable growth, and thoughts from the movement 
have also influenced the established churches. This has led to an increased focus on evangelism, 
visible through the ongoing crusades where a considerable weight is put on charismatic gifts. 
This is an example of how the Christians have focused more on pure Christian values. The 
increased Christian activity has in its turn affected the relationship with the Muslims. But to call 
the majority of the Pentecostal movement and the charismatic elements in the established 
churches “Christian fundamentalists” is in my opinion an exaggeration. The Fundamentalist 
label can however be applied to the radical elements belonging to the Democratic Party with 
Rev. Mtkila as its leader. Through his derogatory and racist statements about the Muslim and the 
Arab and Indian population in Tanzania, he is threatening a peaceful religious relationship. 
 
Regarding the third question, which domestic political changes have affected the religious 
situation, several aspects were introduced. Omari introduced the suggestion that it is the political 
leaders, through their lack of ethical considerations, who have been the cause of the emerging 
problems in Tanzania. He claimed that political leaders were chosen because of their religion and 
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not because of their political skills. As a result the Christians blame Islam, the religion of the 
politicians, for what has happened. Omari argued that the right thing to do would have been to 
blame the politicians for their acts and not their religion. This is a point which most 
commentators find interesting. The present leadership in Tanzania has turned out to be weak, 
both in acting against religious extremists and in choosing an independent political path - which 
is the tradition of the country. The simplicity of Omari’s conclusion was however questioned, 
arguing that he did not consider religion as a force in itself with the ability to influence people 
regardless of political leadership. It was also asserted that Omari to some extent frees the 
religious communities from the responsibilities of actions done in the name of religion by his 
argumentation.  
 David Westerlund’s theory about compartmentalized religion showed us the ujamaa 
government’s ability to make the two religious communities focus on national unity. The task to 
build the nation became, according to Westerlund, more important than to pursue specific 
religious interests. This created a focus on elements in the religions that corresponded with the 
ujamaa philosophy, and hence religious conflicts were avoided. Frieder Ludwig claims that this 
shows that the religious conflicts were not done away with during the ujamaa years, but merely 
allayed. The fall of the philosophy of ujamaa reintroduced according to Ludwig the tension that 
had existed prior to, and partly throughout, the ujamaa years. I partly agreed with Ludwig in this, 
relating his thoughts to the new Muslim intellectuals’ rediscovery of their Muslim roots, found 
among the universal ideas of EAMWS. But the new radical strength in the Muslim revival and 
the presence of foreign Islamic theologians and international organizations in Tanzania, was 
reckoned as elements that made Ludwig’s theory need supplements. The claim that the religious 
conflicts also existed during  Nyerere’s reign was questioned because the overwhelming majority 
of Muslims and Christians actually supported the politics of the government.   
  Kjersti Larsen focused on the effect that the political changes have had on people’s 
attitude towards religion. The new political climate has made it possible for people to freely 
express their religion in public. A result of this has been an increased influence of religion in 
political matters. The Muslims are again allowed to interpret their view of the world according to 
an Islamic worldview. This has also made the more radical Muslim groups view Islam as the 
political solution  to social problems. A change of paradigm has according to Larsen appeared. 
Earlier these conflicts were explained in terms of political ideologies like Marxism, but now they 
are explained in terms of religion. Kjersti Larsen claims that social problems are the reason 
behind the Islamist tendencies in the area, and hence a domestic problem. This argument was 
questioned by asserting that the solution to the problem in its present form, a radical Islam, is 
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imported from other Muslim countries. Central to Kjersti Larsen is also that religion now is more 
important in people’s  perception of their own identity. This makes conflicts expressed in a 
religious language very dangerous. Politicians explaning conflicts in a religious language is by 
Kjersti Larsen seen as the biggest threat to Tanzania’s stability. She connected what has 
happened in Tanzania with what has happened in the rest of the world, but she was reluctant to 
admit that this was due to direct influence of Islamic ideas from other Muslim countries. My 
claim was that the increased focus on an orthodox Islam through literature sponsored by foreign 
Islamic countries, shows the direct influence from other Muslim countries. 
 
The fourth and last question dealt with foreign Muslim influence on the religious situation in 
Tanzania. First a presentation of the global Islamic revival was given. This was done in order to 
understand the nature and the roots of the Islamic resurgence. Secondly a presentation of the 
leading intellectuals of the resurgence followed. The presentation of the international Muslim 
organizations active in Tanzania was introduced by a presentation of the nature of the 
Organization of Islamic Conference. This was done in order to show the religious foundation of 
the organization. I argued that this explained why the Christians in Tanzania were so upset by 
Zanzibar joining OIC. It was further shown that several Muslim international organizations have 
established ties to Muslim groups in Tanzania. The leading Islamic countries like Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt, Libya and Sudan have also intensified their contact with religious groups in 
Tanzania the last decade. These contacts indicate the connection between the ideas of the leading 
intellectuals of the Islamic resurgence like al-Afghani, Qutb and Khomeini and the radical 
Muslim elements in Tanzania. It was also shown that these countries make economic 
contributions to the Muslim groups in Tanzania by sponsoring schools, mosques, scolarships and 
teachers. Iran has even been accused from several sources of sponsoring BALUKTA with 
weapons. 
 The last chapter also revealed that the intention behind the Muslim international 
organizations, to focus on a strong pan-Islamic unity, has not been an undivided success. 
Thoughts about Islam as an universal belief which connects the Muslims in Tanzania to the rest 
of the Muslim world, has gained a foothold. But large differences between the countries 
influencing the Muslims in Tanzania have had  the result that each country only influence certain 
groups, and this way the conflicts between the countries are spread to the different Muslim 
groups in Tanzania. It seems like each country is trying to pursue their view of Islam and secure 
their political contacts with Tanzania. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
 It remains to be seen whether the recent religious and political revival in many parts 
of the Muslim world can attract the Muslims in Tanzania to integrate themselves 
more deeply with the universal umma, the brotherhood of all Muslim believers. If the 
Islamic idea of a socio-political universalism based on religion becomes stronger, it 
can lead to important religious and political changes in Africa. (Westerlund 
1980:46) 
 
These reflections were made by David Westerlund in 1980 in his eminent work about the 
religious situation in Tanzania during the ujamaa years. I will conclude by saying that his 
prophecy to some extent has come true. The religious relations in Tanzania have suffered from 
changes both in the Christian and in the Muslim community. These changes have led to serious 
conflicts and my impression is that the radicalization in certain parts of the Muslim community is 
the most important reason for this. The political changes that have occured in Tanzania the last 
decade with its affect on people’s re-evaluation of their religious identity, have prepared the 
ground for international Islamic influence to gain a foothold. It is in other words the interaction 
between domestic and international events that has created the new situation. The weak 
leadership in Tanzania has been unable to prevent violent actions from taking place. But 
probably no leadership could have stopped the interest among Tanzanian Muslims for the new 
focus on Islam as a political force. The thoughts about the universal ummah have also affected 
the moderate  Muslims. As a part of what is happening in the rest of the world, Tanzanian 
Muslims are looking for ways to restore their lost pride and dignity, and the solution for many of 
them is to return to a more pure form of Islam. The fact that the Muslim community in Kenya 
experiences the same development of focusing on ideas from the worldwide Islamic revival, is 
an indication that these ideas are present due to influence from other Islamic countries. This 
influence is, however, not a united pan-Islamic influence, but reflects the conflicts in the Muslim 
world. The fall of the ujamaa philosophy carried with it a search for new values as the task “to 
build the nation” no longer was dominant. The free market ideology led to a shift of focus from 
the society as a whole towards the individual values of smaller groups. This appeared at a time 
when religious revival swept the world, a revival which especially affected the Muslims. The 
result was an increased focus on the ideas only shared by the Muslim community. The evaluation 
of their situation as a religious community led to a focus on the lost opportunities they had 
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suffered from in their own country. Supported by the universal rise of Muslim voices, the 
Muslims in Tanzania now seek to improve their situation, and one of the obstacles to reach their 
aims is of course the demands from the Christian community. 
  
In the Christian community the change has been noted by an increased interest in spiritual 
matters. A more devoted Christianity focusing on charismatic gifts has experienced progress 
through the Pentecostal movement. This has also affected the established churches - especially 
the Lutheran church. Spreading the Gospel, also to the Muslims, has become an important 
element in the new Christian vitality. This evangelization has not taken place without reactions, 
as radical Christians have provoked Muslims by showing lack of respect for Islam. The question 
of how to share the Good News with other people has always been, and will always be a matter 
of discussion within the churches.  Peaceful religious coexistence is an ideal to the church in 
Tanzania. But it is a question whether peace is more important than sharing the Gospel. Both 
peace and mission should be possible to promote for the Christians in Tanzania. Still, this 
question contains elements of tension. What if all mission towards the Muslims is experienced as 
a provocation? This is a relevant tension, and in the middle of this, the church will always have 
its work. 
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